Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo - Politics (2) - Nairaland
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Why Nigerians Will Become Poorer With Rising Oil Prices - Henry Boyo / Where's The $7billion Placed In 14 Banks By Soludo? Henry Boyo / Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala "A Grave Sin Of Cowardice" - By Ugoji Egbujo (2) (3) (4)
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| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by baralatie(m): 10:22am On Sep 10, 2015 |
testing! testing!! testing!!!
123 |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Nobody: 10:28am On Sep 10, 2015 |
989900:9 out of 10 times threads like this rot away 3 Likes 2 Shares |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by baralatie(m): 10:43am On Sep 10, 2015 |
989900: it pays to read!even from your own text, Mrs Okonjo Iweala is Spot on abd Accurate!!! @989900 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Jesusloveyou: 10:45am On Sep 10, 2015 |
OZAOEKPE:"an economics analyst" quote me anywhere. 4 Likes |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Jesusloveyou: 10:49am On Sep 10, 2015 |
baralatie:even if u test from today til next 4yrs, u don't have anything to say 5 Likes |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by baralatie(m): 10:51am On Sep 10, 2015 |
Jesusloveyou: Origin of Nigeria's Debt Nigeria's External and Domestic Debt EXTERNAL DEBTS Nigeria’s external indebtedness dates back to pre-independence period. However, the quantum of the debt was small until 1978. The debts incurred before 1978 were mainly long-term loans from multilateral and official sources such as the World Bank and the country’s major trading partners. The debts were not much of a burden on the economy because the loans were obtained on soft terms. Moreover, the country had abundant revenue receipts from oil, especially during the oil boom of 1973-1976. However, the fall in oil prices and hence oil receipts in 1977/78 forced the country to raise the first jumbo loan of more than $1.0 billion from the international capital market. The loan, which had a grace period of three years, was used to finance various medium and long-term infrastructural projects, which did not directly yield returns for its amortization. The recovery of the oil market from 1979, with oil prices rising to an all-time high of US$39.00 per barrel in 1980/81, led to the notion that the economy was buoyant. Consequently, some deflationary measures put in place in 1978 were relaxed. A consumption pattern that favoured imported goods emerged which was aggravated and sustained by the import substitution industrialization strategy that depended heavily on imported raw materials and machinery as well as overvalued exchange rate regime. Many of the projects included in the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) had high import content. The plan was based on an estimated foreign exchange inflow of US$30 billion per annum but between 1981 and 1982 monthly imports bills averaged US$2 billion (or US$24 billion per annum) while monthly export receipts sank drastically to an average of US$1.5 billion (or US$18 billion per annum). Besides indiscriminate and excessive importation, there were cases of over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. Predictably, the euphoria of the oil boom was short-lived and when oil prices collapsed in 1982, the economy immediately suffered considerable strains. The production and consumption patterns that emerged during the oil boom could not be sustained in the face of declining foreign exchange earnings. Rather than address the problem of declining foreign exchange revenue both the Federal and state governments embarked on massive external borrowings from the international capital market (ICM). Unfortunately, that was also the period of excess loanable funds in the Western World. The International commercial banks with idle “petro-dollars” in their vaults went out selling loans to unsuspecting developing countries in the guise of assisting their economic development, a phenomenon usually referred to as the recycling of petro-dollars. Thus, pressure soon mounted on the various sectors of the economy resulting in huge imbalances in government finance, low international reserves, deficits in the balance of payments, and the accumulation of trade arrears in respect of insured and uninsured trade credits. That led Nigeria to the refinancing agreement of 1983 in respect of letters of credit amounting to $2.1 billion. Trade debts contracted through open account and bills for collection, which were outstanding as at 31st December 1983 were refinanced through issuance of promissory notes. As trade arrears continued to mount the country could not also service her external debts. A critical point was reached in 1986 when creditors refused to open new credit lines for imports to Nigeria. Therefore, the government approached the creditors for debt relief leading to the restructuring arrangements with the Paris Club in 1986, 1989, 1991 and 2000. The arrangement provided for the capitalization and restructuring of accumulated debt service arrears, their penalties, late and moratorium interests as well as maturities within the consolidated periods. The debt stock therefore increased with leaps and jumps, even when no new loans were contracted. Nigeria’s external debt stock till 1977 was less than US$0.8 billion. Beginning from 1978, the external debt stock began to grow astronomically, rising from US$0.763 billion in 1977 to US$5.09 billion in 1978 and U$8.855 billion in 1980, an increase of over 73.96 percent between 1978 and 1980. By 1985 the debt profile had deteriorated seriously due to persistent inability of the country to meet its external debt service obligations. This resulted in mounting arrears and unmanageable growth of the debt stock relative to available resources. The external debt stock, which was about US$8.855 billion in 1980, grew to nearly US$19 billion by 1985. Correspondingly, the debt stock as a percentage of total export earnings and GDP rose to uncomfortable levels of 154% and 24 %, respectively. In that year, the debt service payment due was a little above US$4 billion, which was about 33% of the total export earnings. However, the actual debt service payment for the year was about US$1.5 billion. As at December 31st, 2001, the country’s external debt stock amounted to US$28.35 billion, which was about 59.4% of the GDP and 153.9 % of export earnings. The total external debt outstanding as at 31st December, 2002 stood at US$30.99 billion as against US$28.34 billion in 2001 indicating an increase of US$2.64 billion or 9.33 per cent. The increase was largely a result of the interest component of payment arrears that accumulated during the year and the sharp depreciation of the US dollar against other currencies in which the debts are denominated. The interest component was made up of contractual interest of US$1.41 billion and late/penalty interest of US$0.049 billion, while the increase due to the effect of the depreciation of the US Dollar was US$1.75 billion. Some debts, which were accepted after further reconciliation with the creditors and drawdown on some multilateral and post cut-off loans also contributed to the increase. The combined effect of the above factors was however mitigated by the buyback of London Club Par Bonds of US$0.601 billion. The debt stock as at 31st December, 2002 comprised US$25.38 billion or 81.89 per cent owed to the Paris Club, US$2.96 billion or 9.55 per cent to the Multilateral Institutions, US$1.44 billion or 4.65 per cent to the London Club, US$1.15 billion or 3.72 per cent to the Promissory Note holders while the sum of US$0.056 billion or 0.18 per cent was owed to non-Paris Club creditors. The growth in the stock of debts owed to the Paris Club creditors (official debts) since the mid-1980s was accounted for partly by unpaid new maturities falling due and the outcomes of non-concessional rescheduling. To address its debt problem, Nigeria had four rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club (in December 1986, March 1989, January 1991 and 2000 respectively), which provided for traditional rescheduling terms with market-related interest rates. Nigeria defaulted on these agreements due to high debt service obligations and adverse cash flow position, which contributed to the build up of its debt profile. Private debt arrears were consolidated in 1991 under the Brady Plan. The stocks amounted to US$5.8 billion. 62 percent of it was bought back at 40 cents per dollar while the remaining US$2.043 billion or 38 percent was collateralized with the United States Treasury zero-coupon bonds maturing in November 15, 2002. The official creditors rose from 20.8 percent in 1985 to about 78 percent in 2001. The total external debt outstanding as at 31st December 2004 stood at US$35.94 billion as against US$32.92 billion in December 2003, indicating an increase of US$3.03 billion or 9.20 percent. As was the case in the year 2003, the increase in the debt stock was largely as a result of the interest component of additional payment arrears that accumulated, and continued depreciation of the US dollar against other currencies in which the debts were denominated. The additional interest of US$1.54 billion was made up of contractual interest of US$1.30 billion and late/penalty interest of US$0.233 billion, while the increase due to the effect of the depreciation of the US dollar was approximately US$1.49 billion. A further breakdown of the total debt outstanding showed that the principal balance was US$30.29 billion; principal arrears amounted to US$1.94 billion, interest arrears and late interest were US$3.36 billion and US$0.357 billion respectively. The increase in the external debt stock was due primarily to arrears that were incurred as a result of non-servicing of the non-ODA (non-official development assistance) bilateral debt: arrears on this debt accounted for 96.6 percent of total arrears. DEBT SERVICING The total external debt service payment for the year 2004 was US$1.75 billion compared to US$1.81 billion in 2003, reflecting a decrease of US$0.054 billion or 3.01 percent. The external debt service payments of US$1.75 billion comprised of principal repayments of US$1.17 billion, and interest payments and commitment charges of US$0.589 billion. Payments to the Paris Club creditors took the lion’s share amounting to US$0.994 billion or 56.67 percent. The sum of US$0.487 billion or 27.77 percent was paid to multilateral institutions, US$0.090 billion or 5.14 percent to London Club, US$0.171 billion or 9.76 percent to the Promissory Note holders and US$0.012 billion or 0.66 percent to non-Paris Club Bilateral creditors. It is important to note that the US$1.75 billion debt service paid in 2004 is actually well below the debt service due for the year of US$2.99 billion. This arises from the fact that Nigeria has not fully serviced its Paris Club debts, as an amount of US$2.23 billion was due while only US$0.99 billion was paid. The shortfall transforms into arrears and attracts severe penalty interest. This very process has contributed to the explosion in Nigeria’s external debt stock over the years. DOMESTIC DEBTS Domestic debt is defined as debt denominated in local currency. 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by baralatie(m): 10:53am On Sep 10, 2015 |
@98900 read this again Origin of Nigeria's Debt Nigeria's External and Domestic Debt EXTERNAL DEBTS Nigeria’s external indebtedness dates back to pre-independence period. However, the quantum of the debt was small until 1978. The debts incurred before 1978 were mainly long-term loans from multilateral and official sources such as the World Bank and the country’s major trading partners. The debts were not much of a burden on the economy because the loans were obtained on soft terms. Moreover, the country had abundant revenue receipts from oil, especially during the oil boom of 1973-1976. However, the fall in oil prices and hence oil receipts in 1977/78 forced the country to raise the first jumbo loan of more than $1.0 billion from the international capital market. The loan, which had a grace period of three years, was used to finance various medium and long-term infrastructural projects, which did not directly yield returns for its amortization. The recovery of the oil market from 1979, with oil prices rising to an all-time high of US$39.00 per barrel in 1980/81, led to the notion that the economy was buoyant. Consequently, some deflationary measures put in place in 1978 were relaxed. A consumption pattern that favoured imported goods emerged which was aggravated and sustained by the import substitution industrialization strategy that depended heavily on imported raw materials and machinery as well as overvalued exchange rate regime. Many of the projects included in the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) had high import content. The plan was based on an estimated foreign exchange inflow of US$30 billion per annum but between 1981 and 1982 monthly imports bills averaged US$2 billion (or US$24 billion per annum) while monthly export receipts sank drastically to an average of US$1.5 billion (or US$18 billion per annum). Besides indiscriminate and excessive importation, there were cases of over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. Predictably, the euphoria of the oil boom was short-lived and when oil prices collapsed in 1982, the economy immediately suffered considerable strains. The production and consumption patterns that emerged during the oil boom could not be sustained in the face of declining foreign exchange earnings. Rather than address the problem of declining foreign exchange revenue both the Federal and state governments embarked on massive external borrowings from the international capital market (ICM). Unfortunately, that was also the period of excess loanable funds in the Western World. The International commercial banks with idle “petro-dollars” in their vaults went out selling loans to unsuspecting developing countries in the guise of assisting their economic development, a phenomenon usually referred to as the recycling of petro-dollars. Thus, pressure soon mounted on the various sectors of the economy resulting in huge imbalances in government finance, low international reserves, deficits in the balance of payments, and the accumulation of trade arrears in respect of insured and uninsured trade credits. That led Nigeria to the refinancing agreement of 1983 in respect of letters of credit amounting to $2.1 billion. Trade debts contracted through open account and bills for collection, which were outstanding as at 31st December 1983 were refinanced through issuance of promissory notes. As trade arrears continued to mount the country could not also service her external debts. A critical point was reached in 1986 when creditors refused to open new credit lines for imports to Nigeria. Therefore, the government approached the creditors for debt relief leading to the restructuring arrangements with the Paris Club in 1986, 1989, 1991 and 2000. The arrangement provided for the capitalization and restructuring of accumulated debt service arrears, their penalties, late and moratorium interests as well as maturities within the consolidated periods. The debt stock therefore increased with leaps and jumps, even when no new loans were contracted. Nigeria’s external debt stock till 1977 was less than US$0.8 billion. Beginning from 1978, the external debt stock began to grow astronomically, rising from US$0.763 billion in 1977 to US$5.09 billion in 1978 and U$8.855 billion in 1980, an increase of over 73.96 percent between 1978 and 1980. By 1985 the debt profile had deteriorated seriously due to persistent inability of the country to meet its external debt service obligations. This resulted in mounting arrears and unmanageable growth of the debt stock relative to available resources. The external debt stock, which was about US$8.855 billion in 1980, grew to nearly US$19 billion by 1985. Correspondingly, the debt stock as a percentage of total export earnings and GDP rose to uncomfortable levels of 154% and 24 %, respectively. In that year, the debt service payment due was a little above US$4 billion, which was about 33% of the total export earnings. However, the actual debt service payment for the year was about US$1.5 billion. As at December 31st, 2001, the country’s external debt stock amounted to US$28.35 billion, which was about 59.4% of the GDP and 153.9 % of export earnings. The total external debt outstanding as at 31st December, 2002 stood at US$30.99 billion as against US$28.34 billion in 2001 indicating an increase of US$2.64 billion or 9.33 per cent. The increase was largely a result of the interest component of payment arrears that accumulated during the year and the sharp depreciation of the US dollar against other currencies in which the debts are denominated. The interest component was made up of contractual interest of US$1.41 billion and late/penalty interest of US$0.049 billion, while the increase due to the effect of the depreciation of the US Dollar was US$1.75 billion. Some debts, which were accepted after further reconciliation with the creditors and drawdown on some multilateral and post cut-off loans also contributed to the increase. The combined effect of the above factors was however mitigated by the buyback of London Club Par Bonds of US$0.601 billion. The debt stock as at 31st December, 2002 comprised US$25.38 billion or 81.89 per cent owed to the Paris Club, US$2.96 billion or 9.55 per cent to the Multilateral Institutions, US$1.44 billion or 4.65 per cent to the London Club, US$1.15 billion or 3.72 per cent to the Promissory Note holders while the sum of US$0.056 billion or 0.18 per cent was owed to non-Paris Club creditors. The growth in the stock of debts owed to the Paris Club creditors (official debts) since the mid-1980s was accounted for partly by unpaid new maturities falling due and the outcomes of non-concessional rescheduling. To address its debt problem, Nigeria had four rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club (in December 1986, March 1989, January 1991 and 2000 respectively), which provided for traditional rescheduling terms with market-related interest rates. Nigeria defaulted on these agreements due to high debt service obligations and adverse cash flow position, which contributed to the build up of its debt profile. Private debt arrears were consolidated in 1991 under the Brady Plan. The stocks amounted to US$5.8 billion. 62 percent of it was bought back at 40 cents per dollar while the remaining US$2.043 billion or 38 percent was collateralized with the United States Treasury zero-coupon bonds maturing in November 15, 2002. The official creditors rose from 20.8 percent in 1985 to about 78 percent in 2001. The total external debt outstanding as at 31st December 2004 stood at US$35.94 billion as against US$32.92 billion in December 2003, indicating an increase of US$3.03 billion or 9.20 percent. As was the case in the year 2003, the increase in the debt stock was largely as a result of the interest component of additional payment arrears that accumulated, and continued depreciation of the US dollar against other currencies in which the debts were denominated. The additional interest of US$1.54 billion was made up of contractual interest of US$1.30 billion and late/penalty interest of US$0.233 billion, while the increase due to the effect of the depreciation of the US dollar was approximately US$1.49 billion. A further breakdown of the total debt outstanding showed that the principal balance was US$30.29 billion; principal arrears amounted to US$1.94 billion, interest arrears and late interest were US$3.36 billion and US$0.357 billion respectively. The increase in the external debt stock was due primarily to arrears that were incurred as a result of non-servicing of the non-ODA (non-official development assistance) bilateral debt: arrears on this debt accounted for 96.6 percent of total arrears. DEBT SERVICING The total external debt service payment for the year 2004 was US$1.75 billion compared to US$1.81 billion in 2003, reflecting a decrease of US$0.054 billion or 3.01 percent. The external debt service payments of US$1.75 billion comprised of principal repayments of US$1.17 billion, and interest payments and commitment charges of US$0.589 billion. Payments to the Paris Club creditors took the lion’s share amounting to US$0.994 billion or 56.67 percent. The sum of US$0.487 billion or 27.77 percent was paid to multilateral institutions, US$0.090 billion or 5.14 percent to London Club, US$0.171 billion or 9.76 percent to the Promissory Note holders and US$0.012 billion or 0.66 percent to non-Paris Club Bilateral creditors. It is important to note that the US$1.75 billion debt service paid in 2004 is actually well below the debt service due for the year of US$2.99 billion. This arises from the fact that Nigeria has not fully serviced its Paris Club debts, as an amount of US$2.23 billion was due while only US$0.99 billion was paid. The shortfall transforms into arrears and attracts severe penalty interest. This very process has contributed to the explosion in Nigeria’s external debt stock over the years. DOMESTIC DEBTS Domestic debt is defined as debt denominated in local currency. 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by threads: 10:55am On Sep 10, 2015 |
IyaIode:  1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by 989900: 11:21am On Sep 10, 2015 |
baralatie: I already replied you with the summary in those 2 adjunct articles. Kindly read them again with NOI out of the picture if you can (even though some will argue she did a good job for her western employers . . . I would be proud of her too if she were my employee . . . forget about her brother I think got a multi million dollar settlement for the brokered settlement between Nigeria and her creditors), and tell me we did fine both from way back and recently. BTW, like I said earlier, you need to read the interview again, the debt part is a tiny fraction of it, the other gentleman Mr. Hinzwaka (not sure if I got it right), is just trying to do a good job of hiding behind one finger -- shying away from the core issues/failures raised. 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Bevista: 12:14pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
hinwazaka:It is entirely possible that Mr Boyo was off the mark in claiming that Nigeria had paid off its debt "several times over". I doubt if he has any valid evidence to support such claim. I, personally, do not think the corrupt military governments paid off the debt. Having said that, I think it is completely uncharitable to dismiss all the other points raised by Boyo. You claimed that you read the whole article but then allowed your bias and prejudice to determine what you comment on. As someone with a fair amount of Economics & Finance background, I can tell you that Boyo raised very salient points. He may have gone overboard in criticizing NOI. Maybe you should comment on some of the other points he raised such (1) rational for the balloon debt repayment (2) why did our debt go up again even with a higher oil price (3) Inflation, Interest rate, Unemployment, Exchange rate (4) Diversification of the economy (5) Subsidy payments (6) 70% budget recurrent expenditure (7) Depletion of foreign reserves and ECA, etc. I'd be glad if you can deepen the debate by commenting on those issues. Baralatie is also encouraged to desist from trolling the thread with that long article. 5 Likes 1 Share |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Jesusloveyou: 12:28pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
[quote author=baralatie post=37862468] Origin of Nigeria's Debt Nigeria's External and Domestic Debt EXTERNAL DEBTS Nigeria’s external indebtedness dates back to pre-independence period. However, the quantum of the debt was small until 1978. The debts incurred before 1978 were mainly long-term loans from multilateral and official sources such as the World Bank and the country’s major trading partners. The debts were not much of a burden on the economy because the loans were obtained on soft terms. Moreover, the country had abundant revenue receipts from oil, especially during the oil boom of 1973-1976. However, the fall in oil prices and hence oil receipts in 1977/78 forced the country to raise the first jumbo loan of more than $1.0 billion from the international capital market. The loan, which had a grace period of three years, was used to finance various medium and long-term infrastructural projects, which did not directly yield returns for its amortization. The recovery of the oil market from 1979, with oil prices rising to an all-time high of US$39.00 per barrel in 1980/81, led to the notion that the economy was buoyant. Consequently, some deflationary measures put in place in 1978 were relaxed. A consumption pattern that favoured imported goods emerged which was aggravated and sustained by the import substitution industrialization strategy that depended heavily on imported raw materials and machinery as well as overvalued exchange rate regime. Many of the projects included in the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) had high import content. The plan was based on an estimated foreign exchange inflow of US$30 billion per annum but between 1981 and 1982 monthly imports bills averaged US$2 billion (or US$24 billion per annum) while monthly export receipts sank drastically to an average of US$1.5 billion (or US$18 billion per annum). Besides indiscriminate and excessive importation, there were cases of over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. Predictably, the euphoria of the oil boom was short-lived and when oil prices collapsed in 1982, the economy immediately suffered considerable strains. The production and consumption patterns that emerged during the oil boom could not be sustained in the face of declining foreign exchange earnings. Rather than address the problem of declining foreign exchange revenue both the Federal and state governments embarked on massive external borrowings from the international capital market (ICM). Unfortunately, that was also the period of excess loanable funds in the Western World. The International commercial banks with idle “petro-dollars” in their vaults went out selling loans to unsuspecting developing countries in the guise of assisting their economic development, a phenomenon usually referred to as the recycling of petro-dollars. Thus, pressure soon mounted on the various sectors of the economy resulting in huge imbalances in government finance, low international reserves, deficits in the balance of payments, and the accumulation of trade arrears in respect of insured and uninsured trade credits. That led Nigeria to the refinancing agreement of 1983 in respect of letters of credit amounting to $2.1 billion. Trade debts contracted through open account and bills for collection, which were outstanding as at 31st December 1983 were refinanced through issuance of promissory notes. As trade arrears continued to mount the country could not also service her external debts. A critical point was reached in 1986 when creditors refused to open new credit lines for imports to Nigeria. Therefore, the government approached the creditors for debt relief leading to the restructuring arrangements with the Paris Club in 1986, 1989, 1991 and 2000. The arrangement provided for the capitalization and restructuring of accumulated debt service arrears, their penalties, late and moratorium interests as well as maturities within the consolidated periods. The debt stock therefore increased with leaps and jumps, no new loans were contracted. Nigeria’s external debt stock till 1977 was less than US$0.8 billion. Beginning from 1978, the external debt stock began to grow astronomically, rising from US$0.763 billion in 1977 to US$5.09 billion in 1978 and U$8.855 billion in 1980, an increase of over 73.96 percent between 1978 and 1980. By 1985 the debt profile had deteriorated seriously due to persistent inability of the country to meet its external obligations. This resulted in mounting arrears and unmanageable growth of the debt stock relative to available resources. The external debt stock, which was about US$8.855 billion in 1980, grew to nearly US$19 billion by 1985. the debt stock as a percentage of total export earnings and GDP rose , what did u want us to do with this, did that answer d failure of ur clueless corrupt heroine, what burst my head most, that they borrow money from China, and the same time going there to invest more 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by omonnakoda: 12:32pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Chiefpriest1:What wonder? In the cost of garri or on newspapers? 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by baralatie(m): 12:35pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Bevista:I would have handled and broken down it down to the specific questions you raised but somehow I don't understand "I am having a tough time accessing this particular thread" just be patient I will have a silent unavoidable chance to respond to all questions and you guys will understand Nigeria's economy a lot better. I hope this post shows 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by omonnakoda: 12:38pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Bevista:The logic of the "several times over" claim is a comparison between the original principal and the total amount paid. Nigeria never stopped servicing its debt at any time so that is not an illogical thing to say though that is usually the case for long term loans that the total amount paid is a multiple of the principal.If consistent with agreed terms there is nothing strange there. Several times over does not mean "more than was contractually agreed" though he may have issues with the agreements 6 Likes 1 Share |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Image123(m): 12:43pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
baralatie: How's she spot on and accurate. Can't you see that under her,in just 5years, we incurred 33.3% of Nigeria's debt since independence? i guess Boyo meant to say that the amount we've paid servicing debts is many times more than the real/initial debt owed. 4 Likes 1 Share |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Bevista: 12:52pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
omonnakoda:As noted in an article posted on this thread by balaratie, Nigeria had defaulted a number of times in honouring its debt servicing obligations, thereby resulting in the original debt compounding over time. If you agree that it is "usually the case for long term loans that the total amount paid is a multiple of the principal", then you cannot claim to have paid of the loan. After 1 year of taking a loan, you owe both principal and interest, so paying off the principal does not mean you have paid of your debt. 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by 989900: 12:54pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Image123: Thank you . . . while selling oil at between $105-$147/barrel for a long while. They only claim to read -- they don't, or they do with bias. I posted the below as an adjunct earlier: "Let's recall, at this juncture, that a few weeks ago, the New York Times called for the outright cancellation of the international debt owed by poor African countries. In making the call, the Times observes that "Right now, African countries spend four times as much on paying back their debts than they do on health care. They are trapped into making ever-escalating interest payments that never touch the principal." Citing Nigeria as a typical example, the New York Times recalls that "NigeriaŠborrowed $5 billion, has paid $16 billion and still owes $32 billion." It then concludes that "canceling these debts should wait no longer." #shylock The New York Times could not be more correct. Its advocacy of debt cancellation, rather than debt relief, falls in line with similar calls by international NGOs. It also rhymes with the voices of debt cancellation that have emanated from various Nigerian media." "Banjo continues with the following details of how an original Paris club loan to Nigeria of only $8 billion (the New York Times reported a lower original loan of $6 billion) later ballooned to $31 billion even though the additional $23 billion was not real money that ever touched the hands or shores of Nigeria or ever entered Nigeria's treasury . . ." https://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/1284.html "Coordinating Minister for the Economy (CME) and Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, on Saturday put the nation’s total debt stock at $63.7 billion, which encompasses multilateral as well as domestic loans by successive federal and state governments since 1960. She said that of this figure, $21.8 billion was incurred under the outgoing government of President Goodluck Jonathan." http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/okonjo-iweala-jonathan-incurred-21bn-of-63bn-national-debts/210139/ How does one justify, or applaud NOI's tenure? BTW, trivial (relatively moot) is the debt issue in the original article, there are far substantial points made in that Boyo's interview that points to the disservice NOI did to her positions in the previous administration. 2 Likes 1 Share |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by omonnakoda: 12:56pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Bevista:Default is a legal and technical term which has a very specific meaning within the context of Sovereign loans. I respectfully suggest you check that up. If you insist Nigeria defaulted provide evidence please I have not made any claims so I do not know what point is being made withthis  1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by 989900: 1:01pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Bevista: Well said. Hammering on the loan part is just a lame distraction/moot point. 2 Likes |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by change49ja: 1:08pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Na wa o.... 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Bevista: 1:18pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
omonnakoda:I agree that it is entirely legal to default. I referred you to an article posted on this thread detailing Nigeria's loan history. It was posted by balaratie, you can go back and read it. I was actually referring to the borrower "claiming" and not omonnakoda. |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Kingspin(m): 1:21pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
I dnt know who is successful in Nigeria, na Fashola, Ta Orji, Amaechi etc 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Hardeybohwarley(m): 5:49pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
989900: 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by delors(m): 5:51pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Pls format the topic appropriately
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| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by sukkot: 5:53pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
okonjo eleke kpuff kpuff 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by HDee(m): 5:56pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Yea.... |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Nobody: 5:56pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Of course....the real issue here is that we are resource dependent....and resource dependent countries find it very easy to get into debt. When prices of our resources are high....we develop a high spending habit. When prices of the resources we sell fall....we then take loans to maintain our high spending habits. Somehow....we have to appoint a minister of finance, a minister of industry, and a minister of education/science who will work together to develop a new industrialization plan....so that we can stop depending on oil. Oil price has fallen.....and this time....they are not going to rise again. 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by speedyGonzales: 5:58pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
hahaha....... |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Caliph69: 5:59pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Long story. Everyone got his or her own opinion. And in a society as diverse and complex as ours, not everyone will appreciate you, or your work no matter how well you did. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala has played her part. The stage is set for others to come and play theirs. |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Dbboy(m): 6:00pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Ngozi okonji iwela i know who the hell is HENRY BOYO. 2 Likes |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by omolami: 6:01pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
You lie bayo. You are a spoiler. Abatenije, that's what you are 1 Like |
| Re: Okonjo-iweala, A Failure —henry Boyo by Nobody: 6:02pm On Sep 10, 2015 |
Everything i have read from Henry Boyo is always negative...Criticised Soludo, Sanusi, NOI..but there is something behind all this ..he feels he is a brillant economist but guess what oga She pass u. 2 Likes |
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