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“If Mugabe Dies, We Will Field His Corpse As A Candidate For Election” - Wife / Photos: What Some Countries Gives Their Soldiers To Eat On The Battle Field. / Video Of Frightened Black Man Forced Into A Coffin By White Man Sparks Outrage (2) (3) (4)
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Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 1:39am On Apr 06, 2015 |
Battle field discussion (picture/video's) of african military; these is a thread where by we discuss military histories and the harsh realty of war are being shared be it in pictures and video ! 4 Likes 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 6:45am On Apr 06, 2015 |
CION pictures 4 Likes 1 Share
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 6:48am On Apr 06, 2015 |
Continues; 1 Like
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 7:21am On Apr 06, 2015 |
OPERATION UNICORD Part of nigeria civil war Date july 2-12,1967 Location: northern biafra border Result; nigeria victory Belligerents; Nigeria and Biafra Commanders; Nigeria( sule apollo and martin adamu). Biafra(H.M njoku). Casualties: unknown on both sides . The Operation UNICORD (July 2 – July 12, 1967) was an offensive launched by the Nigerian Army at the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War. It involved the capture of 6 major Biafran towns near their northern border. Background When Nigeria became an independent state in October 1960 the newly formed government consisted mainly of northern politician from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. Early on the Nigerian government became corrupt with various politicians swindling public funds and rigging votes. By 1965 the Nigerian government became so corrupt that uprisings against the government sprang up all across Nigeria with various politicians attempting to gain more power. This resulted in rioting and mass arrests in the cities of Lagos and Ibadan. The politician Obafemi Awolowo was falsely blamed for causing the riots and was sentenced to 10 years in a Nigerian prison. All of the chaos that occurred in the political ralm gave was to the 1966 Nigerian coup d'etat in which 11 senior politicians were killed by mainly Igbo soldiers led by the Army Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu. The Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar Balewa was one of the 11 politicians assassinated during the coup of January 15. Nzeogwu's soldiers were forced to retreat to Kaduna after General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi was able to assemble a force of soldiers in Lagos to combat the rebellious soldiers. Ironsi was made President of Nigeria on January 16, 1966 and became the first Igbo president in Nigerian history. many northern generals and politicians were angry at Ironsi for two reasons, because he did not execute Major Nzeogwu and because he was giving more and more political power to southern politicians. On July 29, 1966 Ironsi was assassinated by a mutinous soldiers under the command of Lt Col Murtala Mohammed and installed Colonel Yakubu Gowon as Head of State. The counter-coup resulted in the 1966 anti-Igbo pogrom and caused the brutal massacre of 50,000 Igbo civilians living in various northern cities such as Kano and Kaduna. These massacres angered many Igbo civilians and a call for secession was given by Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. Ojukwu met with President Gowon in Aburi, Ghana in December 1966 to discuss the situation that was occurring in Nigeria. A vote was held in May 1967 in the Eastern Region of Nigeria that was to see how many easterners supported a secession. The vote resulted in 68% of easterners approving of a secession of a secular Igbo state. On May 30, 1967 Ojukwu officially seceded the Eastern Region and proclaimed the new Republic of Biafra. Ojukwu managed to assemble a 3,000 man guerrilla force to defend Biafra's front lines. In early July 1967 Nigerian President Gowon ordered General Olusegun Obasanjo to regain control of the Eastern Region. Battle On July 2, 1967 the Nigerian Army opened its offensive operations from the Northern sector. The First Area Command NA, supported by an artillery brigade consisting of scorpion tanks, saladin armored cars, and ferrets was divided into two brigades. The 1st brigade under Maj. Sule Apollo advanced down the Ogugu-Ogunga-Nsukka road while the 2nd brigade under Maj. Martin Adamu advanced down the Gakem-Obudu-Ogoja road. Defending Biafran soldiers under Brig. H.M. Njoku managed to repel the attack, however, the Nigerian Army began recruiting guides and informants to report on the disposition of Biafran troops, their strength, and other crucial information. For 10 days the Nigerian Army fought its way southward and managed to capture the towns of Nsukka, Ogugu, Ogunga, Ogoja, Gakem, and Obudu while also forcing defending Biafran troops to retreat in disarray. Many Biafran soldiers complained of malaria, headache, and other ailments. Thousands of Biafran civilians fled their homes, in fear of being massacred by Nigerian soldiers, and headed for the Biafran capital, Enugu. Aftermath 16 days after the Biafrans retreated Nzeogwu attempted to regain control of Nsukka on July 30 but was killed by Nigerian soldiers while driving down a road. Obasanjo was successful in his conquest of Nsukka but did not enter any further into Biafran territory but instead was put aside after the Biafran Generals Albert Okonkwo and Victor Banjo invaded Nigeria's Mid-Western Region. Murtala Mohammed was put in charge of fending off all Biafran soldiers within Nigeria's boundaries. Victor Banjo got within 135 miles of the Nigerian Capital Lagos before he was intercepted by Mohammed's men. After over a month of bloody fighting the Biafrans retreated to Onitsha and released their hold over the Mid-Western Region. With the Midwest Invasion over the Nigerians returned to Nsukka and began planning an invasion of the Biafran Capital Enugu. Due to Nsukka's proximity to Enugu it was a strategic stronghold. Olusegun Obasanjo invaded the area around Enugu in mid September 1967. Obasanjo knew that Enugu would not fall easily if he attacked it head on so he decided to surround the city and begin a siege. On September 30 Obasanjo was able to break through the Biafran defensive lines around Enugu and entered the city. After 6 days of bloody fighting the Biafrans fled south to Umuahia. Below are some pictures from the civil war 1) A federal soldier armed with an anti-tank bazooka ,seing covering the end of aba-umuahia road where the biafran troops hold positions,sept 28 1968. 2)A biafran soldier with an portable anti-tank bazooka 3)A biafran soldier with a GPMG 4) A federal soldier captured by biafran troops. 7 Likes 1 Share
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Missy89(f): 7:45am On Apr 06, 2015 |
When will the Nigerian military start dressing their troops properly when they are on combat operations? The only time they dress well is during a ceremonial duty It is shameful really 10 Likes 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by patwilly(m): 7:51am On Apr 06, 2015 |
@bidexii I think this is a deliberate misrepresentation of facts. you got that from wikipedia maybe- dumb site. one has to be careful with the information we post on public forums because I fear a generation one day, will wake up and recount history as it NEVER happened!! What I'm saying is, O. Obasanjo was nowhere near the Nsukka front (1st division AOR) as at 1967. He entered the war quite late in 1969 and even then was handed the command of the 3rd marine commando division ( Adekunle's division) whose area of responsibility stretched across the Atlantic theatre from calabar to port Harcourt, bonny and all those areas. 15 Likes 5 Shares |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by patwilly(m): 7:55am On Apr 06, 2015 |
Missy89:Well why spend much needed cash on a soldier who us is about to die....lol just kidding. Reminds me of tsarist Russia where it was said that Russian soldiers were given rifles a piece for three. Lol. Talk about corruption. 1 Like 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 9:13am On Apr 06, 2015 |
patwilly:That is not true ! And you made a 100% misrepresentation of facts by saying;"he entered the war quite late in 1969 . Then what year was he appointed ? The civil war lasted;6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970 (2 years, 6 months, 1 week and 2 days) , so how many months did he played in the war, when he entered late 1969 that the war ended. Get your facts right ? 5 Likes 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Crocz(m): 9:55am On Apr 06, 2015 |
bidexiii:He's still right in OBJ's role...he never laid siege on any land area, he was the commanding officer for the battalion on the atlantic ocean. Go check facts again, I'm sure you'll find it somewhere. OBJ was never near Nnsuka 11 Likes 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 12:10pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Pictures of NA commandos 1 Like
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by patwilly(m): 1:16pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
bidexiii:Listen. Dont be in a hurry to dispute what I've said. I've discovered as regards history especially the Nigerian civil war, a lot of online sources render untrue accounts probably due to ethnic sentiments/leanings on both sides. A more reliable way is to read accounts by key participants in that war and not some hogwash written by someone with second hand motives. Nevertheless, I recommend you read Now a omoigui's essays on the civil. They give quite a balanced view of events in that war. Too bad I'm busy at the moment, I'd have sought it out for you. 8 Likes 2 Shares |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bilaal29: 1:50pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Anyway let the narration continue |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Missy89(f): 2:26pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
patwilly: OFF TOPIC The one rifle to 3 men was was actually a myth that started during the first world war and continued after the second world war mostly based on Khrushchev memoirs The imperial Russian army was well armed just like the Red army of soviet Russia. The reason for high the casualties which made the myth believable however had to do with the fact that the Russians had inferior tactics before 43-44 and suffered heavy loses but adapted and learned from their mistake. Only Shtrafbats (Penal Battalions) where sent in sometimes with sticks carved like guns lol. and forced to wear black in the snow in other to feint an attack while the real units hide in white and counter attack. Take a look at that rotten vest on one that young man! disgusting 3 Likes 3 Shares |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Nobody: 2:52pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Missy89:the vest shows it have taken multiple bullet hits hence the wornout ,it is not rotten as you say sir. 2 Likes |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Nobody: 3:06pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Missy89:soldiers don't like all these gears ,they prefer comfort ,as for the uniforms we operate several variants of camo due to different geogrphical location, the north east is a mix from deserts to a few grassland+units involved have their patterns of dressing e.g special forces 3 Likes 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Missy89(f): 3:07pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Nigerdeltaboi: Bullets do not wore out a vest. they penetrate it and stay inside so u can remove it. That is a wear and tear and has nothing to do with bullets 3 Likes 2 Shares |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Missy89(f): 3:21pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
DEATHMACHINE: The gears are not for comfort but to save their lives and make them function properly. If they train with them enough, they will get used to them. Another thing is they do not have to use imported gears because different gear works for different areas, etc. that is why the military should have a research team or body that tests what will work for the army, try them out of the field and mass produce them! 6 Likes |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by patwilly(m): 3:25pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Missy89:My oh my! I see someone's well grounded on the subject. Yeah you are right. The Russian higher ups were very distrustful of its military; something not uncommon with most corrupt governments.. and then the great purge of '36 to '38 of its officer corps. Virtually all officers from the rank of major upwards were executed! little wonder they were caught up in the early years of world war II. terrible! 2 Likes 1 Share |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 3:26pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
we have soldiers that kit well but they look too heavy,like a video just released by defence HQ,(the 72 mobile strike force)NA soldier coming out of a REVA APC . But for foot infantry men they would match,route and mop villages of insurgency from one to another you need some thing light and don't forget the desert terrain the heat scourge. I don't. Think we are. Doing bad in terms of kitting, we should just improve the webbing gear. Look at the chadian's they look rag-tag but let me tell you something those guys are damn too good they av proven there self in mali and the ongoing insurgent border war ! 3 Likes 2 Shares |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 3:33pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Pictures of nigerian special forces training in pakistan: 1 Like 1 Share
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 3:36pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Continuation..... 2 Likes
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 3:41pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
More..... 2 Likes
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Pebcak: 3:47pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Nobody: 4:47pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Missy89:yes they are for saving lives despite that some troops won't wear them ,just like me i have served countless jobs right from NMS to NDA because i dislike wearing helmets.DICON produces most of the vest currently been used.yes there are shortcomings but its not an easy task kiting over 30,000 troops in combat.cheers 3 Likes |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by Nobody: 4:51pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
bidexiii:where did you get these pics from ? please find a way to conceal their indentities. |
Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 4:51pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
Team and member of 72 strike force ! 1 Like
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 5:40pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
CION operations: guys ain't smiling 6 Likes 1 Share
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 5:43pm On Apr 06, 2015 |
More... 1 Like 1 Share
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 9:25am On Apr 07, 2015 |
THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIRFORCE IN KOREA ( AN ASSESSMENT ) relatively short article can hardly do justice to the experiences of a tactical air force unit through nearly three years of operations. However, an idea of the contribution of 2 Squadron, SAAF to the UN effort during the Korean War can be gained if the following matters are considered: The reasons for the SAAF participation in the Korean War. The manner of integration into the UN Forces and the Command structure. The SAAF operations during the various phases of the Korean War. THE REASONS FOR THE SAAF PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR At the outbreak of the Korean War the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the North Korean Forces. A request was also made to all UN members for assistance in the execution of this decision.(1) Following a special Cabinet meeting on 20 July 1950 the announcement was made that owing to the great distance between South Africa and Korea, direct military participation in the conflict was both impractical and unrealistic.(2) Further negotiations with the United States Government led to the conclusion that, in spite of the anticipated difficulties, direct military assistance was still considered to be the best form of aid that could be rendered by the South African Government.(3) Following a day-long Cabinet sitting on 4 August it was announced that a SAAF fighter squadron would be made available to the UN effort. (4) For the first time in the history of the Union of South Africa all the parties represented in parliament agreed upon an overseas mission for the country's armed forces. South Africa's position on a continent susceptible to the rise and spread of Communism necessitated becoming involved in the first UN effort to directly oppose armed aggression in order to avoid future isolation.(5) The Prime Minister, Dr D.F. Malan, made this clear during the no-confidence debate following the commitment of the South African Air Force to the Far East: '... we have thrown in our forces with UNO, with friendly countries, anti-communist countries, and when aggressive communism has for the first time raised its head, we have sided with the anti-communist countries to combat it. We need those anti-communist countries for our own protection and I think to a fair degree, if all conditions are taken into account, the anti-communist countries also need South Africa in their battle.'(6) The Prime Minister did not have to exert himself to any great extent in order to defend his government's decision. The opposition agreed in principle and it only called into question the Cabinet's hesitation in reaching a decision and its failure to consult parliament.(7) The lone dissenting voice in the Assembly was that of Mr S. Kahn, Native Representative for Cape Western. He had been a member of the South African Communist Party, which had been dissolved in June 1950 in anticipation of the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act.( ![]() Thus it was with the knowledge and sound support of their government and their people that the 50 officers and 157 other ranks of 2 Sqn SAAF sailed from Durban on the Royal Interocean Lines' Tjisadane on 26 September l950.(9) These 207 officers and men had been selected from 1 426 members of the Permanent Force who had initially volunteered for service in the Far East.(10) This initial contingent, which was commanded by Cmdt S. van Breda Theron DSO, DFC, AFC, included many veterans of World War II.(11) After a tedious voyage of six weeks the squadron members arrived in Yokohama Harbour. There they were welcomed by an all-black American brass band which had been especially assembled for the occasion.(12) While in Japan the South Africans were accommodated at the Johnson Air Base just outside Tokyo where they underwent conversion training on the F-51D Mustang and general theatre orientation.(13) On 16 November 1950 an advance SAAF detachment consisting of 13 officers and 21 other ranks left Japan for Pusan East (K-9) Air Base in Korea. Among the 13 officers were the Squadron Commander and his four Flight Commanders who made the crossing in their own F-51D Mustangs. These pilots were to fly with the USAF pilots in order to familiarize themselves with the local operational conditions before leading their own flights on combat missions.(14) On the morning of 19 November 1950 Cmdt Theron and Capt G.B. Lipawsky took off with two USAF pilots to fly the first SAAF combat sorties of the Korean War.(15) MANNER OF INTEGRATION INTO THE UN FORCES AND THE COMMAND STRUCTURE While operating in Korea 2 Sqn SAAF formed an integral part of the UN Forces. On 7 July 1950 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution for the establishment of a United Nations Command (UNC) under the US President. In terms of the same resolution the US President was empowered to appoint a commander for the UN Forces. The next day Gen Douglas McArthur, who was already Commander-in-Chief of the US Far East Command, was named C-in-C of the UNC. The predominance of the US military structures in the Far East gave rise to the practical expedient of MacArthur assigning a dual role to his already existing Far East Command Headquarters, which he simply re-designated GHQ UNCIFEC. This meant that, for all practical purposes, the non-US contingents assigned to the UN Forces were merely integrated with the existing US military machine.(16) Each 'foreign' contingent attached a senior liaison officer to MacArthur's Headquarters who was responsible for the administration of his particular forces in the theatre. The first Senior Air Liaison Officer appointed in Tokyo to represent the SAAF was Cmdt (later Col) J.D. Pretorius.(17) The air force component of the UNCIFEC was known as the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). This included a tactical air force, the US Fifth Air Force. For the greater part of the war 2 Sqn SAAF fell under the operational control of the 18th Fighter- Bomber Wing (18 FBW) which was a combat wing of the Fifth Air Force. The tactical role of the South African squadron was spelt out to the Squadron Commander in his formal mission letter which he received from the Commanding Officer of the 18 FBW just one month after becoming operational. He was charged to hold the squadron ready for the following types of operations: 1. The destruction of enemy airpower. 2. The close support of UN ground forces. 3. Maximum range armed reconnaissance and offensive strikes. 4. Interdiction of enemy ground lines and communications to include attacks along avenues of escape for enemy forces. 5. Escort and/or cover for UN air, sea and land forces. 6. The air defence of military installations.(18)
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 9:28am On Apr 07, 2015 |
Continuation .... In fulfilment of its mission the SAAF contingent in Korea used several air bases on the peninsula. Although the advance detachment was initially stationed at the forward airfield at P'yongyang East (K-24), the intervention of the Chinese Communist Forces in late November 1950 forced its withdrawal to Suwon (K-13) and later further south to Chinhae (K-10). At Chinhae the officers and men of the advance detachment were joined by the main body from Japan in time to celebrate Christmas 1950 together.(19) The squadron used Chinhae as a rear base until the end of December 1952, with Suwon (K-13), Seoul (K-16) and Hoengsong (K-46) serving as advance bases for various periods. (Map 3) The stay at Chinhae was only interrupted for a short spell, from 23 March 1951 to 23 April 1951, when 2 Sqn moved to Pusan (K-9) while the Chinhae base was renovated. From January 1953 until their withdrawal in October 1953 members of 2 Sqn operated their newly acquired F-86F Sabres from the concrete runways at Osan (K-55). SAAF OPERATIONS DURING THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE KOREAN WAR The 2 Sqn pilots became active in Korea at a critical stage in the conflict. In order to appreciate this as well as the task of the squadron in relation to the ground situation, it is necessary to make a brief reference to a general analysis of the course of the war. Based upon the general direction of movement along a north-south axis, the operations of the Korean War can be divided into five distinct phases. These phases are set out in Table 1.(20) The first SAAF combat sorties were flown during the closing stages of Phase Two in support of the UN advance towards the Yalu. The situation, however, changed rather suddenly and a week after becoming operational the 'Flying Cheetahs' found themselves beating off the fresh Chinese troops that were enveloping the withdrawing UN ground forces. Once the Eighth Army had consolidated its positions along a line over 100 km south of the 38th parallel, from P'yongt'aek on the West Coast to Samch'ok on the East Coast, the war settled down to its two longest phases. Phase Four lasted for more than nine months and consisted of the gradual UN fight back to the 38th parallel in the face of determined Communist resistance. Phase Five was characterized by a stalemate along a line approximating the 38th parallel, with neither side wanting to incur heavy losses while an armistice was being negotiated. (Map 4) At this stage the FEAF became the United Nations main offensive weapon, and 2 Sqn SAAF settled down to the business of a tactical air force unit in combat. These phases can be further sub-divided into various periods, mainly on the basis of the several tasks assigned to 18 FBW, and of the ground situation. The latter was dominated by the offensive thrusts which were undertaken by both sides within the broader context of the conflict. An analysis of 2 Sqn combat sorties during the various periods of Phases Four and Five is given in Table 2.(21) The figures are indicative of a number of significant features of the SAAF combat experience in Korea. In general, it is clear that the main task of the squadron was the interdiction of enemy supply routes which not only accounted for approximately 61,45% of SAAF combat sorties, but which reached an early peak from January to May 1951 (78% and 82%). Interdiction can be defined as any air action which prevents, or delays, or destroys enemy movements of men and supplies to the battle zone. The aim of interdiction is to isolate the battlefield from the rear zones.(22) The effectiveness of interdiction missions as opposed to close air support missions remained a controversial point throughout the Korean War.(23) During the first half of 1951 the opinions of the protagonists of interdiction as to the advantages of striking Communist troops and supplies while they were concentrated for transport, prevailed. Consequently this period saw 18 FBW and 2 Sqn directing the bulk of their effort against enemy supply lines. The typical interdiction mission was the armed reconnaissance patrol, which was usually undertaken by flights of four or two aircraft each armed with two napalm bombs, 127 mm rockets and 12,7 mm machine guns, or with variations of these weaponloads. These aircraft ranged along the main north-south supply routes and along the secondary lateral routes searching for targets of opportunity. 2 Sqn paid particular attention to the double railway line and the road in the West between Seoul and Sariwon, and to the Eastern route between Wonsan and the Chosin Reservoir.
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 9:34am On Apr 07, 2015 |
Continuation ... The SAAF pilots made a significant contribution towards the development of the Fifth Air Force's 'Truckbusting' techniques and on 4 April 1951 the Commander of the Fifth Air Force, Lt Gen E.E. Partridge, singled out 2 Sqn SAAF during the UNC morning briefing as the most efficient unit at seeking out and destroying camouflaged enemy vehicles.(24) During Phase Five the interdiction missions by individual flights were largely replaced by daily participation in raids of squadron or of wing strength against selected elements of the enemy's transportation infrastructure. The percentage of the 2 Sqn effort allocated to close air support of ground forces peaked twice during the course of the war, once towards the end of 1951(38,4%), and again during the last five months of 1952 (46%). Usually one or two flights from each of 18 FBW's three squadrons were tasked daily in support of the Eighth Army. In addition, an occasional interdiction mission was diverted to render assistance to the ground forces. (PICTURE) A SAAF F-S1D mustang armed with rockets and napalm bombs taxies out at sowon (K13) air base.
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Re: Battle Field Discussion (picture/video) Of African Military . by bidexiii: 9:38am On Apr 07, 2015 |
Continuation ..... This pattern changed somewhat during the autumn of 1951. The Panmunjon truce talks were suspended at the end of August and Lt Gen Van Fleet intensified general offensive operations along the front line. In the East the action centred around the high ridges on the Western side of the 'Punchbowl', 'Bloody Ridge' and 'Heartbreak Ridge'. In the centre local advances were carried out in order to improve the positions and to maintain pressure on the enemy.(25) These ground operations were well backed by the Fifth Air Force with the fighter-bomber wings allocating entire squadrons to the close air support effort on a daily rotational basis. These arrangements had the practical effect of assigning all 2 Sqn missions to close air support every fourth day. Within a period of ten days 2 Sqn twice broke its own record for the highest number of combat sorties in a single day. On 26 September, 40 sorties were undertaken and on 4 October a new peak of 48 was reached. These were creditable performances for both the air and ground crews of the SAAF. The achievement of the latter is all the more remarkable when it is noted that the squadron only possessed 15 combat-ready aircraft at the time.(26) The pattern of events which unfolded during the autumn of 1952 has a strong resemblance to that of the previous year. The peace talks faltered once again during September 1952 and collapsed once more a month later, with each side reverting to an increase in military pressure in order to force its opponent back to the conference table in a more 'reasonable' frame of mind. The battle for tactically situated outposts along the MLR erupted again in September and during the following month some of the heaviest ground fighting of the entire war took place along the base of the 'Iron Triangle'.(27) 2 Sqn SAAF became involved in these outpost battles. The nature of these operations was such that both sides commonly launched first and last light attacks. Consequently, the Fifth Air Force required a certain number of its fighter-bombers to be on 'Strip Alert' during the twilight and dawn hours. A 'Strip Alert' flight would follow all the normal pre-flight procedures, taxi to the end of the runway, shutdown the engines and wait, with the pilots remaining ready in the cockpits. Once called, the flight would be air briefed to a specific controller, who then directed it to a forward controller, who in turn would indicate the target.(28) A remarkable feature of SAAF activities in Korea, as indicated by Table 2 is the allocation of 32% of the squadron's effort to counter-air operations during 1953. The counter-air missions which were undertaken by the FEAF in Korea included; fighter sweeps, escort missions and interceptions, bombing missions aimed at the destruction of the aircraft on the ground, and of their supporting ground installations, photographic and visual reconnaissance missions.(29) On rare occasions during 1951 and 1952, and for a short period during March 1953, when the newly acquired F-86F Sabres first entered combat, 2 Sqn aircraft were assigned to counter-air missions solely concerned with fighter sweeps and interceptions. Later, however, they were freqeuntly directed against enemy airfields and it was this type of mission which accounted for the large percentage of 2 Sqn effort allocated to counter-air sorties during 1953. (PICTURE) A SAAF F-8f sabre in korea.
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