LaBellaMafiaZA:


Is the post I wrote in response to whatever you're talking about? Stay off my mentions.

MikeZA:
Lmao what a baloney.

sirjerry:
you want me to stay of your mention then why are you posting? this a discussion thread you want people not to quote then you fu ck off or you return to viewing the thread.

ThaVluit:


Fiction - your post.

Below - reality.

ActivateKruger:


hahahahah

Apartheid vs War? You're lost, find another thread because this one is about military discussions, a subject alien to your Igbo mind.

ActivateKruger:


hahahahah

Apartheid vs War? You're lost, find another thread because this one is about military discussions, a subject alien to your Igbo mind.

EroZA:

---

as expected the Islamic Yoruba Yankee is showing his terrorism attitude...

Msauza:



AMECHI HALLUCINATED ABOUT SEEING MANDELA AT HIS HOME. I HAVE FOLLOWED THE HISTORY OF MANDELA A LOT AND EVEN MET HI PERSONALLY AT OUT SCHOOL. HE MENTIONED MANY COUNTRIES IN AFRICA OTHER THAN LIVING IN AMECHIS HOUSE. MAYBE AMECHI MISTAKEN HIM WITH MBEKI

agaugust:


....because you are slum dweller both in Soweto and in Enugu. You need deliverance prayers
.

iconize:


Has anyone debunked the [/b]"fact"[/b] that Mandela was a tourist that lived in Amaechi's house?

iconize:


Yoruba?

This minute I'm Igbo, the next minute I'm Yoruba.

Msauza:



Mandela has never lived in Amechi's house. Amechi is an opportunist who waited until the passing of Mandela to come with all these lies. There is no book or history that support that statement. Even Madiba himself during his visit at our school he has mentioned anything about Nigeria other than Algeria from countries which were far from SA.

AMECHI TOLD LIES!!

ActivateKruger:


It doesn't matter what you're, what matters is that you're Nigerian and you want out of your peace forsaken village called Nigeria

iconize:


White on blek, blek on blek.

Henry120:


You do not only lack aviation fuel, you also lack common tents.

ActivateKruger:


Negro on Negro

#BlackOnBlack

Henry120:
The Uselessness of the SANDF


South Africa’s Military Arms Troubles
October 16, 2014 - Uncategorized - African Military, South Africa

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is drowning in a sea of mismanagement, corruption, political manipulation and strategic myopia.

While this state of affairs will probably not result in an imminent ‘attack’ on the Union Buildings, as was the case in 2009 when justifiably angry rank-and-file soldiers protested over conditions of service, the ongoing fallout is much worse.

It’s hard to know where to begin but let’s start with the basics. Section 200(1) of the Constitution states that, “the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”. If we take the standard dictionary definition of discipline to mean “the practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behaviour, using punishment to correct disobedience”, then it is clear that those who are in charge of structuring and managing the SANDF are in serious breach of its core constitutional imperative.

There is a litany of such ‘indiscipline’. Despite a mountain of evidence stemming from the 1990’s arms deal detailing gross mismanagement and corruption involving SANDF and Department of Defence (DOD) officials as well as senior politicians, hardly any of those responsible have been held to even the most minimal of disciplinary standards.

The ongoing official investigation into the arms deal – the Seriti Commission – is turning out to be more of a whitewash than a clean-up. As has become the standard practice of SANDF and DOD officials as well as associated politicians, the main agenda of the Seriti Commission appears to be to ensure that the myriad ‘indisciplines’ are shielded from any meaningful democratic scrutiny and action.

When the SANDF deployed over 1000 soldiers to the DRC in June 2013 the generals and politicians spoke glowingly about the professionalism of South Africa’s defence forces and their contribution to ‘peace-keeping’ in Africa[b] but did not tell us that the soldiers lacked some of the most basic equipment. It was only through an associated court case later that the Minister of Defence was forced to admit that “our soldiers do not have tents … ”.[/b]

While the rank-and-file soldiers in conflict zones were being treated like 2nd class citizens, SANDF head honcho, Lt. General Solly Shoke spent over R100 000 of taxpayers money flying 1st class to a conference in Malaysia earlier this year.

The DOD has brazenly cast a veil of secrecy over its recent attempts to buy a new luxury VIP jet (no prize for guessing who the beneficiaries are) worth almost R2 billion. When parliamentary questions were asked, Defence Secretary Dr Sam Gulube noted that the matter was a “sensitive project” (read: classified) because it had been conveniently shifted to a ‘Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan’ project list, no doubt a secret itself. Public knowledge about a SANDF deal for purchasing over 200 armoured infantry vehicles worth close to R15 billion was zilch until the actions of some brave whistleblowers.


When opposition parliamentarians recently asked Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula for further details of the SANDF acquisition projects she refused, stating that the information does not belong in the public domain. Not to be outdone in the secrecy stakes, Defence Secretary Gulube told parliament’s defence committee that any attempts to enforce greater scrutiny of the government’s arms procurement programmes would be a threat to national security.

All of this has to be set against the backdrop of the 2014 Defence Force Review which has been approved by the Cabinet and is now making its way through parliament’s labyrinthine corridors.

Despite receiving R42 billion in the 2014/15 budget and untold billions more continuing to be spent on the 1990s arms deal and on other acquisition projects that we know little to nothing about, the Review unequivocally acknowledges that the SANDF is in a “critical state of decline”. It lists a host of serious problems and crises:

The escalating costs associated with the purchase, use and maintenance of the 1990s arms deal programme has resulted in a majority of the fighter planes, helicopters, training jets and naval vessels purchased being mothballed. Those that are in use suffer from chronic under-use and a lack of technical/ maintenance personnel and trained pilots.

Spares, general equipment, ammunition stocks and fuel reserves are “generally depleted”. One instructive example of the resultant impact is that South Africa now has “little airspace or maritime domain awareness” (read: the SANDF can hardly track who and what is in South African airspace and waters).

Nearly 55% of the overall budget is spent on personnel costs, even though SANDF rank-and-file earn relatively little. Despite increased personnel spending, there is a massive shortage of competent personnel at all levels and those with scarce and professional skills are leaving at “concerning rates”.

Practical training and exercises have been cut to the bone such that the SANDF is unable to “execute [its] widening spectrum of tasks” while medical care to SANDF personnel is in a generalised state of crisis .

The SANDF suffers from “fragmented management and information systems [that] inhibit integrated and systemic decision making”.

Predictably though, the Review’s solution to these systemic crises of decision-making, strategic planning and human and financial management is to throw more money into the SANDF pit in order for it to carry out its “constitutional requirements”.

Those “requirements” are interpreted as revolving largely around a military “strategic posture” defined by the “the role that it wishes to play both regionally and continentally”. In other words not, as the actual Constitution states, “to defend and protect the Republic its territorial integrity and its people… ” but to satisfy a politically constructed and elite centred ‘need’ to play big brother in Africa.


We should all take the words of Andrew Feinstein, that fearless exposer and critic of the South African and global arms trade, to heart. He warns us that this ‘shadow world’ “often makes us poorer, not richer, less not more safe and governed not in our own interests but for the benefit of a small, self-serving elite, seemingly above the law, protected by the secrecy of national security and accountable to no one.”

Before it is too late, South Africans need to not only actively demand accountability for past ‘indisciplines’ and abuse of public funds and trust but ensure that our military forces and projects focus on what they are supposed to do – to serve and answer to, the people.

MikeZA:
In your dreams.

Just tell me if you wanna engage in an factual discussion.

You want me to serve you another humble pie?

Henry120:


South Africa’s Military Arms Troubles
October 16, 2014 - Uncategorized - African Military, South Africa

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is drowning in a sea of mismanagement, corruption, political manipulation and strategic myopia.

While this state of affairs will probably not result in an imminent ‘attack’ on the Union Buildings, as was the case in 2009 when justifiably angry rank-and-file soldiers protested over conditions of service, the ongoing fallout is much worse.

It’s hard to know where to begin but let’s start with the basics. Section 200(1) of the Constitution states that, “the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”. If we take the standard dictionary definition of discipline to mean “the practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behaviour, using punishment to correct disobedience”, then it is clear that those who are in charge of structuring and managing the SANDF are in serious breach of its core constitutional imperative.

There is a litany of such ‘indiscipline’. Despite a mountain of evidence stemming from the 1990’s arms deal detailing gross mismanagement and corruption involving SANDF and Department of Defence (DOD) officials as well as senior politicians, hardly any of those responsible have been held to even the most minimal of disciplinary standards.

The ongoing official investigation into the arms deal – the Seriti Commission – is turning out to be more of a whitewash than a clean-up. As has become the standard practice of SANDF and DOD officials as well as associated politicians, the main agenda of the Seriti Commission appears to be to ensure that the myriad ‘indisciplines’ are shielded from any meaningful democratic scrutiny and action.

When the SANDF deployed over 1000 soldiers to the DRC in June 2013 the generals and politicians spoke glowingly about the professionalism of South Africa’s defence forces and their contribution to ‘peace-keeping’ in Africa[b] but did not tell us that the soldiers lacked some of the most basic equipment. It was only through an associated court case later that the Minister of Defence was forced to admit that “our soldiers do not have tents … ”.[/b]

While the rank-and-file soldiers in conflict zones were being treated like 2nd class citizens, SANDF head honcho, Lt. General Solly Shoke spent over R100 000 of taxpayers money flying 1st class to a conference in Malaysia earlier this year.

The DOD has brazenly cast a veil of secrecy over its recent attempts to buy a new luxury VIP jet (no prize for guessing who the beneficiaries are) worth almost R2 billion. When parliamentary questions were asked, Defence Secretary Dr Sam Gulube noted that the matter was a “sensitive project” (read: classified) because it had been conveniently shifted to a ‘Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan’ project list, no doubt a secret itself. Public knowledge about a SANDF deal for purchasing over 200 armoured infantry vehicles worth close to R15 billion was zilch until the actions of some brave whistleblowers.


When opposition parliamentarians recently asked Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula for further details of the SANDF acquisition projects she refused, stating that the information does not belong in the public domain. Not to be outdone in the secrecy stakes, Defence Secretary Gulube told parliament’s defence committee that any attempts to enforce greater scrutiny of the government’s arms procurement programmes would be a threat to national security.

All of this has to be set against the backdrop of the 2014 Defence Force Review which has been approved by the Cabinet and is now making its way through parliament’s labyrinthine corridors.

Despite receiving R42 billion in the 2014/15 budget and untold billions more continuing to be spent on the 1990s arms deal and on other acquisition projects that we know little to nothing about, the Review unequivocally acknowledges that the SANDF is in a “critical state of decline”. It lists a host of serious problems and crises:

The escalating costs associated with the purchase, use and maintenance of the 1990s arms deal programme has resulted in a majority of the fighter planes, helicopters, training jets and naval vessels purchased being mothballed. Those that are in use suffer from chronic under-use and a lack of technical/ maintenance personnel and trained pilots.

Spares, general equipment, ammunition stocks and fuel reserves are “generally depleted”. One instructive example of the resultant impact is that South Africa now has “little airspace or maritime domain awareness” (read: the SANDF can hardly track who and what is in South African airspace and waters).

Nearly 55% of the overall budget is spent on personnel costs, even though SANDF rank-and-file earn relatively little. Despite increased personnel spending, there is a massive shortage of competent personnel at all levels and those with scarce and professional skills are leaving at “concerning rates”.

Practical training and exercises have been cut to the bone such that the SANDF is unable to “execute [its] widening spectrum of tasks” while medical care to SANDF personnel is in a generalised state of crisis .

The SANDF suffers from “fragmented management and information systems [that] inhibit integrated and systemic decision making”.

Predictably though, the Review’s solution to these systemic crises of decision-making, strategic planning and human and financial management is to throw more money into the SANDF pit in order for it to carry out its “constitutional requirements”.

Those “requirements” are interpreted as revolving largely around a military “strategic posture” defined by the “the role that it wishes to play both regionally and continentally”. In other words not, as the actual Constitution states, “to defend and protect the Republic its territorial integrity and its people… ” but to satisfy a politically constructed and elite centred ‘need’ to play big brother in Africa.


We should all take the words of Andrew Feinstein, that fearless exposer and critic of the South African and global arms trade, to heart. He warns us that this ‘shadow world’ “often makes us poorer, not richer, less not more safe and governed not in our own interests but for the benefit of a small, self-serving elite, seemingly above the law, protected by the secrecy of national security and accountable to no one.”

Before it is too late, South Africans need to not only actively demand accountability for past ‘indisciplines’ and abuse of public funds and trust but ensure that our military forces and projects focus on what they are supposed to do – to serve and answer to, the people.

MikeZA:
In your dreams.

Just tell me if you wanna engage in an factual discussion.

You want me to serve you another humble pie?

Henry120:


Your defence minister stated categorically you don't have Tents. Yes, i'll like to have this discussion.

Is she now lying on the pathetic state of the SANDF?

patches689:


Do you suffer from a mental deficiency?

Did you forget that you just posted this?

Or are you simply unable to use your own words to formulate an argument?

Now.

Source please.

iconize:


White on blek, blek on blek.

patches689:


That had nothing to do with the SANDF

it was because ARMSCOR and the UN Fvcked up the tenders for the supply of the base
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/armscor-fails-to-supply-sandf-1.1589325#.VEFAdfmSx8E

All the members of the ARMSCOR board of directors who were responsible were sacked because of it.

Henry120:


http://www.african-defense.com/?p=249

patches689:


Dr. Dale T. McKinley is an independent writer, researcher and lecturer as well as political activist. Originally from Zimbabwe, Dale has lived and worked in Johannesburg since 1990. He ran/managed a socialist bookshop from 1991-1994 and was a full time activist/ educationist with the South African Communist Party from 1995-2000 (before being expelled for trying to be a communist).


http://sacsis.org.za/s/stories.php?iUser=37

Communist, activist and socialist? Reliable unbiased opinion?


Into the trash he goes

Henry120:


stop swearing.

So you do lack common tents, *ROTFL*

Henry120:


He didn't quote himself dummy. He quoted your defence minister and other top government functionaries.

patches689:


No we dont.

It does not say SANDF lacks tents.

It says that the supply of the tents was stalled due to contractual issues arising from ARMSCOR mismanagement.

Those responsible have been fired.

Henry120:


Actually, your defence minister confirms you lack common tents?

LMAO

patches689:


Nope, he mis-quoted our Defence Minsiter

and he is the author of the artical

hence, it is biased.

You dont have a tertiary education do you?

iconize:


You're being sentimental and emotional.

Imagine, you wrote over 2 sentences of crass stupid_ity.

I ask again; has anyone debunked Amaechi's claims?

What will be the old man's benefit lying against the dead?

The other you said he was seeking elevation, and I asked elevation from who?