Battle field discussion (picture/video's) of african military; these is a thread where by we discuss military histories and the harsh realty of war are being shared be it in pictures and video !

CION pictures

Continues;

OPERATION UNICORD
Part of nigeria civil war
Date july 2-12,1967
Location: northern biafra border
Result; nigeria victory
Belligerents; Nigeria and Biafra
Commanders; Nigeria( sule apollo and martin adamu). Biafra(H.M njoku).
Casualties: unknown on both sides .

The Operation UNICORD (July 2 – July 12, 1967) was an
offensive launched by the Nigerian Army at the beginning of
the Nigerian Civil War. It involved the capture of 6 major
Biafran towns near their northern border.
Background
When Nigeria became an independent state in October 1960
the newly formed government consisted mainly of northern
politician from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. Early on the
Nigerian government became corrupt with various
politicians swindling public funds and rigging votes. By 1965
the Nigerian government became so corrupt that uprisings
against the government sprang up all across Nigeria with
various politicians attempting to gain more power. This
resulted in rioting and mass arrests in the cities of Lagos and
Ibadan. The politician Obafemi Awolowo was falsely blamed
for causing the riots and was sentenced to 10 years in a
Nigerian prison. All of the chaos that occurred in the political
ralm gave was to the 1966 Nigerian coup d'etat in which 11
senior politicians were killed by mainly Igbo soldiers led by
the Army Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu. The Nigerian Prime
Minister Abubakar Balewa was one of the 11 politicians
assassinated during the coup of January 15. Nzeogwu's
soldiers were forced to retreat to Kaduna after General
Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi was able to assemble a force of
soldiers in Lagos to combat the rebellious soldiers. Ironsi
was made President of Nigeria on January 16, 1966 and
became the first Igbo president in Nigerian history. many
northern generals and politicians were angry at Ironsi for
two reasons, because he did not execute Major Nzeogwu
and because he was giving more and more political power
to southern politicians. On July 29, 1966 Ironsi was
assassinated by a mutinous soldiers under the command of
Lt Col Murtala Mohammed and installed Colonel Yakubu
Gowon as Head of State. The counter-coup resulted in the
1966 anti-Igbo pogrom and caused the brutal massacre of
50,000 Igbo civilians living in various northern cities such as
Kano and Kaduna. These massacres angered many Igbo
civilians and a call for secession was given by Colonel
Odumegwu Ojukwu. Ojukwu met with President Gowon in
Aburi, Ghana in December 1966 to discuss the situation that
was occurring in Nigeria. A vote was held in May 1967 in the
Eastern Region of Nigeria that was to see how many
easterners supported a secession. The vote resulted in 68%
of easterners approving of a secession of a secular Igbo
state. On May 30, 1967 Ojukwu officially seceded the Eastern
Region and proclaimed the new Republic of Biafra. Ojukwu
managed to assemble a 3,000 man guerrilla force to defend
Biafra's front lines. In early July 1967 Nigerian President
Gowon ordered General Olusegun Obasanjo to regain
control of the Eastern Region.
Battle
On July 2, 1967 the Nigerian Army opened its offensive
operations from the Northern sector. The First Area
Command NA, supported by an artillery brigade consisting
of scorpion tanks, saladin armored cars, and ferrets was
divided into two brigades. The 1st brigade under Maj. Sule
Apollo advanced down the Ogugu-Ogunga-Nsukka road
while the 2nd brigade under Maj. Martin Adamu advanced
down the Gakem-Obudu-Ogoja road. Defending Biafran
soldiers under Brig. H.M. Njoku managed to repel the attack,
however, the Nigerian Army began recruiting guides and
informants to report on the disposition of Biafran troops,
their strength, and other crucial information. For 10 days the
Nigerian Army fought its way southward and managed to
capture the towns of Nsukka, Ogugu, Ogunga, Ogoja, Gakem,
and Obudu while also forcing defending Biafran troops to
retreat in disarray. Many Biafran soldiers complained of
malaria, headache, and other ailments. Thousands of
Biafran civilians fled their homes, in fear of being massacred
by Nigerian soldiers, and headed for the Biafran capital,
Enugu.
Aftermath
16 days after the Biafrans retreated Nzeogwu attempted to
regain control of Nsukka on July 30 but was killed by
Nigerian soldiers while driving down a road. Obasanjo was
successful in his conquest of Nsukka but did not enter any
further into Biafran territory but instead was put aside after
the Biafran Generals Albert Okonkwo and Victor Banjo
invaded Nigeria's Mid-Western Region. Murtala Mohammed
was put in charge of fending off all Biafran soldiers within
Nigeria's boundaries. Victor Banjo got within 135 miles of
the Nigerian Capital Lagos before he was intercepted by
Mohammed's men. After over a month of bloody fighting the
Biafrans retreated to Onitsha and released their hold over
the Mid-Western Region. With the Midwest Invasion over the
Nigerians returned to Nsukka and began planning an
invasion of the Biafran Capital Enugu. Due to Nsukka's
proximity to Enugu it was a strategic stronghold. Olusegun
Obasanjo invaded the area around Enugu in mid September
1967. Obasanjo knew that Enugu would not fall easily if he
attacked it head on so he decided to surround the city and
begin a siege. On September 30 Obasanjo was able to break
through the Biafran defensive lines around Enugu and
entered the city. After 6 days of bloody fighting the Biafrans
fled south to Umuahia.

Below are some pictures from the civil war
1) A federal soldier armed with an anti-tank bazooka ,seing covering the end of aba-umuahia road where the biafran troops hold positions,sept 28 1968.
2)A biafran soldier with an portable anti-tank bazooka
3)A biafran soldier with a GPMG
4) A federal soldier captured by biafran troops.

When will the Nigerian military start dressing their troops properly when they are on combat operations? The only time they dress well is during a ceremonial duty

It is shameful really

@bidexii I think this is a deliberate misrepresentation of facts. you got that from wikipedia maybe- dumb site. one has to be careful with the information we post on public forums because I fear a generation one day, will wake up and recount history as it NEVER happened!! What I'm saying is, O. Obasanjo was nowhere near the Nsukka front (1st division AOR) as at 1967. He entered the war quite late in 1969 and even then was handed the command of the 3rd marine commando division ( Adekunle's division) whose area of responsibility stretched across the Atlantic theatre from calabar to port Harcourt, bonny and all those areas.

Missy89:
When will the Nigerian military start dressing their troops properly when they are on combat operations? The only time they dress well is during a ceremonial duty

It is shameful really

Well why spend much needed cash on a soldier who us is about to die....lol just kidding. Reminds me of tsarist Russia where it was said that Russian soldiers were given rifles a piece for three. Lol. Talk about corruption.

patwilly:
@bidexii I think this is a deliberate misrepresentation of facts. you got that from wikipedia maybe- dumb site. one has to be careful with the information we post on public forums because I fear a generation one day, will wake up and recount history as it NEVER happened!! What I'm saying is, O. Obasanjo was nowhere near the Nsukka front (1st division AOR) as at 1967. He entered the war quite late in 1969 and even then was handed the command of the 3rd marine commando division ( Adekunle's division) whose area of responsibility stretched across the Atlantic theatre from calabar to port Harcourt, bonny and all those areas.

That is not true ! And you made a 100% misrepresentation of facts by saying;"he entered the war quite late in 1969 . Then what year was he appointed ? The civil war lasted;6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970
(2 years, 6 months, 1 week and 2 days) , so how many months did he played in the war, when he entered late 1969 that the war ended. Get your facts right ?

bidexiii:

That is not true ! And you made a 100% misrepresentation of facts by saying;"he entered the war quite late in 1969 . Then what year was he appointed ? The civil war lasted;6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970
(2 years, 6 months, 1 week and 2 days) , so how many months did he played in the war, when he entered late 1969 that the war ended. Get your facts right ?

He's still right in OBJ's role...he never laid siege on any land area, he was the commanding officer for the battalion on the atlantic ocean. Go check facts again, I'm sure you'll find it somewhere. OBJ was never near Nnsuka

Pictures of NA commandos

bidexiii:

That is not true ! And you made a 100% misrepresentation of facts by saying;"he entered the war quite late in 1969 . Then what year was he appointed ? The civil war lasted;6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970
(2 years, 6 months, 1 week and 2 days) , so how many months did he played in the war, when he entered late 1969 that the war ended. Get your facts right ?

Listen. Dont be in a hurry to dispute what I've said. I've discovered as regards history especially the Nigerian civil war, a lot of online sources render untrue accounts probably due to ethnic sentiments/leanings on both sides. A more reliable way is to read accounts by key participants in that war and not some hogwash written by someone with second hand motives. Nevertheless, I recommend you read Now a omoigui's essays on the civil. They give quite a balanced view of events in that war. Too bad I'm busy at the moment, I'd have sought it out for you.

Anyway let the narration continue

patwilly:

Well why spend much needed cash on a soldier who us is about to die....lol just kidding. Reminds me of tsarist Russia where it was said that Russian soldiers were given rifles a piece for three. Lol. Talk about corruption.

OFF TOPIC
The one rifle to 3 men was was actually a myth that started during the first world war and continued after the second world war mostly based on Khrushchev memoirs The imperial Russian army was well armed just like the Red army of soviet Russia.
The reason for high the casualties which made the myth believable however had to do with the fact that the Russians had inferior tactics before 43-44 and suffered heavy loses but adapted and learned from their mistake.

Only Shtrafbats (Penal Battalions) where sent in sometimes with sticks carved like guns lol. and forced to wear black in the snow in other to feint an attack while the real units hide in white and counter attack.

Take a look at that rotten vest on one that young man! disgusting

Missy89:


OFF TOPIC
The one rifle to 3 men was was actually a myth that started during the first world war and continued after the second world war mostly based on Khrushchev memoirs The imperial Russian army was well armed just like the Red army of soviet Russia.
The reason for high losses which made the myth believable however had to do with the fact that the Russians had inferior tactics before 43-44 and suffered heavy loses but adapted and learn from their mistake.

Only Shtrafbats (Penal Battalions) where sent in sometimes with sticks carved like guns lol. and forced to wear black in the snow in other to feint an attack while the real units hide in white and counter attack.

Take a look at that rotten vest on one that young man! disgusting

the vest shows it have taken multiple bullet hits hence the wornout ,it is not rotten as you say sir.

Missy89:
When will the Nigerian military start dressing their troops properly when they are on combat operations? The only time they dress well is during a ceremonial duty

It is shameful really

soldiers don't like all these gears ,they prefer comfort ,as for the uniforms we operate several variants of camo due to different geogrphical location, the north east is a mix from deserts to a few grassland+units involved have their patterns of dressing e.g special forces

Nigerdeltaboi:

the vest shows it have taken multiple bullet hits hence the wornout ,it is not rotten as you say sir.

Bullets do not wore out a vest. they penetrate it and stay inside so u can remove it. That is a wear and tear and has nothing to do with bullets

DEATHMACHINE:

soldiers don't like all these gears ,they prefer comfort ,as for the uniforms we operate several variants of camo due to different geogrphical location, the north east is a mix from deserts to a few grassland+units involved have their patterns of dressing e.g special forces

The gears are not for comfort but to save their lives and make them function properly. If they train with them enough, they will get used to them. Another thing is they do not have to use imported gears because different gear works for different areas, etc. that is why the military should have a research team or body that tests what will work for the army, try them out of the field and mass produce them!

Missy89:


OFF TOPIC
The one rifle to 3 men was was actually a myth that started during the first world war and continued after the second world war mostly based on Khrushchev memoirs The imperial Russian army was well armed just like the Red army of soviet Russia.
The reason for high losses which made the myth believable however had to do with the fact that the Russians had inferior tactics before 43-44 and suffered heavy loses but adapted and learn from their mistake.

Only Shtrafbats (Penal Battalions) where sent in sometimes with sticks carved like guns lol. and forced to wear black in the snow in other to feint an attack while the real units hide in white and counter attack.

Take a look at that rotten vest on one that young man! disgusting

My oh my! I see someone's well grounded on the subject. Yeah you are right. The Russian higher ups were very distrustful of its military; something not uncommon with most corrupt governments.. and then the great purge of '36 to '38 of its officer corps. Virtually all officers from the rank of major upwards were executed! little wonder they were caught up in the early years of world war II. terrible!

we have soldiers that kit well but they look too heavy,like a video just released by defence HQ,(the 72 mobile strike force)NA soldier coming out of a REVA APC . But for foot infantry men they would match,route and mop villages of insurgency from one to another you need some thing light and don't forget the desert terrain the heat scourge.
I don't. Think we are. Doing bad in terms of kitting, we should just improve the webbing gear. Look at the chadian's they look rag-tag but let me tell you something those guys are damn too good they av proven there self in mali and the ongoing insurgent border war !

Pictures of nigerian special forces training in pakistan:

Continuation.....

More.....

Missy89:



The gears are not for comfort but to save their lives and make them function properly. If they train with them enough, they will get used to them. Another thing is they do not have to use imported gears because different gear works for different areas, etc. that is why the military should have a research team or body that tests what will work for the army, try them out of the field and mass produce them!

yes they are for saving lives despite that some troops won't wear them ,just like me i have served countless jobs right from NMS to NDA because i dislike wearing helmets.DICON produces most of the vest currently been used.yes there are shortcomings but its not an easy task kiting over 30,000 troops in combat.cheers

bidexiii:
More.....

where did you get these pics from ? please find a way to conceal their indentities.

Team and member of 72 strike force !

CION operations: guys ain't smiling

More...

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIRFORCE IN KOREA
( AN ASSESSMENT )

relatively short article can hardly do justice to the
experiences of a tactical air force unit through nearly three
years of operations. However, an idea of the contribution of
2 Squadron, SAAF to the UN effort during the Korean War
can be gained if the following matters are considered:
The reasons for the SAAF participation in the Korean War.
The manner of integration into the UN Forces and the
Command structure.
The SAAF operations during the various phases of the
Korean War.
THE REASONS FOR THE SAAF PARTICIPATION IN THE
KOREAN WAR
At the outbreak of the Korean War the United Nations
Security Council passed a resolution calling for the
withdrawal of the North Korean Forces. A request was also
made to all UN members for assistance in the execution of
this decision.(1) Following a special Cabinet meeting on 20
July 1950 the announcement was made that owing to the
great distance between South Africa and Korea, direct
military participation in the conflict was both impractical and
unrealistic.(2) Further negotiations with the United States
Government led to the conclusion that, in spite of the
anticipated difficulties, direct military assistance was still
considered to be the best form of aid that could be rendered
by the South African Government.(3) Following a day-long
Cabinet sitting on 4 August it was announced that a SAAF
fighter squadron would be made available to the UN effort.
(4) For the first time in the history of the Union of South
Africa all the parties represented in parliament agreed upon
an overseas mission for the country's armed forces.
South Africa's position on a continent susceptible to the rise
and spread of Communism necessitated becoming involved
in the first UN effort to directly oppose armed aggression in
order to avoid future isolation.(5) The Prime Minister, Dr
D.F. Malan, made this clear during the no-confidence debate
following the commitment of the South African Air Force to
the Far East:
'... we have thrown in our forces with UNO, with friendly
countries, anti-communist countries, and when aggressive
communism has for the first time raised its head, we have
sided with the anti-communist countries to combat it. We
need those anti-communist countries for our own protection
and I think to a fair degree, if all conditions are taken into
account, the anti-communist countries also need South
Africa in their battle.'(6)
The Prime Minister did not have to exert himself to any
great extent in order to defend his government's decision.
The opposition agreed in principle and it only called into
question the Cabinet's hesitation in reaching a decision and
its failure to consult parliament.(7) The lone dissenting voice
in the Assembly was that of Mr S. Kahn, Native
Representative for Cape Western. He had been a member of
the South African Communist Party, which had been
dissolved in June 1950 in anticipation of the passing of the
Suppression of Communism Act.(
Thus it was with the knowledge and sound support of their
government and their people that the 50 officers and 157
other ranks of 2 Sqn SAAF sailed from Durban on the Royal
Interocean Lines' Tjisadane on 26 September l950.(9) These
207 officers and men had been selected from 1 426
members of the Permanent Force who had initially
volunteered for service in the Far East.(10) This initial
contingent, which was commanded by Cmdt S. van Breda
Theron DSO, DFC, AFC, included many veterans of World
War II.(11) After a tedious voyage of six weeks the squadron
members arrived in Yokohama Harbour. There they were
welcomed by an all-black American brass band which had
been especially assembled for the occasion.(12) While in
Japan the South Africans were accommodated at the
Johnson Air Base just outside Tokyo where they underwent
conversion training on the F-51D Mustang and general
theatre orientation.(13)
On 16 November 1950 an advance SAAF detachment
consisting of 13 officers and 21 other ranks left Japan for
Pusan East (K-9) Air Base in Korea. Among the 13 officers
were the Squadron Commander and his four Flight
Commanders who made the crossing in their own F-51D
Mustangs. These pilots were to fly with the USAF pilots in
order to familiarize themselves with the local operational
conditions before leading their own flights on combat
missions.(14) On the morning of 19 November 1950 Cmdt
Theron and Capt G.B. Lipawsky took off with two USAF pilots
to fly the first SAAF combat sorties of the Korean War.(15)
MANNER OF INTEGRATION INTO THE UN FORCES AND
THE COMMAND STRUCTURE
While operating in Korea 2 Sqn SAAF formed an integral part
of the UN Forces. On 7 July 1950 the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution for the establishment of a United
Nations Command (UNC) under the US President. In terms
of the same resolution the US President was empowered to
appoint a commander for the UN Forces. The next day Gen
Douglas McArthur, who was already Commander-in-Chief of
the US Far East Command, was named C-in-C of the UNC.
The predominance of the US military structures in the Far
East gave rise to the practical expedient of MacArthur
assigning a dual role to his already existing Far East
Command Headquarters, which he simply re-designated
GHQ UNCIFEC. This meant that, for all practical purposes,
the non-US contingents assigned to the UN Forces were
merely integrated with the existing US military machine.(16)
Each 'foreign' contingent attached a senior liaison officer to
MacArthur's Headquarters who was responsible for the
administration of his particular forces in the theatre. The
first Senior Air Liaison Officer appointed in Tokyo to
represent the SAAF was Cmdt (later Col) J.D. Pretorius.(17)
The air force component of the UNCIFEC was known as the
Far East Air Forces (FEAF). This included a tactical air force,
the US Fifth Air Force. For the greater part of the war 2 Sqn
SAAF fell under the operational control of the 18th Fighter-
Bomber Wing (18 FBW) which was a combat wing of the Fifth
Air Force. The tactical role of the South African squadron was
spelt out to the Squadron Commander in his formal mission
letter which he received from the Commanding Officer of
the 18 FBW just one month after becoming operational. He
was charged to hold the squadron ready for the following
types of operations:
1. The destruction of enemy airpower.
2. The close support of UN ground forces.
3. Maximum range armed reconnaissance and offensive
strikes.
4. Interdiction of enemy ground lines and communications
to include attacks along avenues of escape for enemy forces.
5. Escort and/or cover for UN air, sea and land forces.
6. The air defence of military installations.(18)

Continuation ....

In fulfilment of its mission the SAAF contingent in Korea
used several air bases on the peninsula. Although the
advance detachment was initially stationed at the forward
airfield at P'yongyang East (K-24), the intervention of the
Chinese Communist Forces in late November 1950 forced its
withdrawal to Suwon (K-13) and later further south to
Chinhae (K-10). At Chinhae the officers and men of the
advance detachment were joined by the main body from
Japan in time to celebrate Christmas 1950 together.(19) The
squadron used Chinhae as a rear base until the end of
December 1952, with Suwon (K-13), Seoul (K-16) and
Hoengsong (K-46) serving as advance bases for various
periods. (Map 3) The stay at Chinhae was only interrupted
for a short spell, from 23 March 1951 to 23 April 1951, when
2 Sqn moved to Pusan (K-9) while the Chinhae base was
renovated. From January 1953 until their withdrawal in
October 1953 members of 2 Sqn operated their newly
acquired F-86F Sabres from the concrete runways at Osan
(K-55).
SAAF OPERATIONS DURING THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE
KOREAN WAR
The 2 Sqn pilots became active in Korea at a critical stage in
the conflict. In order to appreciate this as well as the task of
the squadron in relation to the ground situation, it is
necessary to make a brief reference to a general analysis of
the course of the war. Based upon the general direction of
movement along a north-south axis, the operations of the
Korean War can be divided into five distinct phases. These
phases are set out in Table 1.(20) The first SAAF combat
sorties were flown during the closing stages of Phase Two in
support of the UN advance towards the Yalu. The situation,
however, changed rather suddenly and a week after
becoming operational the 'Flying Cheetahs' found
themselves beating off the fresh Chinese troops that were
enveloping the withdrawing UN ground forces. Once the
Eighth Army had consolidated its positions along a line over
100 km south of the 38th parallel, from P'yongt'aek on the
West Coast to Samch'ok on the East Coast, the war settled
down to its two longest phases. Phase Four lasted for more
than nine months and consisted of the gradual UN fight back
to the 38th parallel in the face of determined Communist
resistance. Phase Five was characterized by a stalemate
along a line approximating the 38th parallel, with neither
side wanting to incur heavy losses while an armistice was
being negotiated. (Map 4) At this stage the FEAF became the
United Nations main offensive weapon, and 2 Sqn SAAF
settled down to the business of a tactical air force unit in
combat.
These phases can be further sub-divided into various
periods, mainly on the basis of the several tasks assigned to
18 FBW, and of the ground situation. The latter was
dominated by the offensive thrusts which were undertaken
by both sides within the broader context of the conflict. An
analysis of 2 Sqn combat sorties during the various periods
of Phases Four and Five is given in Table 2.(21) The figures
are indicative of a number of significant features of the SAAF
combat experience in Korea. In general, it is clear that the
main task of the squadron was the interdiction of enemy
supply routes which not only accounted for approximately
61,45% of SAAF combat sorties, but which reached an early
peak from January to May 1951 (78% and 82%).
Interdiction can be defined as any air action which prevents,
or delays, or destroys enemy movements of men and
supplies to the battle zone. The aim of interdiction is to
isolate the battlefield from the rear zones.(22) The
effectiveness of interdiction missions as opposed to close air
support missions remained a controversial point throughout
the Korean War.(23) During the first half of 1951 the
opinions of the protagonists of interdiction as to the
advantages of striking Communist troops and supplies while
they were concentrated for transport, prevailed.
Consequently this period saw 18 FBW and 2 Sqn directing
the bulk of their effort against enemy supply lines. The
typical interdiction mission was the armed reconnaissance
patrol, which was usually undertaken by flights of four or
two aircraft each armed with two napalm bombs, 127 mm
rockets and 12,7 mm machine guns, or with variations of
these weaponloads. These aircraft ranged along the main
north-south supply routes and along the secondary lateral
routes searching for targets of opportunity. 2 Sqn paid
particular attention to the double railway line and the road
in the West between Seoul and Sariwon, and to the Eastern
route between Wonsan and the Chosin Reservoir.

Continuation ...

The SAAF pilots made a significant contribution towards the
development of the Fifth Air Force's 'Truckbusting'
techniques and on 4 April 1951 the Commander of the Fifth
Air Force, Lt Gen E.E. Partridge, singled out 2 Sqn SAAF
during the UNC morning briefing as the most efficient unit at
seeking out and destroying camouflaged enemy vehicles.(24)
During Phase Five the interdiction missions by individual
flights were largely replaced by daily participation in raids of
squadron or of wing strength against selected elements of
the enemy's transportation infrastructure. The percentage of
the 2 Sqn effort allocated to close air support of ground
forces peaked twice during the course of the war, once
towards the end of 1951(38,4%), and again during the last
five months of 1952 (46%). Usually one or two flights from
each of 18 FBW's three squadrons were tasked daily in
support of the Eighth Army. In addition, an occasional
interdiction mission was diverted to render assistance to the ground forces.

(PICTURE) A SAAF F-S1D mustang armed with rockets and napalm bombs taxies out at sowon (K13) air base.

Continuation .....

This pattern changed somewhat during the autumn of 1951.
The Panmunjon truce talks were suspended at the end of
August and Lt Gen Van Fleet intensified general offensive
operations along the front line. In the East the action
centred around the high ridges on the Western side of the
'Punchbowl', 'Bloody Ridge' and 'Heartbreak Ridge'. In the
centre local advances were carried out in order to improve
the positions and to maintain pressure on the enemy.(25)
These ground operations were well backed by the Fifth Air
Force with the fighter-bomber wings allocating entire
squadrons to the close air support effort on a daily
rotational basis. These arrangements had the practical effect
of assigning all 2 Sqn missions to close air support every
fourth day. Within a period of ten days 2 Sqn twice broke its
own record for the highest number of combat sorties in a
single day. On 26 September, 40 sorties were undertaken
and on 4 October a new peak of 48 was reached. These were
creditable performances for both the air and ground crews
of the SAAF. The achievement of the latter is all the more
remarkable when it is noted that the squadron only
possessed 15 combat-ready aircraft at the time.(26)
The pattern of events which unfolded during the autumn of
1952 has a strong resemblance to that of the previous year.
The peace talks faltered once again during September 1952
and collapsed once more a month later, with each side
reverting to an increase in military pressure in order to
force its opponent back to the conference table in a more
'reasonable' frame of mind. The battle for tactically situated
outposts along the MLR erupted again in September and
during the following month some of the heaviest ground
fighting of the entire war took place along the base of the
'Iron Triangle'.(27) 2 Sqn SAAF became involved in these
outpost battles. The nature of these operations was such
that both sides commonly launched first and last light
attacks. Consequently, the Fifth Air Force required a certain
number of its fighter-bombers to be on 'Strip Alert' during
the twilight and dawn hours. A 'Strip Alert' flight would follow
all the normal pre-flight procedures, taxi to the end of the
runway, shutdown the engines and wait, with the pilots
remaining ready in the cockpits. Once called, the flight
would be air briefed to a specific controller, who then
directed it to a forward controller, who in turn would
indicate the target.(28)
A remarkable feature of SAAF activities in Korea, as indicated
by Table 2 is the allocation of 32% of the squadron's effort to
counter-air operations during 1953. The counter-air
missions which were undertaken by the FEAF in Korea
included;
fighter sweeps, escort missions and interceptions,
bombing missions aimed at the destruction of the aircraft on
the ground, and of their supporting ground installations,
photographic and visual reconnaissance missions.(29)
On rare occasions during 1951 and 1952, and for a short
period during March 1953, when the newly acquired F-86F
Sabres first entered combat, 2 Sqn aircraft were assigned to
counter-air missions solely concerned with fighter sweeps
and interceptions. Later, however, they were freqeuntly
directed against enemy airfields and it was this type of
mission which accounted for the large percentage of 2 Sqn
effort allocated to counter-air sorties during 1953.

(PICTURE) A SAAF F-8f sabre in korea.