I initially wrote this article in December 2015 after the terror attack in America, but saw the need to release it after the attack in Nice. Let's begin.

Nigeria has been facing insecurity issues for a long time now. This insecurity has become more manifest in the last 6 years, following the end of the Niger Delta militancy due to amnesty, as the country has been bedeviled by outright terrorism poised by Boko Haram.

There’s no need for me to go further into details about the impact of Boko Haram or why it sprung up; this is already well covered elsewhere. However, wherever the need arises, I’ll shed light on it. My focus in this writeup though is on the tactics being used by our military and intelligence agencies to tackle Boko Haram.

To begin with, it has been established that Nigeria is witnessing acts of terrorism. In order to offset this dangerous development, the Nigerian security outfits engaged in this fight, have chosen to use some tactics to rout the terrorists.




Firstly, the FG deployed armed security personnels to the locations witnessing the most attacks. For instance, Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Bauchi and Yobe states have suffered the most attacks; thus, more security personnels have been stationed there. Also, as a result of these attacks on these locations, these states have been placed under emergency by the FG. The placement of troops and the use of State of Emergency helped, to an extent, to stem the tide against these terror attacks. However, these areas have still not stopped witnessing devastating terror attacks. Even worse, these attacks are becoming increasingly trans-national, with assaults launched from and on Niger and Cameroun.



Additionally, the use of troops deployment, which saw Nigeria use fighter jets on its own territory for the first time in 25 years, has not helped to deter terror attacks, even in other parts of Nigeria. For instance, Kano and Kaduna have not stopped witnessing terror attacks, even though intermitten, as the recent attacks in the post-election 2015 months have shown.



From my observation, the military seems to think its enemy is fighting guerilla warfare, as the military merely repels attacks, and attacks Boko Haram “bases” in some towns and in the Sambisa forests and recover arms or rescue hostages in the process. This is obviously a combination of conventional military tactics and guerilla defensive deterrence. Thus, one frequently hears the Nigerian military speak about how Boko Haram launches attacks against “soft targets”, when the terror group attacks civilian locations far from the conventional "war front".




What Are Soft Targets?
These are entities which are most vulnerable to attacks by enemy forces, they include civilians and locations of average security protection.

Clearly, the military makes it seem as though BH is weak/unpowerful whenever they claim it attacks “soft targets”. They seem to be chiding the fact that BH attacks the more vulnerable rather than it coming face to face with the superior power of the military to test its might. But this assumption clearly misunderstands the purpose of terror acts!



This sort of tactic misses the whole point of counterterrorism. It misses the fact that terrorism and the sort perpetuated by BH, is not conventional warfare. Terrorists don’t just seat in one location, plan attacks from there singularly and return to that same spot! No! And far from it. Instead they could have cells (sleepers, for some), working in different locations and communicating rarely but in a coordinated manner. More on this later.



Perharps troops deployment by the US, France and Russia might put an end to ISIS in the Middle East, because their location and strongholds are already well known, and mapped out. But this same tactic had never gone fine in the fight against Al Qaeda.



The reason is simple. ISIS uses a relatively conventional warfare strategy of fighting to claim/hold territory while “outsourcing” foreign terror attacks against “soft foreign targets” to worldwide sympathizers domiciled in any country, irrespective of whether they have a criminal background or not; worst still, it doesn’t have to train them or know them, it just transmits terror skills and propaganda via the internet, and whoever admires it can take action independently (more on this later).


Meanwhile Al Qaeda uses unconventional warfare and it holds no territory outrightly most times. It simply uses cells to launch attacks, and some few foot soldiers to protect few territory from which it continuously launches attacks on a target for a while.

BH’s mode of operation is much similar to that of Al Qaeda; whereas the Nigerian military and the media seems to hold strongly to the belief that holding territory is BH’s ultimate aim.

Personally, I believe BH operates like Al Qaeda, and little like ISIS, save for the aspect of holding territories. But Al Qaeda too has used both tactics in Afghanistan and Yemen. Yet, in 2010, it attempted to blowup a US-bound airplane through one of its Yemen trained sympathizers. While in 2001, it rammed 2 planes into the WTC, killing thousands.


How Have Our Tactics Faired Against Boko Haram?


From the above, troop deployment and the use of State of Emergency is clearly a method of conventional warfare, and falls short of being capable and efficient against BH.



Secondly, Nigerian intelligence outfits are yet to track finances, sponsors, and supporters of BH. This is an issue that seems not to be on the frontburner in the fight against BH. At the onset of the Boko Haram crisis, Nigeria did arrest or investigate the sources of BH’s finance and outside sponsor. However, this hasn’t yielded any good, or perharps some good have come of it but they are just silent about it, who knows. The likes of Kabiru Sokoto, Abdul Qada, and other BH supporters arrested and detained by the DSS are, as it appears, yet to yield any good. Without uncovering the financial sources of BH, Nigeria will never be able to put an end to BH.



Third, Nigerian security outfits are yet to fully secure the Nigerian borders. It is a known fact that Nigeria’s borders are porous ans makes it vulnerable to transnational attacks. Yet nothing much has been done about this issue. This appaling situation has even allowed Chad, Cameroun, and Niger republic to send their troops across the Nigerian borders to attack BH, while the Nigerian military looked on doing nothing much. An embarrassing feat. If Nigeria must tackle BH effectively, then its borders need to be effectively protected.



Fourthly, Nigeria is yet to tackle the ideology that supports Boko Haram. When BH menace first became more manifest in 2011, the government introduced TV ads and radio broadcast aimed at quelling the ideology of BH. These broadcasts are still being done, but have remained the same. No new concept has been added to it. Thus Nigerians hear it, but it's meaningless and seem more like a propaganda message than an awareness message. New concepts need to be introduced into these awareness campaigns if it is to have any reasonable impact on the fight against terrorism.



Additionally, the fight against Boko Haram is not one that involves the military alone. The military cannot protect the millions of Nigerians vulnerable to Boko Haram attacks. And if Boko Haram begins to support the sort of "lone wolf" attacks currently aiding ISIS, then Nigeria will become more vulnerable on multiple fronts.
Like it or not, this lone wolf issue is the next phase of terrorism and Nigeria is completely unprepared for it! This shall be the subject of my next article.


lalasticlala, seun do the needful.
http://criticalnigerian..com/2016/07/terror-in-name-of-god-nigeria-failing.html