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Je Suis Baga Et Nigerian(i Am Baga And Nigerian by Cannonleo(m): 12:25am On Jan 12, 2015 |
Baga: the carnage, inaccurate reportage and Government ‘indifference’ Part 1 Last week, the world was inundated with news of the attack on Baga town by the extremist group, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (“People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad” , otherwise known as Boko Haram. Baga is in the north- eastern Nigerian Borno State, close to Lake Chad. It lies north-east of the town of Kukawa which is the headquarters of the Kukawa Local Government Area. The town is approximately 196km from Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. Indeed, Baga is more or less a border community and this played a significant role in its being chosen as headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force MJTF, comprising troops from Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon—put together as a multilateral response to neutralising the menace posed by Boko Haram. To the residents of Baga town, and given the various brushes they have had with the extremist group, it is doubtful if this joint force is actually worth the piece of paper containing the instruments that decreed its existence. The attack last week came on the heels of the withdrawal of Chadian forces from the base at Baga, two days before Boko Haram came calling. According to Nigerian security sources quoted by domestic media, the Chadians claimed they were rotating their troops. The Cameroonians have never contributed to the force, while the Nigeriens, in the aftermath of the attack in question, have announced that they will not be sending troops anytime soon. According to foreign media sources, Niger’s foreign minister, Mohamed Bazoum, has clearly affirmed that his country would not step in to help recapture the area. At this very moment, Nigerian forces are involved in coordinated ground and air operations to dislodge the terror group from Baga, discountenancing any regional support for such effort. If past history is anything to go by, they will prevail soonest but what often happens after that (revenge attacks by the group in the face of poor garrisoning efforts by security forces) is raising apprehension already. Perhaps, relying on a regional strategy was useful for mobilising against Boko Haram in the first place, but domestic observers of Nigerian diplomacy have always felt that such regional effort should only be political, while Nigeria single-handedly provide a military response, something they believe she is capable of doing as long as the local population in areas sympathetic to Boko Haram sided with the authorities. So how did Nigeria get to this sorry pass? Indeed, several successes have been made by Nigerian forces against Boko Haram, but these are hardly reported, even by the domestic press in Nigeria. Should Boko Haram take a town somewhere however, it is often reported with glee by both local and foreign media. The pattern of the insurgency over the past year has been such that Boko Haram, with the exception of a few towns, actually is not controlling the expanse of territory ascribed to it by the press. It is usually flushed out of any town or village it has taken, often a few days after such ‘capture,’ by Nigerian forces. The group is however quite adept at propaganda and seems ahead of the Nigerians in utilising this to maximum advantage. nigerian authorities quite rightly recognised that Boko Haram could become a regional scourge and sought the cooperation of its neighbours early enough. Those neighbours however did not seem to have shared that view. Cameroon, which dithered in coming on board early enough to hinder the group from operating on its own soil (from which, ironically, most Boko Haram operations against Nigeria often originated in the early days of the insurgency), had to be ‘forced’ on board by President Francois Hollonde of France before she started ‘cooperating.’ Analysts ascribed that to the fear of President Paul Biya, staying in power for too long, being wary of exposing his army to war which could embolden them to challenge his long stay in office when the insurgency ends, or even in the course of it. Today, she is paying the price of that delay with sustained Boko Haram attacks and new warnings of worse ones to come. The recent Baga attack was symbolic and signposted the desire of Boko Haram to get into the news again, having lost media visibility when it could not hold all the ‘territories’ it captured in Adamawa State just some months before. It suffered very heavy losses in the hands of Nigerian forces in the counter-attack launched by the State. Boko Haram apparently coordinated its Baga offensive with a reprisal attack in Damaturu, capital of another Nigerian north-eastern State of Yobe, which was successfully repelled by Nigerian forces (again hardly reported), although it raised questions regarding the origin of those attackers. From eyewitness accounts, they may have been embedded in the city itself for long before staging that brazen but foolhardy attempt, following pre-emptive raids on their hideouts by Nigerian Special Forces just days before the reprisals were launched. The western media, posing as ‘experts’ on the Boko Haram campaign, often publish reports which expose their lack of understanding of the problem, the unfolding developments and perhaps, a deliberate attempt by them to undermine efforts by the Nigerian authorities to defeat the insurgency. True, the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan has made several mistakes and exhibited, atimes, outright indifference in its response to the threat. However, security forces have made significant gains in their effort to contain and eventually defeat the extremists despite lack of equipment, platforms and devices required for engaging such threats. In their response, they have been hampered by a late review of doctrine (an army that had become comfortable with undertaking peacekeeping on a large scale in order to discourage its officers from eyeing political intervention thereby becoming ‘soft’), lack of clarity on the mission by the political leadership and outright sabotage from within its own ranks and from local politicians. |
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