Good day guy please i need the help of all the tech guru on this forum

Its been over a month now, whenever I turn my data on to browse, and after I turned it off for few minutes, different international line will just be dialing themselves on my phone without me knowing and in the process zapping all my airtime.

And the line will not register on dial numbers, you won't even know anything of such happened if you didn't see it when its dialing. Its only when I try to make call that I will realized my airtime is gone

I try Google for assistance but its not helping, the only help I got was some international line that will flash you, making you you to think someone you know abroad wants you to call so they could wipe your airtime.

Sometimes they flash but I don't have problem with that because I don't call them back.

Google did not talk about the international line dialing itself.

I think I am the first person this is happening to.

Anyone with this kind of experience ??

Please guys help me it is frustrating me.

I format the phone yet it kept happening.

Please anyone with idea of what I can do should please help me.

Thanks guys

Front page please @lalasticlala

Do factory reset or flash. Some gionee phone do crazy things like that

Insert another soon card into your phone to confirm the problem is not with your sim.

AGROMERCHAENT:
Do factory reset or flash. Some gionee phone do crazy things like that

I have try that

My mum gets this strange missed calls too some times... But it doesn't deduct her airtime tho. The numbers are usually from Benin, Cape Verde or Central African Republic....

oti bo sowo aiye

Visit your service provider

xtervaganza:
oti bo sowo aiye

Na d same aye go keep you

Oloriburuku somebody

2special:
Visit your service provider

I'm thinking if dat too

It is just d time cos u will sit outside dia office taya b4 u enter

Thanks

omoiyalayi:


I'm thinking if dat too

It is just d time cos u will sit outside dia office taya b4 u enter

Thanks

I think they're the ones that can really solve the problem

What device do you use?
What service provider do you use?
......let's start from there.

Emmynation:
What device do you use?
What service provider do you use?
......let's start from there.

Its a tecno A88 with android 7 os

ouvredeparis:
My mum gets this strange missed calls too some times... But it doesn't deduct her airtime tho. The numbers are usually from Benin, Cape Verde or Central African Republic....

The ones that called do not deduct airtime its only when u call them back that your airtime is gone

I get d call too but I don't bother to call them

But in this my case the number dial itself from my phone, even when the phone is on sleep mood it won't wake up until my airtime is finished. I still don't get how that is possible

I'm also faced with this same problem, but more intense. This person hacked my Whatsapp account and starting sending people (total strangers) messages on how he can help them with a job by clicking a link, in return, I'll receive threats and insults. I can't remember how many times I gave out apologies for offences I did not commit.

I decided to change numbers on Whatsapp but this fellow was always online with my old line. Sent countless messages to both Whatsapp and my service provider, no result. I had the line blocked, changed phone, yet this same number that the OP shared keeps flashing like every 2/3 days, even after putting several of these same foreign numbers on auto reject list.

Now, my new line dials unknown numbers each time I insert the sim in my old phone (I don't get to see it in the call log) & when I call my SP, they'll tell me, I dialed a foreign number that exhausted all of my airtime. I am tired to say the least.

uzomanny:
I'm also faced with this same problem, but more intense. This person hacked my Whatsapp account and starting sending people (total strangers) messages on how he can help them with a job by clicking a link, in return, I'll receive threats and insults. I can't remember how many times I gave out apologies for offences I did not commit.

I decided to change numbers on Whatsapp but this fellow was always online with my old line. Sent countless messages to both Whatsapp and my service provider, no result. I had the line blocked, changed phone, yet this same number that the OP shared keeps flashing like every 2/3 days, even after putting several of these same foreign numbers on auto reject list.

Now, my new line dials unknown numbers each time I insert the sim in my old phone (I don't get to see it in the call log) & when I call my SP, they'll tell me, I dialed a foreign number that exhausted all of my airtime. I am tired to say the least.

I'm actually suffering the same fate concerning the Whatsapp thing. As I am typing right now my Whatsapp is not working since it had happened like several times. They will be telling me that my number is registered to another phone and Whatsapp keep banning my line everytime because of this. In fact I'm tired

omoiyalayi:


Its a tecno A88 with android 7 os

...that's a refurbished device. there's also one named Infinix A88,a factory reset may not do because your initial problems (numbers automatically dialed) may be due to some bloatwares,I'd say you flash the phone with a global ROM .
But also it could be due to malware, flash a global ROM.
That should help

I don't think it's from your GSM line,try putting your sim in another device.

omoiyalayi:


I'm actually suffering the same fate concerning the Whatsapp thing. As I am typing right now my Whatsapp is not working since it had happened like several times. They will be telling me that my number is registered to another phone and Whatsapp keep banning my line everytime because of this. In fact I'm tired

Change the phone and block the line you use on Whatsapp.

omoiyalayi:


The ones that called do not deduct airtime its only when u call them back that your airtime is gone

I get d call too but I don't bother to call them

But in this my case the number dial itself from my phone, even when the phone is on sleep mood it won't wake up until my airtime is finished. I still don't get how that is possible

Most of these cheap Android phones comes with lots of malicious apps. There was a time Gionee was busted for secretly installing adwares on their phones before shipping.

I believe your phone is infected with a kernel level malware with access to CALL_PHONE and WRITE_CALL_LOG permissions. This is why your phone can place calls to those numbers and it wouldn’t appear on your call log.

You may be wondering what the people that infected your phone with such malicious app stands to gain. Those numbers your phone usually call are premium numbers(google it for more information) which anyone can setup. Any time your phone secretly dials those numbers, the person who infected your phone automatically gets a commission sent to him from your SP.

Now to solve the problem, you have to options: 1) Install a clean Android OS that is compatible with your device like someone suggested earlier or 2) use a tool like Permission Explorer(download from play store) to enable you to isolate the possible culprit. With Permission Explorer, check for apps with access to CALL_PHONE and WRITE_CALL_LOG.

One more thing, you may have to stop visiting pôrn sites as those are where your devices contract those e-STI 99.634% of the time.

You might have heard of False Base Station (FBS), Rogue Base Station (RBS), International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI) Catcher or Stingray. All four of these terminologies refer to a tool consisting of hardware and software that allow for passive and active attacks against mobile subscribers over radio access networks (RANs). The attacking tool (referred to as FBS hereafter) exploits security weaknesses in mobile networks from 2G (second generation) to 3G, 4G and 5G. (Certain improvements have been made in 5G, which I’ll discuss later.)

In mobile networks of all generations, cellular base stations periodically broadcast information about the network. Mobile devices or user equipment (UE) listen to these broadcasting messages, select an appropriate cellular cell and connect to the cell and the mobile network. Because of practical challenges, broadcasting messages aren’t protected for confidentiality, authenticity or integrity. As a result, broadcasting messages are subject to spoofing or tampering. Some unicasting messages aren’t protected either, also allowing for spoofing. The lack of security protection of mobile broadcasting messages and certain unicasting messages makes FBS possible.

An FBS can take various forms, such as a single integrated device or multiple separated components. In the latter form [1], an FBS usually consists of a wireless transceiver, a laptop and a cellphone. The wireless transceiver broadcasts radio signals to impersonate legitimate base stations. The laptop connects to the transceiver (e.g., via an USB interface) and controls what to broadcast as well as the strength of the broadcasting signal. The cellphone is often used to capture broadcasting messages from legitimate base stations and feed into the laptop to simplify the configuration of the transceiver. In either form, an FBS can be made compact with a small footprint, allowing it to be left in a location unnoticeably (e.g., mounted to a street pole) or carried conveniently (e.g., inside a backpack).

An FBS often broadcasts the same network identifier as a legitimate network but with a stronger signal to lure users away. How much stronger does an FBS’s signal need to be to succeed? The answer to that question hasn’t been well understood until recently. According to the experiments in the study [2], an FBS’s signal must be more than 30db stronger than a legitimate signal to have any success. When the signal is 35db stronger, the success rate is about 80 percent. When it’s 40db stronger, the success rate increases to 100 percent. In these experiments, FBS broadcasts the same messages with the same frequency and band as the legitimate cell. Another strategy taken by an FBS is to broadcast the same network identifier but with a different tracking area code, tricking the UE into believing that it has entered a new tracking area, and then switch to the FBS. This strategy can make it easier to lure the UE to the FBS and should help reduce the signal strength required by the FBS to be successful. However, the exact signal strength requirement in this case wasn’t measured in the experiments.

Once camped at an FBS, a UE is subject to both passive and active attacks. In passive attacks, an adversary only listens to radio signals from both the UE and legitimate base stations without interfering with the communication (e.g., with signal injection). Consequences from passive attacks include—but are not limited to—identity theft and location tracking. In addition, eavesdropping often forms a stepping stone toward active attacks, in which an adversary also injects signals. An active attacker can be a man-in-the-middle (MITM) or man-on-the-side (MOTS) attacker.

In MITM attacks, the attacker is on the path of the communication between a UE and another entity and can do pretty much anything to the communication, such as reading, injecting, modifying and deleting messages. One such attack is to downgrade a UE to 2G with weak or null ciphers to allow for eavesdropping. Another example of an MITM attack is aLTEr [3], which only tampers with DNS requests in LTE networks, without any downgrading or tampering of control messages. Although user plane data is encrypted in LTE, it’s still subject to tampering if the encryption (e.g., AES counter mode) is malleable due to the lack of integrity protection.

In MOTS attacks, an attacker doesn’t have the same amount of control over communication as with an MITM attack. More often, the attacker injects messages to obtain information from the UE (e.g., stealing the IMSI by an identity request), send malicious messages to the UE (e.g., phishing SMS) or hijack services from a victim UE (e.g., answering a call on behalf of the UE [4]). A MOTS attacker, without luring a UE to connect to it, can still interfere with existing communication—for example, by injecting slightly stronger signals that are well timed to overwrite a selected part of a legitimate message [2].

FBS has been a security threat to all generations of mobile networks since 2G. The mitigation to FBS was studied by 3GPP in the past—however, without any success due to practical constraints such as deployment challenges in cryptographic key management and difficulty in timing synchronization. In 5G release 15 [5], network side detection of FBS is specified, which can help mitigate the risk, albeit fail to prevent FBS. 5G release 15 also introduces public key encryption of subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI) before it is sent out from the UE, which—if implemented—makes it difficult for FBS to steal SUPI. In 5G release 16 [6], FBS is being studied again. Various solutions have been proposed, including integrity protection of broadcasting, paging and unicasting messages. Other detection approaches have also been proposed.

Our view is that FBS arises mainly from the lack of integrity protection of broadcasting messages. Thus, a fundamental solution is to protect broadcasting messages with integrity (e.g., using public key based digital signatures). Although challenges remain with such a solution, we don’t believe those challenges are insurmountable. Other solutions are based on the signatures of attacks, which may help but can eventually be bypassed when attacks evolve to change their attacking techniques and behaviors. We look forward to agreement from 3GPP SA3 on a long-term solution that can fundamentally solve the problem of FBS in 5G

Block dialing international numbers

Download truecaller it has an option to to block certain numbers from calling and expose certain numbers on your mobile.

Random international numbers calling you! I suspect a one ring scam

Ola17:


Most of these cheap Android phones comes with lots of malicious apps. There was a time Gionee was busted for secretly installing adwares on their phones before shipping.

I believe your phone is infected with a kernel level malware with access to CALL_PHONE and WRITE_CALL_LOG permissions. This is why your phone can place calls to those numbers and it wouldn’t appear on your call log.

You may be wondering what the people that infected your phone with such malicious app stands to gain. Those numbers your phone usually call are premium numbers(google it for more information) which anyone can setup. Any time your phone secretly dials those numbers, the person who infected your phone automatically gets a commission sent to him from your SP.

Now to solve the problem, you have to options: 1) Install a clean Android OS that is compatible with your device like someone suggested earlier or 2) use a tool like Permission Explorer(download from play store) to enable you to isolate the possible culprit. With Permission Explorer, check for apps with access to CALL_PHONE and WRITE_CALL_LOG.

One more thing, you may have to stop visiting pôrn sites as those are where your devices contract those e-STI 99.634% of the time.

Thanks a lot

uzomanny:
I'm also faced with this same problem, but more intense. This person hacked my Whatsapp account and starting sending people (total strangers) messages on how he can help them with a job by clicking a link, in return, I'll receive threats and insults. I can't remember how many times I gave out apologies for offences I did not commit.

I decided to change numbers on Whatsapp but this fellow was always online with my old line. Sent countless messages to both Whatsapp and my service provider, no result. I had the line blocked, changed phone, yet this same number that the OP shared keeps flashing like every 2/3 days, even after putting several of these same foreign numbers on auto reject list.

Now, my new line dials unknown numbers each time I insert the sim in my old phone (I don't get to see it in the call log) & when I call my SP, they'll tell me, I dialed a foreign number that exhausted all of my airtime. I am tired to say the least.

i think they have your phone, not your sim. Tell your service providers to do thorough research on your line

najoomey:
You might have heard of False Base Station (FBS), Rogue Base Station (RBS), International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI) Catcher or Stingray. All four of these terminologies refer to a tool consisting of hardware and software that allow for passive and active attacks against mobile subscribers over radio access networks (RANs). The attacking tool (referred to as FBS hereafter) exploits security weaknesses in mobile networks from 2G (second generation) to 3G, 4G and 5G. (Certain improvements have been made in 5G, which I’ll discuss later.)

In mobile networks of all generations, cellular base stations periodically broadcast information about the network. Mobile devices or user equipment (UE) listen to these broadcasting messages, select an appropriate cellular cell and connect to the cell and the mobile network. Because of practical challenges, broadcasting messages aren’t protected for confidentiality, authenticity or integrity. As a result, broadcasting messages are subject to spoofing or tampering. Some unicasting messages aren’t protected either, also allowing for spoofing. The lack of security protection of mobile broadcasting messages and certain unicasting messages makes FBS possible.

An FBS can take various forms, such as a single integrated device or multiple separated components. In the latter form [1], an FBS usually consists of a wireless transceiver, a laptop and a cellphone. The wireless transceiver broadcasts radio signals to impersonate legitimate base stations. The laptop connects to the transceiver (e.g., via an USB interface) and controls what to broadcast as well as the strength of the broadcasting signal. The cellphone is often used to capture broadcasting messages from legitimate base stations and feed into the laptop to simplify the configuration of the transceiver. In either form, an FBS can be made compact with a small footprint, allowing it to be left in a location unnoticeably (e.g., mounted to a street pole) or carried conveniently (e.g., inside a backpack).

An FBS often broadcasts the same network identifier as a legitimate network but with a stronger signal to lure users away. How much stronger does an FBS’s signal need to be to succeed? The answer to that question hasn’t been well understood until recently. According to the experiments in the study [2], an FBS’s signal must be more than 30db stronger than a legitimate signal to have any success. When the signal is 35db stronger, the success rate is about 80 percent. When it’s 40db stronger, the success rate increases to 100 percent. In these experiments, FBS broadcasts the same messages with the same frequency and band as the legitimate cell. Another strategy taken by an FBS is to broadcast the same network identifier but with a different tracking area code, tricking the UE into believing that it has entered a new tracking area, and then switch to the FBS. This strategy can make it easier to lure the UE to the FBS and should help reduce the signal strength required by the FBS to be successful. However, the exact signal strength requirement in this case wasn’t measured in the experiments.

Once camped at an FBS, a UE is subject to both passive and active attacks. In passive attacks, an adversary only listens to radio signals from both the UE and legitimate base stations without interfering with the communication (e.g., with signal injection). Consequences from passive attacks include—but are not limited to—identity theft and location tracking. In addition, eavesdropping often forms a stepping stone toward active attacks, in which an adversary also injects signals. An active attacker can be a man-in-the-middle (MITM) or man-on-the-side (MOTS) attacker.

In MITM attacks, the attacker is on the path of the communication between a UE and another entity and can do pretty much anything to the communication, such as reading, injecting, modifying and deleting messages. One such attack is to downgrade a UE to 2G with weak or null ciphers to allow for eavesdropping. Another example of an MITM attack is aLTEr [3], which only tampers with DNS requests in LTE networks, without any downgrading or tampering of control messages. Although user plane data is encrypted in LTE, it’s still subject to tampering if the encryption (e.g., AES counter mode) is malleable due to the lack of integrity protection.

In MOTS attacks, an attacker doesn’t have the same amount of control over communication as with an MITM attack. More often, the attacker injects messages to obtain information from the UE (e.g., stealing the IMSI by an identity request), send malicious messages to the UE (e.g., phishing SMS) or hijack services from a victim UE (e.g., answering a call on behalf of the UE [4]). A MOTS attacker, without luring a UE to connect to it, can still interfere with existing communication—for example, by injecting slightly stronger signals that are well timed to overwrite a selected part of a legitimate message [2].

FBS has been a security threat to all generations of mobile networks since 2G. The mitigation to FBS was studied by 3GPP in the past—however, without any success due to practical constraints such as deployment challenges in cryptographic key management and difficulty in timing synchronization. In 5G release 15 [5], network side detection of FBS is specified, which can help mitigate the risk, albeit fail to prevent FBS. 5G release 15 also introduces public key encryption of subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI) before it is sent out from the UE, which—if implemented—makes it difficult for FBS to steal SUPI. In 5G release 16 [6], FBS is being studied again. Various solutions have been proposed, including integrity protection of broadcasting, paging and unicasting messages. Other detection approaches have also been proposed.

Our view is that FBS arises mainly from the lack of integrity protection of broadcasting messages. Thus, a fundamental solution is to protect broadcasting messages with integrity (e.g., using public key based digital signatures). Although challenges remain with such a solution, we don’t believe those challenges are insurmountable. Other solutions are based on the signatures of attacks, which may help but can eventually be bypassed when attacks evolve to change their attacking techniques and behaviors. We look forward to agreement from 3GPP SA3 on a long-term solution that can fundamentally solve the problem of FBS in 5G

so how can he resolve this?

omoiyalayi:
Good day guy please i need the help of all the tech guru on this forum

Its been over a month now, whenever I turn my data on to browse, and after I turned it off for few minutes, different international line will just be dialing themselves on my phone without me knowing and in the process zapping all my airtime.

And the line will not register on dial numbers, you won't even know anything of such happened if you didn't see it when its dialing. Its only when I try to make call that I will realized my airtime is gone

I try Google for assistance but its not helping, the only help I got was some international line that will flash you, making you you to think someone you know abroad wants you to call so they could wipe your airtime.

Sometimes they flash but I don't have problem with that because I don't call them back.

Google did not talk about the international line dialing itself.

I think I am the first person this is happening to.

Anyone with this kind of experience ??

Please guys help me it is frustrating me.

I format the phone yet it kept happening.

Please anyone with idea of what I can do should please help me.

Thanks guys

Front page please @lalasticlala

PHOENIX BROWSER is a powerful add blocker.

Download Phoenix browser and use it to browse for one week. It will clear.

Your phone is already overtaken by a malware. Flashing it won't help. This type of thing is common with tecno phones.

I've lost several phones to malwares. Not again.

Blastedholligan:
so how can he resolve this?

Contact Network Provider
Change Phone

najoomey:

Contact Network Provider
Change Phone

it is to change phone cos im sure he has contacted service provider

This is not an issue from your phone, I think you urgently need to contact your service provider

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