NgeneUkwenu:
That jonathan has exactly 156 Days to spend in Aso Rock is not even contestable! The only debate in the mouth of the people is, where he would be heading to! ICC or Okiriki

NgeneUkwenu:
That jonathan has exactly 156 Days to spend in Aso Rock is not even contestable! The only debate in the mouth of the people is, where he would be heading to! ICC or Okiriki

kkkp:
They keep selling our properties to themselves and call it privatization.

Sibabasibaba1:
Ayeni has not done what isn't done in other climes. That is how it is done everywhere in the world. If you know anything about the elite policy network theory, you will know that in every country, the elites rule. Even if Buhari comes in tomorrow, nothing will change. The only thing that will change is that another set of elites will share our commonwealth. Is it not Tinubu and his cronies that run Lagos? Hypocrisy is when you condemn one bad act because you are not involved and keep mute on a similar act when you are involved. I will leave you with part of an essay I wrote 6 years ago on where power lies in the US communication policymaking: I used the elite policy network theory to illuminate my points.
-------------------------



Elite policy networks, as we noted earlier, is another theory that will help us understand where power lies in the making of communication policy in the USA and who has benefited. The theory sees policies as serving the interests of the dominant class in the society. The theory is all about links and connections. It explains how circle of friends and associates pull the secret strings that produce or review policies. Wright Mills (1956: 292) notes that “ the conception of power elite and of its unity rests upon the… coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organisations. It also rests upon the similarity of origins and outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies”.

For instance, in the mid 1980s, Hollywood producers used their links with the White House to influence the FCC to drop rules that curb the networks’ control over program production. The Hollywood producers, who may lose business if the change went through, pressurised President Ronald Reagan, who had long- term ties with the movie industry. “The President, in turn, called in the FCC chair for an unprecedented informational talk. Congress, responding to Hollywood lobbyists, added its pressure. The FCC withdrew its plan to deregulate the networks’ program-making role” (Head and Sterling, 1990:435). This confirms Mosco (1979: 128) position that “…evidence suggests…a considerable amount of industry influence is exerted not directly on the commission but through the Congress by the control that broadcasters have over the access of representatives. … Any proposal to insulate the commission from industry influence would therefore have to deal with the complex of relationships in which the commission is embedded”.

Another example comes from the 1996 Telecommunication Act. The camaraderie between the then President Bill Clinton’s government and the computer community, influenced the Act to a large extent. From Aufderheide (1999: 40), we can trace the White House connection that shaped the Act. According to her, “…The Clinton-Gore campaign strategically positioned itself as forward looking on technology issues, making friends in the computer community and handsomely collecting campaign contributions from computing and telecommunications companies in the process”. And on assumption of office, after winning the presidential elections in 1992, Clinton and Gore appointed as FCC chairman, their friend, Reed Hundt, with an implied term of reference of handling the regulatory details of the Act when enacted. Hundt reveals his links with the duo thus: “I had been Al Gore’s friend since high school and an adviser to him in his 1990 presidential campaign…I had known Bill Clinton since we were in law school together (Hundt, 2000: ix).

Explaining the part he would play as FCC chairman in the shaping of the Act, he adds: “My duty, as I saw it, would be to fulfil Al’s vision for the information highway. …We would cause new technologies to spread across the country. …The Democratic Congress would rewrite the 1934 Communications Act to replace monopoly with competition, in accordance with Al Gore’s wishes. …From the White House, Vice President Gore would negotiate the new law with Congress, and at the FCC I would handle the fascinating details of issuing the regulations that put any necessary law into specific meaning and effect” (Hundt 2000: 7).

So from the perspective of this theory, we can be infer that communication policies can actually originate from any meeting of friends and associates at any location. Positions are also ‘allocated’ at such meetings to ‘dependable’ persons that would help frustrate opposition. The theory also helps us understand how policies cloaked in the garb of ‘public interest’ may actually be aimed at furthering a group’s ambition or at protecting shared industry and political interests.

We will again use the 1996 Telecommunication Act as an example. Hundt (2000: 4-5) illuminates this for us: “The day after the November 1992 election, Al Gore’s closest advisers sat in attendance on the Vice President-elect on his modest suite at the Colonial Hotel in Little Rock. … Al proceeded down a list of things to do, assigning everyone some task. …I had long wanted the opportunity of public service. …If the Vice- President wanted to cause change in this part of the economy, he needed someone dependable at the FCC”. Hundt goes further to let us into the meetings where the specifics of the Act were drafted: “A dozen of us met at least once in two weeks in Al’s west wing office. …In order to promote economic growth, the group wanted to stimulate investment in new communication technologies. … To these ends, Al and his team crafted a policy that reversed the century-old ordering of the information sector into separate monopolies, each tightly regulated by FCC and the local governments… (Hundt, 2000:8-9).

Again, Hundt provides us with another apt illustration of elite power networks’ relevance in the analysing US communications policy: “The night I was sworn in, Betsy and I went to the White House…to a jazz concert hosted by Ameritech, the Midwestern Bell telephone company. …Ameritech’s fate depended on how the administration chose to rewrite the nation’s communication laws. The company’s corporate officers sat with the President. I was in the back of the room with Quello. … But from the quaint, edenic politics of friendship, I had won the job I wanted” (Hundt, 2000: 17). And Ameritech, too, benefited from its closeness with government. According to Aufderheide (1999: 59), when the Congress finally passed the bill, it addressed specific concerns “from a variety of perspectives. Ameritech, which already had a burglar alarm business, was exempted from the clauses restricting Bells from entry into the service, which hooks up to phone lines”.


From the foregoing, therefore, it will be safe to say that the real power in the making of communications policy in the USA lies in the hands of the dominant class in the society and large corporations since they have the wherewithal with which they can bankroll election campaigns, influence political appointments and lobby regulators as well as legislators. Aufderheide (1999:41-43), description of the unprecedented lobbying in the Congress before the enactment of 1996 Telecommunication Act captures this point better:

"As the House bill was put to vote in July 1995, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) called the process ‘living proof of what unlimited money can do to buy influence and the Congress of the United States’.… Those with more money probably got more of what they wanted.… By contrast, consumer, religious, minority, disabled, and other constituencies profoundly affected by communication decision making were hardly represented with PAC money, and many advocates on behalf of civil rights, the poor, children, and other vulnerable constituencies found it difficult even to raise telecommunications as a significant social rights and justice issue in the press, legislators’ offices, or at foundations. … In short lobbyists for communications and mass media interests profoundly influenced and often drafted, legislation…"

It, therefore, goes without saying that large corporations and the dominant class have benefited from US communications policies. Of course, they cannot spend money to influence policies without benefiting.

PervRocker:
Story for amadioha,orunmila & Co. GMB we know 2015

Sibabasibaba1:
Ayeni has not done what isn't done in other climes. That is how it is done everywhere in the world. If you know anything about the elite policy network theory, you will know that in every country, the elites rule. Even if Buhari comes in tomorrow, nothing will change. The only thing that will change is that another set of elites will share our commonwealth. Is it not Tinubu and his cronies that run Lagos? Hypocrisy is when you condemn one bad act because you are not involved and keep mute on a similar act when you are involved. I will leave you with part of an essay I wrote 6 years ago on where power lies in the US communication policymaking: I used the elite policy network theory to illuminate my points.
-------------------------



Elite policy networks, as we noted earlier, is another theory that will help us understand where power lies in the making of communication policy in the USA and who has benefited. The theory sees policies as serving the interests of the dominant class in the society. The theory is all about links and connections. It explains how circle of friends and associates pull the secret strings that produce or review policies. Wright Mills (1956: 292) notes that “ the conception of power elite and of its unity rests upon the… coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organisations. It also rests upon the similarity of origins and outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies”.

For instance, in the mid 1980s, Hollywood producers used their links with the White House to influence the FCC to drop rules that curb the networks’ control over program production. The Hollywood producers, who may lose business if the change went through, pressurised President Ronald Reagan, who had long- term ties with the movie industry. “The President, in turn, called in the FCC chair for an unprecedented informational talk. Congress, responding to Hollywood lobbyists, added its pressure. The FCC withdrew its plan to deregulate the networks’ program-making role” (Head and Sterling, 1990:435). This confirms Mosco (1979: 128) position that “…evidence suggests…a considerable amount of industry influence is exerted not directly on the commission but through the Congress by the control that broadcasters have over the access of representatives. … Any proposal to insulate the commission from industry influence would therefore have to deal with the complex of relationships in which the commission is embedded”.

Another example comes from the 1996 Telecommunication Act. The camaraderie between the then President Bill Clinton’s government and the computer community, influenced the Act to a large extent. From Aufderheide (1999: 40), we can trace the White House connection that shaped the Act. According to her, “…The Clinton-Gore campaign strategically positioned itself as forward looking on technology issues, making friends in the computer community and handsomely collecting campaign contributions from computing and telecommunications companies in the process”. And on assumption of office, after winning the presidential elections in 1992, Clinton and Gore appointed as FCC chairman, their friend, Reed Hundt, with an implied term of reference of handling the regulatory details of the Act when enacted. Hundt reveals his links with the duo thus: “I had been Al Gore’s friend since high school and an adviser to him in his 1990 presidential campaign…I had known Bill Clinton since we were in law school together (Hundt, 2000: ix).

Explaining the part he would play as FCC chairman in the shaping of the Act, he adds: “My duty, as I saw it, would be to fulfil Al’s vision for the information highway. …We would cause new technologies to spread across the country. …The Democratic Congress would rewrite the 1934 Communications Act to replace monopoly with competition, in accordance with Al Gore’s wishes. …From the White House, Vice President Gore would negotiate the new law with Congress, and at the FCC I would handle the fascinating details of issuing the regulations that put any necessary law into specific meaning and effect” (Hundt 2000: 7).

So from the perspective of this theory, we can be infer that communication policies can actually originate from any meeting of friends and associates at any location. Positions are also ‘allocated’ at such meetings to ‘dependable’ persons that would help frustrate opposition. The theory also helps us understand how policies cloaked in the garb of ‘public interest’ may actually be aimed at furthering a group’s ambition or at protecting shared industry and political interests.

We will again use the 1996 Telecommunication Act as an example. Hundt (2000: 4-5) illuminates this for us: “The day after the November 1992 election, Al Gore’s closest advisers sat in attendance on the Vice President-elect on his modest suite at the Colonial Hotel in Little Rock. … Al proceeded down a list of things to do, assigning everyone some task. …I had long wanted the opportunity of public service. …If the Vice- President wanted to cause change in this part of the economy, he needed someone dependable at the FCC”. Hundt goes further to let us into the meetings where the specifics of the Act were drafted: “A dozen of us met at least once in two weeks in Al’s west wing office. …In order to promote economic growth, the group wanted to stimulate investment in new communication technologies. … To these ends, Al and his team crafted a policy that reversed the century-old ordering of the information sector into separate monopolies, each tightly regulated by FCC and the local governments… (Hundt, 2000:8-9).

Again, Hundt provides us with another apt illustration of elite power networks’ relevance in the analysing US communications policy: “The night I was sworn in, Betsy and I went to the White House…to a jazz concert hosted by Ameritech, the Midwestern Bell telephone company. …Ameritech’s fate depended on how the administration chose to rewrite the nation’s communication laws. The company’s corporate officers sat with the President. I was in the back of the room with Quello. … But from the quaint, edenic politics of friendship, I had won the job I wanted” (Hundt, 2000: 17). And Ameritech, too, benefited from its closeness with government. According to Aufderheide (1999: 59), when the Congress finally passed the bill, it addressed specific concerns “from a variety of perspectives. Ameritech, which already had a burglar alarm business, was exempted from the clauses restricting Bells from entry into the service, which hooks up to phone lines”.


From the foregoing, therefore, it will be safe to say that the real power in the making of communications policy in the USA lies in the hands of the dominant class in the society and large corporations since they have the wherewithal with which they can bankroll election campaigns, influence political appointments and lobby regulators as well as legislators. Aufderheide (1999:41-43), description of the unprecedented lobbying in the Congress before the enactment of 1996 Telecommunication Act captures this point better:

"As the House bill was put to vote in July 1995, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) called the process ‘living proof of what unlimited money can do to buy influence and the Congress of the United States’.… Those with more money probably got more of what they wanted.… By contrast, consumer, religious, minority, disabled, and other constituencies profoundly affected by communication decision making were hardly represented with PAC money, and many advocates on behalf of civil rights, the poor, children, and other vulnerable constituencies found it difficult even to raise telecommunications as a significant social rights and justice issue in the press, legislators’ offices, or at foundations. … In short lobbyists for communications and mass media interests profoundly influenced and often drafted, legislation…"

It, therefore, goes without saying that large corporations and the dominant class have benefited from US communications policies. Of course, they cannot spend money to influence policies without benefiting.

netizenbuzz:


That something is normal or done everywhere doesn't make it right. Slavery was normal, that didn't make it right. Stop with this mentality.