I visited Ironsi at his official residence, the Flag Staff House,
at No. 1 Glover Road, Ikoyi, Lagos, as he was a bit
indisposed. Incidentally, my personal relationship with
Ironsi had always been very cordial, and I had nothing
against him as a person or as a military officer at the time.
When I called on him that night, he was not in bed as
expected of somebody suffering from what he called “severe
cold and lumbago” but was sitting with some people inside
the compound (but outside the bungalow) on the shore of
the lagoon nearby. He quickly left the lagoon side and
advanced to meet me and took me inside the house. The
other people never joined us.


Ironsi informed me that he had
decided to postpone his visit to Sokoto to spend Sallah
there at the invitation of his friend”, the Sultan of Sokoto,
the spiritual leader of northern Muslims and a cousin of the
Sardauna, Premier of the Northern Region. As I was going
out of Ironsi’s house, felt rather guilty for inconveniencing
him and his other guests still sitting outside. So I decided to
apologize to them, and I spotted at least Ifeajuana amongst
the guests, who was cited in the Special Branch Report as
one of the coup plotters.
Another well calculated move by Ironsi was to post to the
command of infantry battalions stationed outside Lagos and
Ibadan areas, of he considered reliable or weak, and in case
of the latter, support strong Igbo deputies. He posted
Odumegwu Ojukwu to Kano, Fajuyi Enugu and Sodeinde
(killed during the coup) to Kaduna. The idea was to ensure
that in the event of staging a coup, Ironsi could rally support
from these areas.


The problems of Lagos and Ibadan could
be attended to by him personally and this was easy as
adequate arrangements were made to eliminate the
“enemy” senior military commanders of units stationed in
these areas, Finally, the policy pursued by the Ironsi
government on assumption of power was decided in favour
of the long-term interest of the Igbos who staged the first
coup - the abolishing of federal administrative structure of
the country, the unification of the civil and judicial services,
failure to deal with the rebel army officers who cold
bloodedly and cowardly murdered their fellow officers who
were not given a chance to defend themselves in the
military tradition, the mass promotion of Igbo officers to fill
vacancies left by their departed colleagues, and assumption
of command of strategic military units.
Judging from the foregoing, it appears that General Ironsi
was probably aware of the coup plan at least in its broad
outline, and from personal standpoint would he-expected to
welcome the manner in which it was executed, i.e., the
elimination of those who were considered “dangerous”
officers likely to challenge his supremacy after the ousting
of the civilian government - Brigadiers Maimalari and
Ademulegun, Col. Kur Muhammed, and Lt. Cols. Largema
and Pam - all of whom were immensely popular with their
troops, who could be used to prevent Ironsi’s ascension to
political power. When he succeeded, Ironsi styled himself
head of the Federal Military Government and supreme
commander of the armed forces, a designation which though
normal in military tradition of a generalissimo during war
time was borrowed from the title of a book: The Supreme
Command, which Ironsi presented to me a few months
before the first coup.
Ironsi no doubt, had been nursing for sometime the idea of
assuming the supreme command not only of the Nigerian
Armed forces but also of the country itself. This objective
was achieved at the cost of untimely deaths of many fine
officers, a fate to which Ironsi himself ultimately succumbed
during the July 1966 counter-coup


The counter-coup was, as expected, staged by the
remnants of the northern officer corps who as at January
1966 were of the ranks of major, captain, and subalterns
(except Gowon who was Lt. Col.). These officers were
seething with rage, anger and bitterness over the murder of
their beloved and respected senior officers whom many
regarded as heroes and were ready to risk their lives to
avenge their deaths.


The officers were also under political
pressure to do something to retrieve the honour (mutunci)
of the North. “The Northern officers were apprehensive that
a repeat performance of January 15th, 1966 incident might
culminate in their annihilation.” The northern other ranks
were particularly engaged that their officers had let them
down by allowing the episode of January 966 to occur and
by not taking swift action to avenge it. Some of the soldiers
were calling their officers derogatory names such as mata
(wonen) who were weaklings and incapable of any manly
heroic action and more ominously threatening to “do it
themselves” and deal with all army officers, northerners and
others as well.



The hatred arid derision of the northern army officers spread
to northern civilian population almost all of whom were of
the opinion that General Ironsi was definitely in the know of
the coup plan at least in its broad outline especially such
matters as the elimination of what was considered
“dangerous” officers likely to challenge his supremacy after
ousting of the civilians. The civilians became hostile to the
northern military establishment to the extent of refusing to
socialise with the officers.


It was rumoured that there was
pressure from some civilian parents of army officers’ wives
to desert their husbands for their cowardly behaviour in
failing to retrieve the honour or mutunci of the northern
people. Thus the northern officers had to do something to
save their skin and preserve whatever little honour they
had. And so they struck 29th July, 1966, in broad daylight
as promised by Lt. Col. Hassan Usman Katsina, the military
governor of the North, unlike the executors of the January
1966 coup who murdered their military colleagues in their
sleep. May the souls of all those killed during the January
and July insurrections, military and civilians, rest in peace,
or as we say in HausaAllah Yaji kanMusulmi.



The take over of the Federal Military Government by Ironsi
and his associates put the North in a disadvantaged
position vis a vis the South the newly established Supreme
Military Council, dominated by the latter The composition of
the council was as follows:
General Aguiyi Ironsi - Head of State (Chairman)
Lt. Col. David Ejoor - Military Governor (Mid- West)
Lt. Odumegwu Ojukwu - Military Governor (East)
Lt. Col. Fajuyi - Military Governor (West).
II
Major Hassan Usman Katsina - Military Governor (North)
Lt. Col Y Gowon - Chief of Staff (Army)
‘Louis Edet - Inspector General of Police
Kam Salem - Deputy Inspector General of Police
George Kurubo - Commander (Air Force)
Commodore J.A.E. Wey - Commander (Navy)


Thus out of ten members of the Supreme Military Council,
the North had three, whilst the South bad seven including
the chairman. This was very irksome to the northern
establishment which used to be in the forefront in running
Nigeria’s affairs since independence in 1960. As if this
lopsidedness was not enough, Ironsi introduced measures
that would further marginalise the North and non-Igbos in
general. Promotions and postings in the armed forces were
heavily tilted against the North which had already lost its
senior officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above
(with one exception). Then suddenly and without
consultation, Ironsi promulgated the Unification Decree No.
34 abolishing the federal structure of Nigeria and also
unified the Civil and Judicial Services, The protection which
the regions hitherto enjoyed in controlling and running these
services by their -indigenes was lost.


The North was the
hardest hit by these measures.
Thus, within a few days of the, promulgation of the
Unification Decree, the North erupted spontaneously in
violence during which many Igbos were killed. The
northerners wanted to secede from the federation arewa or
araba - was the clarion call by virtually all northerners. The
July 1966 counter-coup was intended to achieve this
objective but common sense prevailed and the unity of the
country was preserved. However, the Eastern Region
headed by Ojukwu achieved de-facto separation by
expelling all non-easterners from the East and urging all
easterners living elsewhere in Nigeria to return home.
Seizure of federal government’s property and funds located
in the Eastern Region invited sanctions by the federal
government. The situation in the country was very tense
and needed only small incidents to erupt. Thus, when Radio
Cotonou, Dahomey (now Benin Republic) announced that
northerners were being killed in the East, there were
revenge killings of Igbos and others in the North in
September/October 1966. The security situation in the
country continued to deteriorate despite spirited efforts by
Nigerian chiefs and “Leaders of Thought” as well as foreign
well-wishers of Nigeria to reconcile the various factions.
In the end Lt. Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu declared the Eastern
Re “Republic of Biafra”, thus seceding from the federation of
Niger 30th May, 1967. This action was preceded by dividing
Nigeria into n states, three of them in the Eastern Region,
one for Igbo and two eastern minorities living in the Niger
Delta, Calabar and Ogoja areas declaration of Biafra was
followed by dismissal of Ojukwu from Nigerian Army and
governorship, police action and the commencement of civil
war on 6th July, 1967.


The crises and conflicts and aftermath that afflicted Nigeria
ben January, 1966 and January, 1970 were monumental
tragedies we ought to .have put behind us so that the
country could forge ahead. Alas, that not been the case as
testified during public hearing of the Human Right
Violations and Investigations Commission (Justice Oputa
Panel), he Enugu and Abuja in July and September/October
2001 respectively. Pan-Igbo organisation, Ohaneze Ndi
Igbo, presented a petition to Oputa Panel accusing the
peoples of the North of all sorts of crimes against the Igbos
and demanded a reparation sum of over eight trillion Naira
(N8,000,000,000,000) to compensate them for alleged
losses lives and properties during the crisis. It was
surprising that present Igbo could make such accusations
against the North considering that Ohaneze Ndi Igbo under
the responsible leadership of the late Sir Francis Ibiarn,
concluded that:
...of the debt .of blood between the North and the Igbos,


the
Igbos started the cycle, the North retaliated. It was the
same story in the North as well as in Igboland - Blood spoke
to blood - and the Igbos who started it all cannot complain
that more of their people died in it.


In their petition to the Oputa Panel at Enugu, part of the
conclusions of Ohaneze Ndi Igbo concern the troubles
related to the 1966 mass at and counter-massacre,
pogroms and counter-pogroms which occurred between
communities in the Northern Region and communities in 1
Eastern Region in a reciprocal fashion. It is regrettable that
some Nigerians appear to want to revive the precipitating
conditions for repeat performances of the incidents of
January and July, 1966. Captain Ben Gbulie’s book,
Nigeria’s Five Majors in which raging remarks were made
about assassinated northern leaders, was provocative, to
say the least.


He was one of the key actors of the coup at Kaduna when
the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello was
assassinated. He was also a leading member of the group of
Igbos who presented Ohaneze Ndi Igbo’s petition to the
Oputa Panel at Enugu in July 2001. He was summoned to
appear before the commission at Abuja in September/
October 2001 at the request of the Arewa Consultative
Forum (ACF) (a northern umbrella organization) which
cross-examined Captain Gbulie. He did not show any
remorse and still believed that the 15 January, 1966 coup
was staged to pre-empt ajihad to be launched by Northern
Muslims led by the Sardauna by 16th January, 1966 though
a number of Christian military officers who could have
assisted their brethren in resisting the jihad were also killed
on January 15th, 1966. Instead of answering questions from
ACF Counsel, Gbulie was diversionary and unco-operative.
When the son of late Lt. Col. Pam, who was slain during the
January, 1966 coup, asked for apology from Gbulie, who
cast aspersions on his father in the said Nigeria s Five
Majors, Gbulie did not respond. When young Pam requested
the panel to reconcile him and Gbulie, neither the panel, on
which Pam’s mother, Elizabeth Pam, sat, nor Gbulie said a
word, talkless of coming to embrace Pam, as was done by
other petitioners and accused at some sittings of the
commission. I was present at this public hearing and was
utterly disgusted at this unbecoming behaviour on the part
of Captain Gbulie. I could not help remarking - Akwai
sauran rina a Kaba (roughly - we are not yet out of the
woods). It is hoped !hat Gbulie and his ilk would have a
change of heart, retrace the dangerous steps they are taking
and give peace a chance to reign in Nigeria once again.
Concluded
Culled from Kurfi’s autobiography: ‘My Life and Times’



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