Early in the morning of 1 July 1967, Nigeria’s
young head of state, Colonel Yakubu Gowon, was
feeling uneasy in his office at the Supreme
Headquarters, Dodan Barracks in Lagos. The
unease was a result of his being ceaselessly
pressured to authorize a military invasion of the
breakaway Republic of Biafra.

Thirty officers had been recalled from courses
abroad. Trains and truck convoys, bearing fuel,
supplies and men, were still leaving Kano and
Kaduna for the south of River Benue.

Colonel Mohammed Shuwa of the First Area
Command had moved his command headquarters
southwards and set it up in Makurdi. The 2nd
Battalion was already headquartered in Adikpo.
Schools and private homes had been
commandeered for the use of Major Sule Apollo
and his 4th Battalion in Oturkpo. They were
itching for action. The same day, Major B.M.
Usman “a member of the intimate northern group
around Gowon” told the American defense
attaché: “I do not know what in hell he is waiting
for; the boys are all ready to go. They are only
waiting on his word.”

Members of the Supreme Military Council, who had
been meeting twice daily, were waiting for his
word. The whole nation was waiting. Biafra, which
was on high alert, was also waiting.

On 27 June 1967, Cyprian Ekwensi, famous writer
and Biafra’s Director of Information Service,
through the Voice of Biafra (formerly Enugu
Radio), urged Biafrans to be prepared for an
invasion on June 29 since “Northerners have often
struck on 29th day of the month.” He was alluding
to the day northern officers, led by Major T.Y.
Danjuma, seized Gowon’s predecessor, Major-
General Aguiyi-Ironsi, and killed him in a forest
outside Ibadan.

Gowon, then 31, had been running the affairs of
57million Nigerians for 10 months. It had not been
easy. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, his 58-year old
trusted deputy and adviser, was with Okoi Arikpo
and Philip Asiodu, permanent secretaries of the
ministries of External Affairs and Trade and
Industries respectively.

They were preparing to put the noose on the neck
of the Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell-BP, which had
frozen royalty payments due to the Federation
Account on 1 June 1967 and had offered to pay
the Biafran government £250,000.

Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafran
leader, had ordered all oil companies to start
paying all royalties to Enugu because they were
operating in a new country or risk heavy penalties.
Specifically, he demanded a minimum of £2million
from Shell-BP. The Federal Government had
imposed an economic blockade on Biafra. It
entailed barring all merchant vessels and sea
tankers from sailing to and from Koko, Warri,
Sapele, Escravos, Bonny, Port Harcourt, Calabar
ports, which Ojukwu had declared part and parcel
of Biafra.

Biafra controlled the land on which the oil
installations sat; the Nigerian government
controlled the coastal entrance and exit to those
lands. Shell-BP was confused as to whose order
should be obeyed. Sir David Hunt, the British High
Commissioner to Nigeria, told his American
counterpart after the meeting with the Nigerian
delegation: “Awolowo is very firmly in control of
Ministry of Finance and he is giving Stanley Gray,
Shell’s General Manager and other experts from
London a very difficult time for the past three
days.” They persuaded Awolowo to accept a deal
that would favour the Nigerian government and,
at the same time, would predispose oil workers and
the £150million investment to danger in the hands
of Biafran military forces. Awolowo refused,
arguing that anything short of the status quo was
recognition of Biafra and concession to the rebels.

As for security of investments and personnel, he
argued that once royalties were paid, the Nigerian
government would have the capacity to fund
whatever action it would take on the rebels and
Shell-BP’s investments would be safe.

continue...

Gowon paced to the large outdated map of the
country by the door to his office. When he asked
Awolowo to come and join his government, Awolowo
said he would accept only if Gowon did something
about the dominance of North over the rest of
the nation. A month before, Gowon had broken up
the North into six states, but the map by the door
still showed the old Nigeria, with an imposing
North at the top. He ran his finger around the
boundaries of Biafra and asked himself: “How can
I authorize an invasion of my own people?” He
knew what it meant to be resented. He was not
the most senior officer in the army. He was not a
Muslim Hausa or Fulani from Kano, Kaduna or
Sokoto. He was a Christian from one of the small
minorities that dot the North and yet, events had
promoted him to the position of the Head of
State and Commander-in-Chief–to the chagrin of
many northern officers, politicians, and emirs.

He knew the Igbo were resented in the North for
succeeding where indigenes had failed. His Igbo
lover, Edith Ike, told him her life was threatened
twice in Lagos since she returned from the North
in March.

According to the secret US document of 1 July
1967, Edith’s parents, having lived in the North
for 30 years, where she too was born, had fled
back to the East in October 1966 because of that
year’s massacre of the Igbo. Not 30,000 but
around 7,000 were killed, according to the
American documents. Donald Patterson of the
Political Section and Tom Smith of the Economic
Section travelled from the US Embassy in Lagos
to the North after the pogrom. “The Sabon-Garis
were ghost towns, deserted, with the detritus of
people, who had fled rapidly, left behind. Most
Northerners we talked to had no apologies for
what had happened to the Ibos, for the pogrom
that had killed so many. There were exceptions,
but in general, there was no remorse and the
feeling was one of good riddance.

“One day, our Hausa gardener attacked and tried
to beat up our Ibo cook. We fired the gardener,
but not long afterwards, the cook left for the
East,” said Patterson.

Earlier that week, Gowon called the West German
Ambassador in Lagos. The Germans were eager to
be in the good graces of the Gowon
administration. A war loomed. And in wars,
buildings, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure
are destroyed. These would need rebuilding. The
contract for the 2nd Mainland Bridge (later
called Eko Bridge) was signed two years earlier by
the Ambassador, CEO of Julius Berger Tiefbau AG
and Shehu Shagari, Federal Commissioner for
Works and Survey. That was Julius Berger’s first
contract in Nigeria. It was due for completion in
less than two years and they wanted more
bilateral cooperation. The ambassador assured
Gowon over the phone that he had taken care of
all the details and guaranteed the safety of
Edith, the nation’s “First Girlfriend”.

On the evening of 30 June, just before her
departure on a commercial airline, Edith told the
American Defense Attaché Standish Brooks, and
his wife, Gail, that she actually wanted to go to
the UK or USA, but Jack, as she affectionately
called Gowon, insisted that she could be exposed
to danger in either of the two countries.
Germany, he reasoned, would be safer.

continue...

To Major B.M. Usman and other northern officers
around Gowon, who had attributed his slow
response to the secession to the fact that his
girlfriend was Igbo and that her parents were
resettled in the East, it was such a huge relief
that at the Supreme Military Council meeting of 3
July 1967, Gowon authorized the long awaited
military campaign.

Edith had safely landed in West Germany. Gowon
told the gathering: “Gentlemen, we are going to
crush the rebellion, but note that we are going
after the rebels, not the Ibos.” The military
action, which was to become the Nigerian Civil War
or the Biafran War or Operation Unicord, as it was
coded in military circles, officially started on 6
July 1967 at 5 a.m.

The North was minded to use the war as a tool to
reassert its dominance of national affairs. Mallam
Kagu, Damboa, Regional Editor of the Morning
Post, told the American consul in Kaduna: “No one
should kid himself that this is a fight between the
East and the rest of Nigeria. It is a fight
between the North and the Ibo.” He added that
the rebels would be flushed out of Enugu within
six weeks. Lt. Colonel Hassan Katsina went further
to say with the level of enthusiasm among the
soldiers; it would be a matter of “only hours
before Ojukwu and his men were rounded up”.

The northern section of the Nigerian military was
the best equipped in the country. To ensure the
region’s continued dominance, the British assigned
most of the army and air force resources to the
North. It was only the Navy’s they could not
transfer. All the elite military schools were there.
The headquarters of the infantry and artillery
corps were there. Kaduna alone was home to the
headquarters of the 1st Division of the Nigerian
Army, Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria
(Army Depot), Air Force Training School and,
Nigerian Defence Academy.

Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power in
1966, once told the story of how Muhammadu
Ribadu, his counterpart in Defence Ministry, went
to the Nigerian Military School, Zaria, and the
British Commandant of the school told him many
of the students could not continue because they
failed woefully. When Ribadu thumbed through the
list, Sule said, it was a Mohammed, an Ibrahim, a
Yusuf or an Abdullahi. “You don’t know what you
are doing and because of this you cannot continue
to head the school,” an irate Ribadu was said to
have told the commandant.

Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was one of the students for
whom the commandant was sacked. “You can see
what Yar’Adua later became in life. He became
the vice president. This is the power of forward
planning,” Sule declared.

Unknown to the forward planners, according to
the US documents, Ojukwu had been meticulously
preparing for war as early as October 1966, after
the second round of massacre in the North. He
had stopped the Eastern share of revenues that
were supposed to accrue to the Federation
Account. By 30 April 1967, he had recalled all
Igbos serving in Nigeria embassies and foreign
missions and those that heeded his call were
placed on the payroll of the government of
Eastern Region. The 77,000 square kilometres of
the Republic of Biafra–a mere 8 per cent of the
size of Nigeria–was already divided into 20
provinces, with leaders selected for each. They
had their own judiciary, legislative councils,
ministries and ambassadors. Alouette helicopters
and a B26 bomber were procured from the French
Air Force through a Luxemburg trading company.

Hank Warton, the German-American arms dealer,
had been flying in Czech and Israeli arms via Spain
and Portugal since October 1966. The military
hardware, they could not get, they seized. A DC3
and a Fokker F27 were seized from the Nigerian
Air Force in April. NNS Ibadan, a Nigerian Navy
Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) that docked in
Calabar Port, was quickly made Biafran.

Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was supposed to be
in Enugu in prison for his role in 1966 coup, joined
in training recruits in Abakaliki. Foreign
mercenaries were training indoctrinated old
people, young men and teenagers recruited as
NCOs [Non-commissioned Officers] in jungle
warfare, bomb making, mortar and other artillery
firing. Ojukwu, through speeches, town hall
meetings, market square performances and radio
broadcasts, succeeded in convincing his people that
their destiny was death or a separate state. All
his performances in Ghana that culminated in the
Aburi Accord of January 1967, or discussions with
the Awolowo-led National Conciliation Committee
five months later, turned out to be ruse.

The underground war preparations, the secret
arms stockpiles openly manifested themselves as
Ojukwu’s stubborn refusal to accept offers or
concessions during these peace meetings.

But the Biafrans knew that their vulnerable line
was along Ogoja, Ikom, Calabar, Port Harcourt,
and Yenogoa. Support from the six million people
making up the Eastern minorities was very much
unsure. The minorities viewed their leaders in
Biafra high command as traitors. And without the
minorities, Biafra would be landlocked and most
likely, unviable as a state. More so, their vast oil
and gas resources were the reason they
contemplated secession in the first place. The
Biafra high command believed that if there was
going to be any troop incursion from there, they
are going to be transported through ship. They
already had a B26 bomber to deal fire to
Nigeria’s only transport ship, NNS Lokoja, anytime
it approached the Biafran coastline.

continue. ..

To Major B.M. Usman and other northern officers
around Gowon, who had attributed his slow
response to the secession to the fact that his
girlfriend was Igbo and that her parents were
resettled in the East, it was such a huge relief
that at the Supreme Military Council meeting of 3
July 1967, Gowon authorized the long awaited
military campaign.

Edith had safely landed in West Germany. Gowon
told the gathering: “Gentlemen, we are going to
crush the rebellion, but note that we are going
after the rebels, not the Ibos.” The military
action, which was to become the Nigerian Civil War
or the Biafran War or Operation Unicord, as it was
coded in military circles, officially started on 6
July 1967 at 5 a.m.

The North was minded to use the war as a tool to
reassert its dominance of national affairs. Mallam
Kagu, Damboa, Regional Editor of the Morning
Post, told the American consul in Kaduna: “No one
should kid himself that this is a fight between the
East and the rest of Nigeria. It is a fight
between the North and the Ibo.” He added that
the rebels would be flushed out of Enugu within
six weeks. Lt. Colonel Hassan Katsina went further
to say with the level of enthusiasm among the
soldiers; it would be a matter of “only hours
before Ojukwu and his men were rounded up”.

The northern section of the Nigerian military was
the best equipped in the country. To ensure the
region’s continued dominance, the British assigned
most of the army and air force resources to the
North. It was only the Navy’s they could not
transfer. All the elite military schools were there.
The headquarters of the infantry and artillery
corps were there. Kaduna alone was home to the
headquarters of the 1st Division of the Nigerian
Army, Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria
(Army Depot), Air Force Training School and,
Nigerian Defence Academy.

Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power in
1966, once told the story of how Muhammadu
Ribadu, his counterpart in Defence Ministry, went
to the Nigerian Military School, Zaria, and the
British Commandant of the school told him many
of the students could not continue because they
failed woefully. When Ribadu thumbed through the
list, Sule said, it was a Mohammed, an Ibrahim, a
Yusuf or an Abdullahi. “You don’t know what you
are doing and because of this you cannot continue
to head the school,” an irate Ribadu was said to
have told the commandant.

Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was one of the students for
whom the commandant was sacked. “You can see
what Yar’Adua later became in life. He became
the vice president. This is the power of forward
planning,” Sule declared.

Unknown to the forward planners, according to
the US documents, Ojukwu had been meticulously
preparing for war as early as October 1966, after
the second round of massacre in the North. He
had stopped the Eastern share of revenues that
were supposed to accrue to the Federation
Account. By 30 April 1967, he had recalled all
Igbos serving in Nigeria embassies and foreign
missions and those that heeded his call were
placed on the payroll of the government of
Eastern Region. The 77,000 square kilometres of
the Republic of Biafra–a mere 8 per cent of the
size of Nigeria–was already divided into 20
provinces, with leaders selected for each. They
had their own judiciary, legislative councils,
ministries and ambassadors. Alouette helicopters
and a B26 bomber were procured from the French
Air Force through a Luxemburg trading company.

Hank Warton, the German-American arms dealer,
had been flying in Czech and Israeli arms via Spain
and Portugal since October 1966. The military
hardware, they could not get, they seized. A DC3
and a Fokker F27 were seized from the Nigerian
Air Force in April. NNS Ibadan, a Nigerian Navy
Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) that docked in
Calabar Port, was quickly made Biafran.

Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was supposed to be
in Enugu in prison for his role in 1966 coup, joined
in training recruits in Abakaliki. Foreign
mercenaries were training indoctrinated old
people, young men and teenagers recruited as
NCOs [Non-commissioned Officers] in jungle
warfare, bomb making, mortar and other artillery
firing. Ojukwu, through speeches, town hall
meetings, market square performances and radio
broadcasts, succeeded in convincing his people that
their destiny was death or a separate state. All
his performances in Ghana that culminated in the
Aburi Accord of January 1967, or discussions with
the Awolowo-led National Conciliation Committee
five months later, turned out to be ruse.

The underground war preparations, the secret
arms stockpiles openly manifested themselves as
Ojukwu’s stubborn refusal to accept offers or
concessions during these peace meetings.

But the Biafrans knew that their vulnerable line
was along Ogoja, Ikom, Calabar, Port Harcourt,
and Yenogoa. Support from the six million people
making up the Eastern minorities was very much
unsure. The minorities viewed their leaders in
Biafra high command as traitors. And without the
minorities, Biafra would be landlocked and most
likely, unviable as a state. More so, their vast oil
and gas resources were the reason they
contemplated secession in the first place. The
Biafra high command believed that if there was
going to be any troop incursion from there, they
are going to be transported through ship. They
already had a B26 bomber to deal fire to
Nigeria’s only transport ship, NNS Lokoja, anytime
it approached the Biafran coastline.

continue. ..

The Biafrans also knew that Gowon wanted to
respect the neutrality of Midwest and not invade
through Niger Bridge, which would have driven the
people of the Midwest into waiting Biafran hands.

But if Gowon changed his mind and there was a
general mobilization of the two battalions of the
federal troops there, they had trustworthy men
there that would alert Enugu. And if that failed,
according to the US documents, the Niger Bridge
had been mined using “explosives with metal
covering across the roadbed at second pier out
from the eastern side”.

The Biafrans also knew that the Yoruba, who were
sworn enemies of the Northern hegemony, would
never join the North militarily or politically
against the Biafrans. When Gowon vouched to
“crush the rebellion,” progressive Yoruba
intellectuals deplored the language. Professor
Hezekiah Oluwasanmi, Vice Chancellor of University
of Ife, described the use of the word as
unfortunate. Justice Kayode Eso of the Western
Court of Appeal said: “Crushing the East was not
the way to make Nigeria one.”

Mr. Strong, the American consul in Ibadan, whom
they had been speaking to, confidentially wrote:
“As intellectuals and modernizers, they see the
conflict in terms of continuing determination of
conservative North to dominate the more
advanced South and they expressed fear that once
North subdues East, it will seek to assert outright
dominance over the West. The centre of trouble
might then swing back to the West, where it all
started.”

The Biafrans understood, therefore, that their
strongest defence perimeter would be along
Nsukka, Obudu, Gakem and Nyonya in Ogoja
province, where they share border with the North.

That was where they concentrated. On 8 July
after three days of fighting, only four Biafran
troops were dead and nine wounded in Obudu,
while up to 100 Nigerian troops were dead,
according to the Irish Embassy official, Eamon
O’tuathail, who visited the Catholic Mission
Hospital in Obudu. He said: “Forty five (45) of
the dead had already been buried and the
villagers were seen carrying the heads of the
remaining around town.” In June before fighting
started, Ojukwu charged on Biafra Radio: “Each
Biafran soldier should bring back ten or twenty
Hausa heads.”

At Nyanya, Nigerian troops attempted to seize
the bridge linking Obudu and Ogoja, but were
beaten back by the Biafran troops on 7 July at
1400hrs. According to the New York Times’ Lloyd
Garrison’s dispatch of 8 July: “The Biafran Air
Force–a lone B-26 fighter bomber–flew sorties
from Enugu today, bombing and strafing enemy
columns. Asked what damage it had inflicted, its
European pilot replied: “Frankly, I don’t know. But
we made a lot of smoke. Hundreds of Enugu
pedestrians waved and cheered each time the
plane returned from a mission and swooped low
over the city buzzing Ogui Avenue.”

Tunde Akingbade of the Daily Times, who was
returning from the frontlines, said the first
Nigerian battalion in Ogoja area was “almost
completely wiped out by a combination of mines
and electrical devices (Ogbunigwe)”.

In the first few weeks of the war, the Biafrans
were clearly on top. “Enugu is very calm,” the
confidential cable of 13 July 1967 noted. “Ojukwu
is dining with Field Commanders in State House
tonight.”

On the federal side, confusion reigned. They had
grossly underestimated Biafran capabilities.

“Gowon and his immediate military advisers believe
they can carry out a successful operation putting
their trust in the superiority of the Hausa
soldier,” the British High Commissioner, Sir David
Hunt, told his American counterpart on 31 May
1967. He said further: “A northern incursion would
be hastily mounted, ill-conceived and more in the
nature of a foray.”

Even the Nigerian infantry, which advanced as far
as Obolo on Oturkpo-Nsukka Road, was easily
repelled. It ran out of ammunition. At the
Supreme Headquarters in Lagos, they were
accusing Shuwa, the commander, of not sending
enough information about what was going on.
Shuwa counter-accused that he was not getting
enough and timely orders. Requests for
ammunition and hardware procurement were
chaotically coming to the Federal Armament
Board from different units, not collectively from
the central command.

Major S.A. Alao, acting commander of Nigerian Air
Force (after George Kurubo defected to Biafran
High Command) together with the German
adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Shipp, had
travelled to many European cities to buy jets.
They were unsuccessful. Gowon had written to the
American president for arms. The State
Department declined military assistance to either
side. Gowon replied that he was not requesting for
assistance, but a right to buy arms from the
American market. That too was rejected.


continue...

Interesting read! Meanwhile, after fighting for the elusive one Nigeria where are the principal actors today? Karma will continue to pay everyone back.

The Biafrans also knew that Gowon wanted to
respect the neutrality of Midwest and not invade
through Niger Bridge, which would have driven the
people of the Midwest into waiting Biafran hands.

But if Gowon changed his mind and there was a
general mobilization of the two battalions of the
federal troops there, they had trustworthy men
there that would alert Enugu. And if that failed,
according to the US documents, the Niger Bridge
had been mined using “explosives with metal
covering across the roadbed at second pier out
from the eastern side”.

The Biafrans also knew that the Yoruba, who were
sworn enemies of the Northern hegemony, would
never join the North militarily or politically
against the Biafrans. When Gowon vouched to
“crush the rebellion,” progressive Yoruba
intellectuals deplored the language. Professor
Hezekiah Oluwasanmi, Vice Chancellor of University
of Ife, described the use of the word as
unfortunate. Justice Kayode Eso of the Western
Court of Appeal said: “Crushing the East was not
the way to make Nigeria one.”

Mr. Strong, the American consul in Ibadan, whom
they had been speaking to, confidentially wrote:
“As intellectuals and modernizers, they see the
conflict in terms of continuing determination of
conservative North to dominate the more
advanced South and they expressed fear that once
North subdues East, it will seek to assert outright
dominance over the West. The centre of trouble
might then swing back to the West, where it all
started.”

The Biafrans understood, therefore, that their
strongest defence perimeter would be along
Nsukka, Obudu, Gakem and Nyonya in Ogoja
province, where they share border with the North.

That was where they concentrated. On 8 July
after three days of fighting, only four Biafran
troops were dead and nine wounded in Obudu,
while up to 100 Nigerian troops were dead,
according to the Irish Embassy official, Eamon
O’tuathail, who visited the Catholic Mission
Hospital in Obudu. He said: “Forty five (45) of
the dead had already been buried and the
villagers were seen carrying the heads of the
remaining around town.” In June before fighting
started, Ojukwu charged on Biafra Radio: “Each
Biafran soldier should bring back ten or twenty
Hausa heads.”

At Nyanya, Nigerian troops attempted to seize
the bridge linking Obudu and Ogoja, but were
beaten back by the Biafran troops on 7 July at
1400hrs. According to the New York Times’ Lloyd
Garrison’s dispatch of 8 July: “The Biafran Air
Force–a lone B-26 fighter bomber–flew sorties
from Enugu today, bombing and strafing enemy
columns. Asked what damage it had inflicted, its
European pilot replied: “Frankly, I don’t know. But
we made a lot of smoke. Hundreds of Enugu
pedestrians waved and cheered each time the
plane returned from a mission and swooped low
over the city buzzing Ogui Avenue.”

Tunde Akingbade of the Daily Times, who was
returning from the frontlines, said the first
Nigerian battalion in Ogoja area was “almost
completely wiped out by a combination of mines
and electrical devices (Ogbunigwe)”.

In the first few weeks of the war, the Biafrans
were clearly on top. “Enugu is very calm,” the
confidential cable of 13 July 1967 noted. “Ojukwu
is dining with Field Commanders in State House
tonight.”

On the federal side, confusion reigned. They had
grossly underestimated Biafran capabilities.

“Gowon and his immediate military advisers believe
they can carry out a successful operation putting
their trust in the superiority of the Hausa
soldier,” the British High Commissioner, Sir David
Hunt, told his American counterpart on 31 May
1967. He said further: “A northern incursion would
be hastily mounted, ill-conceived and more in the
nature of a foray.”

Even the Nigerian infantry, which advanced as far
as Obolo on Oturkpo-Nsukka Road, was easily
repelled. It ran out of ammunition. At the
Supreme Headquarters in Lagos, they were
accusing Shuwa, the commander, of not sending
enough information about what was going on.
Shuwa counter-accused that he was not getting
enough and timely orders. Requests for
ammunition and hardware procurement were
chaotically coming to the Federal Armament
Board from different units, not collectively from
the central command.

Major S.A. Alao, acting commander of Nigerian Air
Force (after George Kurubo defected to Biafran
High Command) together with the German
adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Shipp, had
travelled to many European cities to buy jets.
They were unsuccessful. Gowon had written to the
American president for arms. The State
Department declined military assistance to either
side. Gowon replied that he was not requesting for
assistance, but a right to buy arms from the
American market. That too was rejected.


continue...

Following

Weldone op.



Following






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The CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but
American diplomatic and consular corps in Nigeria
predicted victory for the Federal side and
concluded that a united Nigeria served American
interests better than the one without the Eastern
Region. Two conflicting conclusions from an
important department and a useful agency. The
American government chose to be neutral. Dean
Rusk, America’s Secretary of State said: “America
is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an
area under British influence.”

The British on the other hand were foot-
dragging. At the insistence of Awolowo, “the
acting prime minister” as he was called in
diplomatic circles, Gowon approached the Soviet
Union.

According to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67)
sent by Dr. Martin Hillenbrand, American
Ambassador in East Germany, to his counterpart
in Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu, Ojukwu’s special envoy,
met Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandr
Romanov, in Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said
that for USSR to recognize Biafra and supply it
arms, the latter had to nationalize the oil
industry. Ojukwu refused, saying that he had no
money to reimburse the oil companies and that
Biafrans did not have the expertise to run the oil
installations.

A month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal
Commissioner for Information and Labour, went to
Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with Moscow
and promised to nationalize the oil industry,
including its allied industries once they got arms
to recapture them from the Biafrans. Within
days, 15 MiGs arrived in sections in Ikeja and Kano
airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no
nationalization.

Meanwhile, buoyed by the confidence from early
success, the Biafrans went on the offensive. Their
B26 (one of the six originally intended for use
against the Nigerian Navy) was fitted with
multiple canon and 50mm calibre machine gun
mounts. It conducted bombing raids on Makurdi
airfield, Kano and Kaduna. Luckily for Nigeria,
the two transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get
more reserve mortar and 106-artillery ammo. In
Kano, there were no fatalities, only a slight
damage to the wing of a commercial plane.

Kaduna, however, was not that lucky. On 10
August 1967, the B26 dropped bombs on Kaduna
airbase, damaging many buildings and the main
hangar. The German consulate in Kaduna
confirmed that a German citizen, a Dornier
technician tasked with maintaining Nigerian
military planes, was killed and two others injured.
A week later, the senior traffic control officer,
A.O. Amaku, was arrested for sabotage. He was
accused of failing to shut off the airport’s
homing device, thus giving the Biafran plane
navigational assistance. His British assistant, Mr.
Palfrey, was similarly suspected. He resigned and
immediately returned to the UK. However, Major
Obada, the airbase commanding officer and an
Urhobo from the Midwest, strongly defended the
accused.

The daring bomb raid provoked many more
Northern civilians to run to the nearest army base
and enlist to fight.

According to a report by US Ambassador Elbert
Matthews, cabled to Washington on 3 July 1967,
unidentified men tried to bomb the police
headquarters in Lagos on the night of 2 July. They
attempted to drive an automobile into the
compound, but the guards did not open the gate.

They packed the car across the street near a
small house opposite a petrol station. Leaving the
car, the men fled and within seconds, an explosion
took place. The house was demolished and all its
occupants killed, but the petrol station was
unaffected. Eleven people, including some of the
guards at the police headquarters, were injured.

Two hours later, a second explosion, from
explosives in a car parked by a petrol station,
rocked Yaba. This time, the station caught fire.
The ambassador remarked: “It is possible this is a
start of campaign of terrorism…public reactions
could further jeopardize safety of Ibos in Lagos.”
And sure it did.

A Lagos resident, who visited the police
headquarters after the attack, told the
Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”

There was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots
broke out. Northern soldiers at the 2nd Battalion
Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to launch a
mini-version of the previous year’s torture and
massacre of the Igbo in the North. On 7 July
1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant Colonel
Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the bombing in a
radio broadcast. “A good number of Igbos in Lagos
is innocent and loyal to the federal government.

It is only fair that they be allowed to go about
their business unmolested so long as they abide by
the law and are not agents and evildoers,”
Johnson said.

He called for Lagosians to join civil defence units
and for Easterners to come and register with the
police.

Meanwhile, the corpses of troops and soldiers
wounded in Yahe, Wakande, Obudu and Gakem that
arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967 sparked
enormous interest in enlistment and volunteering.

Recruitment centres were established in Ibadan,
Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at the Kano
centre, headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the
Nigerian Regiment that generated the biggest
number of recruits. According to the US
confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of these
were veterans, who had been recruited to fight on
the British side in Burma. The Burma veterans
marched angrily to the recruitment offices to
replace those that had been killed or injured.

Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these, 5,000 were
immediately sent to the frontline. They said they
needed no training; only guns.

As they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem,
4km southeast of Nsukka, when mortal fires from
the Biafran artillery landed close by,
inexperienced recruits ducked for cover behind
their transport columns out of fear and
incompetence in bush warfare. Not these Burma
veterans. Damboa, the Regional Editor of the
Morning Post, was embedded with some of these
veterans under the command of Major Shande,
formerly of the 5th Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu
commanded in 1963.

continue...

The CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but
American diplomatic and consular corps in Nigeria
predicted victory for the Federal side and
concluded that a united Nigeria served American
interests better than the one without the Eastern
Region. Two conflicting conclusions from an
important department and a useful agency. The
American government chose to be neutral. Dean
Rusk, America’s Secretary of State said: “America
is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an
area under British influence.”

The British on the other hand were foot-
dragging. At the insistence of Awolowo, “the
acting prime minister” as he was called in
diplomatic circles, Gowon approached the Soviet
Union.

According to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67)
sent by Dr. Martin Hillenbrand, American
Ambassador in East Germany, to his counterpart
in Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu, Ojukwu’s special envoy,
met Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandr
Romanov, in Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said
that for USSR to recognize Biafra and supply it
arms, the latter had to nationalize the oil
industry. Ojukwu refused, saying that he had no
money to reimburse the oil companies and that
Biafrans did not have the expertise to run the oil
installations.

A month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal
Commissioner for Information and Labour, went to
Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with Moscow
and promised to nationalize the oil industry,
including its allied industries once they got arms
to recapture them from the Biafrans. Within
days, 15 MiGs arrived in sections in Ikeja and Kano
airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no
nationalization.

Meanwhile, buoyed by the confidence from early
success, the Biafrans went on the offensive. Their
B26 (one of the six originally intended for use
against the Nigerian Navy) was fitted with
multiple canon and 50mm calibre machine gun
mounts. It conducted bombing raids on Makurdi
airfield, Kano and Kaduna. Luckily for Nigeria,
the two transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get
more reserve mortar and 106-artillery ammo. In
Kano, there were no fatalities, only a slight
damage to the wing of a commercial plane.

Kaduna, however, was not that lucky. On 10
August 1967, the B26 dropped bombs on Kaduna
airbase, damaging many buildings and the main
hangar. The German consulate in Kaduna
confirmed that a German citizen, a Dornier
technician tasked with maintaining Nigerian
military planes, was killed and two others injured.
A week later, the senior traffic control officer,
A.O. Amaku, was arrested for sabotage. He was
accused of failing to shut off the airport’s
homing device, thus giving the Biafran plane
navigational assistance. His British assistant, Mr.
Palfrey, was similarly suspected. He resigned and
immediately returned to the UK. However, Major
Obada, the airbase commanding officer and an
Urhobo from the Midwest, strongly defended the
accused.

The daring bomb raid provoked many more
Northern civilians to run to the nearest army base
and enlist to fight.

According to a report by US Ambassador Elbert
Matthews, cabled to Washington on 3 July 1967,
unidentified men tried to bomb the police
headquarters in Lagos on the night of 2 July. They
attempted to drive an automobile into the
compound, but the guards did not open the gate.

They packed the car across the street near a
small house opposite a petrol station. Leaving the
car, the men fled and within seconds, an explosion
took place. The house was demolished and all its
occupants killed, but the petrol station was
unaffected. Eleven people, including some of the
guards at the police headquarters, were injured.

Two hours later, a second explosion, from
explosives in a car parked by a petrol station,
rocked Yaba. This time, the station caught fire.
The ambassador remarked: “It is possible this is a
start of campaign of terrorism…public reactions
could further jeopardize safety of Ibos in Lagos.”
And sure it did.

A Lagos resident, who visited the police
headquarters after the attack, told the
Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”

There was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots
broke out. Northern soldiers at the 2nd Battalion
Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to launch a
mini-version of the previous year’s torture and
massacre of the Igbo in the North. On 7 July
1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant Colonel
Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the bombing in a
radio broadcast. “A good number of Igbos in Lagos
is innocent and loyal to the federal government.

It is only fair that they be allowed to go about
their business unmolested so long as they abide by
the law and are not agents and evildoers,”
Johnson said.

He called for Lagosians to join civil defence units
and for Easterners to come and register with the
police.

Meanwhile, the corpses of troops and soldiers
wounded in Yahe, Wakande, Obudu and Gakem that
arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967 sparked
enormous interest in enlistment and volunteering.

Recruitment centres were established in Ibadan,
Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at the Kano
centre, headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the
Nigerian Regiment that generated the biggest
number of recruits. According to the US
confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of these
were veterans, who had been recruited to fight on
the British side in Burma. The Burma veterans
marched angrily to the recruitment offices to
replace those that had been killed or injured.

Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these, 5,000 were
immediately sent to the frontline. They said they
needed no training; only guns.

As they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem,
4km southeast of Nsukka, when mortal fires from
the Biafran artillery landed close by,
inexperienced recruits ducked for cover behind
their transport columns out of fear and
incompetence in bush warfare. Not these Burma
veterans. Damboa, the Regional Editor of the
Morning Post, was embedded with some of these
veterans under the command of Major Shande,
formerly of the 5th Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu
commanded in 1963.

continue...

The CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but
American diplomatic and consular corps in Nigeria
predicted victory for the Federal side and
concluded that a united Nigeria served American
interests better than the one without the Eastern
Region. Two conflicting conclusions from an
important department and a useful agency. The
American government chose to be neutral. Dean
Rusk, America’s Secretary of State said: “America
is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an
area under British influence.”

The British on the other hand were foot-
dragging. At the insistence of Awolowo, “the
acting prime minister” as he was called in
diplomatic circles, Gowon approached the Soviet
Union.

According to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67)
sent by Dr. Martin Hillenbrand, American
Ambassador in East Germany, to his counterpart
in Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu, Ojukwu’s special envoy,
met Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandr
Romanov, in Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said
that for USSR to recognize Biafra and supply it
arms, the latter had to nationalize the oil
industry. Ojukwu refused, saying that he had no
money to reimburse the oil companies and that
Biafrans did not have the expertise to run the oil
installations.

A month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal
Commissioner for Information and Labour, went to
Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with Moscow
and promised to nationalize the oil industry,
including its allied industries once they got arms
to recapture them from the Biafrans. Within
days, 15 MiGs arrived in sections in Ikeja and Kano
airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no
nationalization.

Meanwhile, buoyed by the confidence from early
success, the Biafrans went on the offensive. Their
B26 (one of the six originally intended for use
against the Nigerian Navy) was fitted with
multiple canon and 50mm calibre machine gun
mounts. It conducted bombing raids on Makurdi
airfield, Kano and Kaduna. Luckily for Nigeria,
the two transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get
more reserve mortar and 106-artillery ammo. In
Kano, there were no fatalities, only a slight
damage to the wing of a commercial plane.

Kaduna, however, was not that lucky. On 10
August 1967, the B26 dropped bombs on Kaduna
airbase, damaging many buildings and the main
hangar. The German consulate in Kaduna
confirmed that a German citizen, a Dornier
technician tasked with maintaining Nigerian
military planes, was killed and two others injured.
A week later, the senior traffic control officer,
A.O. Amaku, was arrested for sabotage. He was
accused of failing to shut off the airport’s
homing device, thus giving the Biafran plane
navigational assistance. His British assistant, Mr.
Palfrey, was similarly suspected. He resigned and
immediately returned to the UK. However, Major
Obada, the airbase commanding officer and an
Urhobo from the Midwest, strongly defended the
accused.

The daring bomb raid provoked many more
Northern civilians to run to the nearest army base
and enlist to fight.

According to a report by US Ambassador Elbert
Matthews, cabled to Washington on 3 July 1967,
unidentified men tried to bomb the police
headquarters in Lagos on the night of 2 July. They
attempted to drive an automobile into the
compound, but the guards did not open the gate.

They packed the car across the street near a
small house opposite a petrol station. Leaving the
car, the men fled and within seconds, an explosion
took place. The house was demolished and all its
occupants killed, but the petrol station was
unaffected. Eleven people, including some of the
guards at the police headquarters, were injured.

Two hours later, a second explosion, from
explosives in a car parked by a petrol station,
rocked Yaba. This time, the station caught fire.
The ambassador remarked: “It is possible this is a
start of campaign of terrorism…public reactions
could further jeopardize safety of Ibos in Lagos.”
And sure it did.

A Lagos resident, who visited the police
headquarters after the attack, told the
Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”

There was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots
broke out. Northern soldiers at the 2nd Battalion
Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to launch a
mini-version of the previous year’s torture and
massacre of the Igbo in the North. On 7 July
1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant Colonel
Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the bombing in a
radio broadcast. “A good number of Igbos in Lagos
is innocent and loyal to the federal government.

It is only fair that they be allowed to go about
their business unmolested so long as they abide by
the law and are not agents and evildoers,”
Johnson said.

He called for Lagosians to join civil defence units
and for Easterners to come and register with the
police.

Meanwhile, the corpses of troops and soldiers
wounded in Yahe, Wakande, Obudu and Gakem that
arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967 sparked
enormous interest in enlistment and volunteering.

Recruitment centres were established in Ibadan,
Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at the Kano
centre, headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the
Nigerian Regiment that generated the biggest
number of recruits. According to the US
confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of these
were veterans, who had been recruited to fight on
the British side in Burma. The Burma veterans
marched angrily to the recruitment offices to
replace those that had been killed or injured.

Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these, 5,000 were
immediately sent to the frontline. They said they
needed no training; only guns.

As they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem,
4km southeast of Nsukka, when mortal fires from
the Biafran artillery landed close by,
inexperienced recruits ducked for cover behind
their transport columns out of fear and
incompetence in bush warfare. Not these Burma
veterans. Damboa, the Regional Editor of the
Morning Post, was embedded with some of these
veterans under the command of Major Shande,
formerly of the 5th Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu
commanded in 1963.

continue...

.

One day, at about 2a.m, Biafran forces began
firing from the jungle in the hope of drawing a
return fire if the enemy was ahead. “But the
veterans were too smart and began to creep
towards the source of firing. After some time,
the Biafran troops began to advance thinking that
there were no federal troops ahead since there
was no return of fire. They walked straight into
the pointing guns of these veterans, their fingers
squeezed the triggers,” said Damboa to a US
Consulate officer named Arp.

These veterans were shooting at innocent Igbo
civilians, too. Damboa further told Arp, when he
came back from the frontlines on 17 September
1967, that “federal troops were shooting most Ibo
civilians on sight, including women and children
except for women with babies in their arms.

Initially they observed the rules laid down by
Gowon on the treatment of civilians. Then, after
the takeover of the Midwest, they heard stories
that Ibo soldiers had killed all the northerners
they found residing in the Midwest. Since that
time, Federal troops have been shooting Ibo
civilians on sight,” added Damboa.


The Midwest Invasion

Something was happening to Biafran soldiers,
which the Federal troops observed but could not
explain. Indeed, the fortunes of the Federal
troops were improving. Colonel Benjamin
Adekunle’s 3rd Marine Commando had landed on
25 July 1967 at Bonny Island, establishing a heavy
presence of federal forces in the creeks. Two L29
Delfins fighter jets from Czechoslovakia (NAF 401
and NAF 402) were at the Ikeja Airport and
battle ready.

Five more, on board Polish vessel Krakow, were a
week away from the Apapa Ports. Major Lal, an
ammunition ordnance officer seconded from the
Indian Army to Nigeria, had arrived from Eastern
Europe, where he had gone to acquire information
necessary to utilize Czech aerial ordnance.

Sections of 15 Soviet MiG bombers hidden in NAF
hangars were being assembled by 40 Russian
technicians lodging in Central Hotel, Kano. Bruce
Brent of Mobil Oil was flying jet oil to Kano to fuel
these bombers. Captain N.O. Sandburg of Nigerian
Airlines had flown in seven pilots, who had
previously done mercenary work in South Africa
and Congo, to fly the MiGs. Names, birthdates
and passport numbers of 26 Russians, who were to
serve as military advisors had been passed to
Edwin Ogbu, Permanent Secretary, External
Affairs Ministry. They were in Western Europe
awaiting a direct flight to Lagos.

But George Kurubo, the Federal Air Force Chief
of Staff, who had earlier joined the Biafran high
command, had defected back to the fold and had
been sent to Moscow as ambassador to facilitate
the flow of more arms from the Soviets.

Lt. Colonel Oluwole Rotimi, Quartermaster-
General of the Nigerian Army, went to western
Europe with a fat chequebook.

What followed was the arrival of Norwegian ship,
Hoegh Bell, bearing 2,000 cases of ammunition;
and British ship, Perang, which discharged its own
2000 cases of ammunition. A German ship
Suderholm also arrived. Those in charge of it
claimed she was in Apapa to offload gypsum. But
the US defense attaché reported that it was
carrying “300 tonnes of 60mm and 90mm ammo.”

The Ghanaian vessel, Sakumo Lagoon, was already
in Lome, heading to Apapa to discharge its own
ammo. A cache of 1,000 automatic
fabriquenationale rifles had arrived Lagos by air
on 8 August 1967 from the UK.

Speaking secretly to UK Defence Attaché, Lt.
Colonel Ikwue said he too had gone to the German
Defence Firm, Merex, to buy ammunition: 106mm
US recoilless rifles at $86 per round; 84mm ammo
for the Carl Gustav recoilless rifles at $72 per
round; 105mm HEAT- High Explosive Anti-Tank
warheads at $47 per round. Ikwue also bought
three English Electra Canberra, eight Mark II
Bombers at $105,000 each, 15 Sabre MK VI-T33
Jets at $100,000 each.

With all of these, Awolowo, rejected Hassan
Katsina’s request for funding of 55, 000 more
rifles for new recruits. However, he agreed once
Gowon intervened and assured him it was not a
request inspired by fraudulent intentions.

Federal troops had captured Nsukka, 56km from
Enugu. Over 200 non-Igbo Biafran policemen had
fled across the Mamfe border into Cameroun. In
Ogoja, the Ishibori, Mbube and other non-Igbo
Biafrans welcomed the federal troops after
driving out the Biafran troops in a fierce battle.

The Biafrans blew up the bridge over the Ayim
River at Mfume as they retreated.

The momentum was with the Federal side, but
they knew their victories were not only because of
their military superiority. At critical stages of
battle, even when the Biafrans were clearly
winning, they suddenly withdrew. An instance was
on 15 July 1967, to the west of Nsukka on the
route to Obolo. According to a conversation
Colonel J.R. Akahan, Nigeria’s Chief of Army
Staff, had with British Defence Advisor, the
Nigerian infantry companies of the 4th Battalion,
totally unaware of the presence of the 8th
Battalion of the Biafran army, were buried under
a hail of bullets and mortar.

Yet, the Biafran forces began to retreat. This
enabled the remnants of the federal infantry
company to regroup and successfully counter-
attack. Even more senior Biafran commanders
that should have been aware that the area had
come under federal control were driving into the
arms of the federal side. Nzeogwu and Tome
Bigger (Ojukwu’s half-brother) were victims of
the mysterious happening. Ojukwu initially put this
down to breakdown of communication in the chain
of command. During a special announcement over
Biafran radio on 15 July 1967, Ojukwu said:

“Yesterday, a special attack, which would have
completely sealed the doom of enemy troops in
the Nsukka sector of the northern front, was
ruthlessly sabotaged by a mysterious order from
the army high command…Our valiant troops were
treacherously exposed to enemy flanks.”

At 9.30p.m on 8 August 1967, Biafran forces
invaded the Midwest. In the recollection of Major
(Dr.) Albert Nwazu Okonkwo, military
administrator of Midwest, made available in
confidence through an American teacher living in
Asaba to Clinton Olson, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Lagos on 1 November 1967, it was known by 4
August 1967 in Asaba that the Midwest, West and
Lagos would soon be invaded.

On 5 August, Ojukwu had warned the Midwest
government, headed by Colonel David Ejoor, that
if northern troops were allowed to stay in the
Midwest, the region would become a battleground.
Many Midwestern officers knew of the plans; some
of them had gone to Biafra earlier to help in the
preparations. Lt Col. Nwawo, Commander of the
Fourth Area Command at Benin, was probably
aware. Lt Col. Okwechime, according to the
document, certainly knew of it. Lt Col. Nwajei did
not know and was never trusted by the anti-Lagos
elements in the Midwest. “After the Biafran
takeover, Nwajei was sent back to his village of
Ibusa, where he was said to be engaged in
repainting his home until just the arrival of
Nigerian troops in the area,” disclosed the
document.

Major Albert Okonkwo, later appointed military
administrator, did not know in advance.

Lieutenant (later Major) Joseph Isichei and
Lieutenant Colonel Chukwurah were not informed
in advance. “Major Samuel Ogbemudia participated
in the invasion, properly by prior agreement,” the
document stated.

That night of 8 August, Biafran army units blazed
across the Onitsha Bridge and disarmed the Asaba
garrison that was then stationed at St Peter’s
Teachers’ Training College. Then they went on to
the Catering Rest House, where Midwest officers
were living, and disarmed the officers. The only
exception was Major Asama, the local commander,
who escaped and drove to Agbor at about
22.30hrs.

There were no casualties except for one officer
with a gunshot wound in the leg. The invading
force drove to Agbor, where it split into three
columns. One column drove northwards towards
Auchi and Aghenebode. A second column went to
Warri and Sapele.

“The main force led by Victor Banjo was supposed
to drive on to Benin and capture Ijebu-Ode, reach
Ibadan on 9 August, reach Ikeja near Lagos by 10
August, setting up a blockade there to seal off
the capital city,” the document quoted Okonkwo as
saying.

However, this main column stopped in Agbor for six
hours, reaching Benin at dawn. There was no real
resistance in Benin, where no civilian was killed.
The main column left Benin for Ijebu-Ode early in
the afternoon. It stopped at Ore, just at the
Western Region’s border.

According to US Defense Attaché report, three
weeks before, Ejoor informed the Supreme
Headquarters that he had information that
Ojukwu was planning to send soldiers in mufti to
conquer the Midwest. So, the 3rd Battalion, which
was heading towards the Okene – Idah route to
join the 1st Division on the Nsukka frontline, was
ordered to stop at Owo. The first Recce Squadron
from Ibadan, which had already reached Okene,
was reassigned to take care of any surprise in the
Midwest. By the time Lagos heard of the invasion,
this squadron was quickly upgraded from company
strength to a battalion, with troops of Shuwa’s
1st Division across the river, and another
battalion was stationed at Idah to hold a defensive
alignment against any Biafran surprise from
Auchi.

Upon receiving the telephone call from Major
Asama about the Biafran invasion at Asaba, Ejoor
hurriedly left his wife and children at the State
House, went to his friend, Dr Albert Okonkwo at
Benin Hospital to borrow his car. He then sought
asylum in the home of Catholic Bishop of Benin,
Patrick Kelly.

In his first radio address to the people of Midwest
on 9 August 1967, Banjo said Ejoor was safe and
“efforts were being made to enlist his continued
service in Midwest and in Nigeria.” Ejoor stayed in
the seminary next door to the bishop’s house for
almost two weeks, receiving visitors including
Banjo, Colonels Nwawo and Nwajei, Major (Dr.)
Okonkwo, who were trying to persuade him to
make a speech supporting the new administration.

Ejoor refused. He was told that he was free to go
wherever he wished without molestation. Not
trusting what they might do, he went back to
Isoko his native area, where he remained till
federal forces captured it on 22 September 1967.
Before Banjo knew the full score, he met with Mr.
Bell, UK Deputy High Commissioner, the evening of
Benin invasion. Bell summarized his and Banjo’s
words as:

a. There were no fatal casualties though some
were wounded.

b. Ejoor and two senior officers were not in Benin
when Eastern troops arrived. Bell had firm
impression that they had been warned about the
day’s event.

c. All the Midwest is now under the control of
combined East/Midwest forces.

d. East was asked to cooperate by certain Midwest
officers because an invasion of the Midwest by the
North was imminent.

e. That he does not agree with Ojukwu on the
separate existence of Biafra. He is convinced that
a united Nigeria is essential.

f. Bell said he saw only three officers at the
army headquarters: one was a Midwestern medical
officer (Major Okoko). All others were Easterners.

Meanwhile when Banjo made the first radio
address, he announced the impending appointment
of a military administrator, but there was
considerable difficulty among the Biafran and
Midwestern leaders in selecting a suitable man.
First choice was to be someone from the Ishan or
Afemai areas. Someone from the Delta was next,
preferably an Ika-Igbo. However, the stalemate
continued until Ojukwu intervened and selected
Albert Okonkwo. Ojukwu knew Okonkwo only by
reputation.

Okonkwo had certain things that recommended
him. First, he had an American wife, which cut the
family/tribe relationship problem of those times in
half. Second, he was considered to be politically
“sterile,” having been in the US for 13 years and
was not associated with any political party or
faction. Third, he was commissioned a captain in
the medical corps on 2 October 1965 and just
made a Major on 22 June 1967. The implication was
that he was not tainted by army politics. He was
also very pro-Biafra.

continue. ..

As soon as Okonkwo became military administrator,
Banjo was recalled to Enugu to explain the failure
of the military campaign. During his absence, the
Midwest Administration was established (an
Advisory Council and an Administrative Council).

Banjo succeeded in convincing Biafran leaders in
Enugu that his halt at Ore had been dictated by
military expediency. He then returned to the
Midwest front. Banjo informed Okonkwo of the
military situation through Major Isichei, Chief of
Staff of the Midwest. Isichei later commented
that he had noticed that Banjo’s headquarters
staff never discussed plans or operations in his
presence. Through Isichei, Banjo told Okonkwo that
Auchi had been lost after a fierce battle when, in
fact, it was not defended at all.

Suspicions began to thicken around Banjo.
Okonkwo, in a confidential statement made
available to the Americans, said he also noticed
that Banjo obtained money by requisition from him
for materials, food and officers salaries’, thus
drawing on the Midwest treasury. On 19
September, when Okonkwo telephoned Enugu, he
discovered from the Biafran Army HQ that Banjo
was simultaneously drawing funds from Biafra for
all these supplies. Okonkwo sent Major Isichei to
arrest Banjo for embezzlement, but they found
that he had already left Benin and had left
orders for all Midwest and Biafran soldiers to fall
back to Agbor.

Okonkwo ordered his Midwest government to move
from Benin to Asaba, which it did that day. The
seat of the government was behind the textile
factory, in homes once inhabited by expatriates.
In August, Okonkwo tape-recorded five broadcasts
to be used when possible. Those included the
Declaration of Independence and the Proclamation
of the Republic of Benin, as well as a decree
setting up a Benin Central Bank, a Benin
University, etc. The Republic of Benin
Proclamation was delayed while the consent of the
Oba of Benin was sought. Finally, just when the
Oba had been convinced that the Republic was
“best for his people,” the actions of Banjo were
discovered and the Midwest seemed about to be
lost, or at least Benin was undefended. Okonkwo
went ahead with the broadcast early on 20
September 1967 in order to record for history
that the Midwest was separate from Biafra. It
was the last act of his government in Benin.
Early afternoon on 9 August, Banjo’s main force
left Benin for Ijebu-Ode. It was composed of both
Biafran and Midwest units. Midwest troops, who
were mostly Igbo, had joined the “liberation
army”. Commanding the Midwest forces with
Banjo was Major Samuel Ogbemudia, who had been
nursing the idea of defection. When the troops
reached Ore and halted, Ogbemudia disappeared
to later rejoin the Nigerian Army. Lt. Col Bisalla,
acting Chief of Army Staff, confirmed that
Ogbemudia, in the morning of 9 August,
telephoned him precisely at 7:20am to inform him
of the “trouble in Benin.”

According to Standish Brooks, the US Defense
Attaché, Ogbemudia was the first Nigerian officer
to attend American Military School’s
counterinsurgency course in Fort Bragg, 1961.
Brooks said after his arrival in Lagos on 9
September 1967, Ogbemudia said: “He escaped
with a small group of non-Ibo troops from the
Benin garrison and have been waging a guerrilla
warfare against Eastern units. Having run out of
ammo, he made his way back to Lagos.”

Army Headquarters believed him and Brooks’
report further stated: “Ogbemudia would be sent
to the headquarters of Second Division in Auchi to
assist in operational planning because of his
intimate knowledge of the Midwest area and his
recent experience in the Midwest under Eastern
control.”

From 20 September onwards, the Midwest and
Biafran Army began to fall apart. The 17th
Battalion in Ikom mutinied and fled. So did the
12th and 16th Battalion in the Midwest.

In the evening of 22 September, the Midwest
paymaster, Col. Morah, from Eze near Onicha
Olona, offered an American expatriate in Asaba
£3, 000 if the American would arrange for Morah
to get $5,000 upon his arrival in the United
States. This would have been a profit of about $3,
400 to the American. The offer was refused.

Later on September 25, Morah disappeared with
£33, 000, the document said. This was the time six
NAF planes went on reconnaissance and reported
back to the Defence Headquarters that they had
noticed “heavy movements of civilians over the
bridge from Asaba to Onitsha,” but did not have
the details. On 27 September, Okonkwo called a
meeting of all Midwest civil servants, where he
said if the Nigerian Army reached Agbor, he
would close the Onitsha Bridge. He would not let
the civil servants abandon the population of Asaba
to the inevitable massacre when the Federal Army
reached the town. The people of Asaba knew by
this time of the killings of Igbos in Benin when the
federal forces reached it on 20 September.

Everyone assumed that it would happen in Asaba.
From 20 September, there were no Biafran
soldiers stationed west of Umunede, east of
Agbor.

On 1 October, Midwest commanders in Umunede
and Igueben, south of Ubiaja on the Auchi-Agbor
Road, fled from their positions. Their Biafran
subordinates promptly retreated. Constant
streams of retreating Biafran and Midwest troops
filed through Asaba on 2 and 3 October. The
Biafrans were usually mounted in vehicles, while
the Midwesterners had to walk. The attitude of
the Biafran soldiers and officers was that they
would not fight for the Midwest if the Midwest
Army did not want to fight. In Asaba on 2
October, the elders and chiefs met to consider
sending a delegation to the approaching Nigerian
Army to surrender the town and ask for
protection in return for help in finding and
capturing Biafran soldiers in the town. Cadet
Uchei, who brought soldiers to stop the delegation
with death threats, thwarted this effort. At this
time, some 35 non-Igbos were rounded up and
given shelter at St. Patrick’s College, Asaba.

Twice, Cadet Uchei brought soldiers to kill the
refugees and arrest the Americans in charge of
the school. On the first occasion, Lt. Christian
Ogbulo, ADC to Okonkwo, stopped the attempt.
Cadet Williams from Ogwashi-Uku brought soldiers
to rescue only the Americans from Uchei’s second
attempt. Also on 2 October, Col. Chukwurah, who
had been the commanding officer at Agbor, came
to Asaba and told the Midwest Army HQ staff
that he had overthrown Okonkwo and he was now
military governor of the Midwest. Chukwurah fled
across the bridge to Biafra before nightfall.

Only two of the officers of the Midwest Army
were known not to have fled from battle during
the campaign: Major Joe Isichei (who was a
Lieutenant on August 9) and Lt-Col. Joe Achuzia.
Gathering a few soldiers, they attempted to shoot
their way out. Okwechime was seen in Onitsha at
this time; he had been wounded. By the evening of
2 October, the Midwest Army was completely
dissolved.

From 6 a.m on 4 October, machine gun-and
mortar fire was heard near Asaba, but the
direction was uncertain. It was later discovered
that the firing came from Asaba-Isele-Uku Road.
At about 1p.m, as the staff members of St.
Patrick’s College were leaving the dining room,
the first mortar shell landed on the school
football field. Mortar shelling continued until dusk.
Federal troops reached the northern edge of the
campus, along the Asaba-Agbor Road, at about
5p.m. By noon of 5 October, there were six
battalions lining up on the road in front of the
college, according to Captain Johnson, who was
third in command of the 71st Battalion. By the
evening of 6 October, Federal forces held the
road all the way into the Catholic Mission, two
miles inside Asaba. Biafran resistance west of the
Niger was over.

Major Alani Akinrinade commanded the 71st
Battalion. (Akinrinade in a clarification, said his
command was the 6th Brigade and truly he was in
Asaba at this time.

His second in command was a Tiv officer, older
than Alani. The men of this battalion were mostly
Yoruba and Tiv, with some Delta (Ijaw) men. “Most
spoke English. They were disciplined, courageous
and polite,” the American report stated.

Captain Johnson ordered the Americans to leave
Asaba by the morning of 6 October. The reason
was understood to be that the 71st Battalion was
unable to guarantee their safety from the
“second wave” of federal soldiers, known as “the
Sweepers” coming behind. “The Sweepers” were
only briefly observed, but they wore long hair, had
“cross-hatching tribal marks on both cheeks” and
apparently willing to live up to their reputation as
“exterminators.” According to secret cables sent
from American embassies in Niger and Chad to the
Embassy and consulates in Nigeria, thousands of
Nigeriens and Chadians crossed the border to
enlist for the war.

Ten trucks of Nigerien soldiers were seen being
transported for service in the Nigerian Army from
Gusau to Kaduna and over 2,000 more waiting on
Niger-Nigeria border for transportation to
Kaduna. The secret document went on: “1,000
Chadian soldiers passed through Maiduguri en
route Kaduna. These mercenary soldiers
constituted the “Sweepers.” The captured
American teachers aptly observed that there were
soldiers regarded as fighting soldiers and there
were other units that came behind to conduct
mass exterminations.

Major Alani, it was understood, was trying to get
as many civilians as possible into the bush before
the sweepers could arrive.

On the 5 October, when they came, a lieutenant
attempted to arrest the American teachers at St.
Patrick’s College and their non-Igbo refugees,
who had hidden from retreating but still vicious
Biafran troops.

Captain Johnson quickly summoned Major Alani. The
lieutenant claimed to be acting for a “Major
Jordane,” but a check proved this as false. Alani
sent the lieutenant and his men away and posted
a guard to the school until the staff and
refugees left Asaba. There were too many civilians
to be executed that Captain Paul Ogbebor and his
men were asked to get rid of a group of several
hundred Asaba citizens rounded up on 7 October.
Not wanting to risk insubordination, he marched
the contingent into the bush, told the people to
run and had his men fire harmlessly into the
ground. Eyewitness accounts confirmed that he
performed the same life-saving deception in
Ogwashi-Uku.

However, other civilian contingents the sweepers
rounded up were shot behind the Catholic Mission
and their bodies thrown into the Niger River. This
incident and many others were reported to
Colonel Arthur Halligan, the US military attaché in
Nigeria at that time, the document concluded.
At night on 19 September, Banjo was arrested in
Agbor. He was court martialed in Enugu three
days later. Okonkwo participated in the court-
martial and Ojukwu was present too. Banjo was
found guilty, together with Emmanuel Ifeajuna
(“the man from Ilaah who shot Abubakar” –the
Prime Minister), Phillip Alale and Sam Agbam.

Bob Barnard, American consul in Enugu, said
Ojukwu told him that he ordered the killing of
Banjo, Ifeajuna, Alale and Agbam because they
had planned to oust him from office, oust Gowon
as well and install Awolowo as Prime Minister. The
American military attaché, Arthur Halligan and
Brooks, the Defense Attaché who had some prior
intimation of the coup cabled the Defense
Intelligence Agency in Washington 3 August 1967
that “in the long run, Njoku will unseat Ojukwu.”

Ojukwu told Barnard: “The plotters intended to
take Brigadier Hillary Njoku, the head of Biafran
Army into custody and bring him to the State
House under heavy armed guard ostensibly to
demand of him that Njoku be relieved of command
on the grounds of incompetence.” They had been
behind the withdrawal of troops and reverses of
prior Biafran victories. He continued: “Once inside
the State House, Njoku’s guards would be used
against him. Ifeajuna would then declare himself
acting Governor and offer ceasefire on Gowon’s
terms. Banjo would go to the West and replace
Brigadier Yinka Adebayo, the military governor of
Western Region. Next, Gowon would be removed
and Awolowo declared Prime Minister of Reunited
Federation…Victor Banjo, Ifeajuna and others
kept in touch with co-conspirators in Lagos via
British Deputy High Commission’s facilities in
Benin.”

When the American consul asked Ojukwu for
evidence, Ojukwu replied: “Banjo is a very
meticulous man who kept records and notes of
everything he did. The mistake of the plotters was
they talked too much, their moves too conspicuous
and they made notes. As a result, the conspirators
came under surveillance from the early stages of
the plot’s existence. Their plans then became
known and confirmed by subsequent events.”

In a separate document, Clint Olson, American
Deputy Chief of Mission wrote: “Much of the
information recounted came from Major (Dr.)
Okonkwo. Banjo freely admitted in his testimony
that a group of Yorubas on both sides of the
battle were plotting together to take over Lagos
and Enugu governments and unite Nigeria under
Chief Awolowo. Gowon, Ojukwu, and Okonkwo were
to be eliminated; Gowon was to have been killed by
Yoruba officers in the Federal Army.”

The document stated further: “When arrested on
the night of 19 – 20th September, Banjo offered
no resistance because he said then it was too late
to stop the affair and the plot was already in
motion. His role, Banjo said, was already
accomplished. As far as is known, Banjo died
without revealing the names of his collaborators in
Lagos.

Before Banjo got to Enugu after his arrest,
Okonkwo had telephoned Gowon to warn him of a
threat to his life. Okonkwo said he was afraid that
the assassination of Gowon would prevent the
Heads of State Mission of the Organization of
African Unity from coming to Nigeria. The OAU
mission held the best hope of resolving the war,
Okonkwo believed.

Whether Ojukwu knew of or agreed with Okonkwo’s
warning to Gowon was not known. However
according to the American Olson, roadblocks
appeared in many places in Lagos and were
severely enforced. They were removed after about
48 hours as mysteriously as they had appeared.

Gowon, in an exclusive interview with New Nigeria
after Banjo revealed himself as the head of an
invading army, said he once met Banjo and Ojukwu
in 1965 during the crisis that followed the 1964
parliamentary elections. They were discussing the
merits of the army taking over governance.

www.nairaland.com/attachments/12659769_aea1258ddf4e4536abe802a5e0d44de0_jpegdb514a759f8af0ea4325127672001d3f


Nigeria

I noticed in almost all the civil war narratives by biafrans...the enemy was almost always referred to as northerners or hausafulanis.. does it mean the yorubas were so insignificant during the war? Little or no mentions about them .

Racoon:
Interesting read! Meanwhile, after fighting for the elusive one Nigeria where are the principal actors today? Karma will continue to pay everyone back.

Interesting, but this seems like an information geared towards laundering Gowon's image and making excuses for his role in the war.

After three years of fighting with millions dead, look at Nigeria today and tell me if all those efforts weren't in vain.

boman2014:
The CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but
American diplomatic and consular corps in Nigeria
predicted victory for the Federal side and
concluded that a united Nigeria served American
interests better than the one without the Eastern
Region. Two conflicting conclusions from an
important department and a useful agency. The
American government chose to be neutral. Dean
Rusk, America’s Secretary of State said: “America
is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an
area under British influence.”

The British on the other hand were foot-
dragging. At the insistence of Awolowo, “the
acting prime minister” as he was called in
diplomatic circles, Gowon approached the Soviet
Union.

According to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67)
sent by Dr. Martin Hillenbrand, American
Ambassador in East Germany, to his counterpart
in Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu, Ojukwu’s special envoy,
met Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandr
Romanov, in Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said
that for USSR to recognize Biafra and supply it
arms, the latter had to nationalize the oil
industry. Ojukwu refused, saying that he had no
money to reimburse the oil companies and that
Biafrans did not have the expertise to run the oil
installations.

A month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal
Commissioner for Information and Labour, went to
Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with Moscow
and promised to nationalize the oil industry,
including its allied industries once they got arms
to recapture them from the Biafrans. Within
days, 15 MiGs arrived in sections in Ikeja and Kano
airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no
nationalization.

Meanwhile, buoyed by the confidence from early
success, the Biafrans went on the offensive. Their
B26 (one of the six originally intended for use
against the Nigerian Navy) was fitted with
multiple canon and 50mm calibre machine gun
mounts. It conducted bombing raids on Makurdi
airfield, Kano and Kaduna. Luckily for Nigeria,
the two transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get
more reserve mortar and 106-artillery ammo. In
Kano, there were no fatalities, only a slight
damage to the wing of a commercial plane.

Kaduna, however, was not that lucky. On 10
August 1967, the B26 dropped bombs on Kaduna
airbase, damaging many buildings and the main
hangar. The German consulate in Kaduna
confirmed that a German citizen, a Dornier
technician tasked with maintaining Nigerian
military planes, was killed and two others injured.
A week later, the senior traffic control officer,
A.O. Amaku, was arrested for sabotage. He was
accused of failing to shut off the airport’s
homing device, thus giving the Biafran plane
navigational assistance. His British assistant, Mr.
Palfrey, was similarly suspected. He resigned and
immediately returned to the UK. However, Major
Obada, the airbase commanding officer and an
Urhobo from the Midwest, strongly defended the
accused.

The daring bomb raid provoked many more
Northern civilians to run to the nearest army base
and enlist to fight.

According to a report by US Ambassador Elbert
Matthews, cabled to Washington on 3 July 1967,
unidentified men tried to bomb the police
headquarters in Lagos on the night of 2 July. They
attempted to drive an automobile into the
compound, but the guards did not open the gate.

They packed the car across the street near a
small house opposite a petrol station. Leaving the
car, the men fled and within seconds, an explosion
took place. The house was demolished and all its
occupants killed, but the petrol station was
unaffected. Eleven people, including some of the
guards at the police headquarters, were injured.

Two hours later, a second explosion, from
explosives in a car parked by a petrol station,
rocked Yaba. This time, the station caught fire.
The ambassador remarked: “It is possible this is a
start of campaign of terrorism…public reactions
could further jeopardize safety of Ibos in Lagos.”
And sure it did.

A Lagos resident, who visited the police
headquarters after the attack, told the
Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”

There was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots
broke out. Northern soldiers at the 2nd Battalion
Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to launch a
mini-version of the previous year’s torture and
massacre of the Igbo in the North. On 7 July
1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant Colonel
Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the bombing in a
radio broadcast. “A good number of Igbos in Lagos
is innocent and loyal to the federal government.

It is only fair that they be allowed to go about
their business unmolested so long as they abide by
the law and are not agents and evildoers,”
Johnson said.

He called for Lagosians to join civil defence units
and for Easterners to come and register with the
police.

Meanwhile, the corpses of troops and soldiers
wounded in Yahe, Wakande, Obudu and Gakem that
arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967 sparked
enormous interest in enlistment and volunteering.

Recruitment centres were established in Ibadan,
Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at the Kano
centre, headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the
Nigerian Regiment that generated the biggest
number of recruits. According to the US
confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of these
were veterans, who had been recruited to fight on
the British side in Burma. The Burma veterans
marched angrily to the recruitment offices to
replace those that had been killed or injured.

Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these, 5,000 were
immediately sent to the frontline. They said they
needed no training; only guns.

As they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem,
4km southeast of Nsukka, when mortal fires from
the Biafran artillery landed close by,
inexperienced recruits ducked for cover behind
their transport columns out of fear and
incompetence in bush warfare. Not these Burma
veterans. Damboa, the Regional Editor of the
Morning Post, was embedded with some of these
veterans under the command of Major Shande,
formerly of the 5th Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu
commanded in 1963.

continue...

So you're saying the existence of the NNPC Is a civil war necessity to get weapons from the USSR. So NNPC Is a communist heritage in a supposed free market economy.

OP, please what book did this come from?

mightyhazel:
I noticed in almost all the civil war narratives by biafrans...the enemy was almost always referred to as northerners or hausafulanis.. does it mean the yorubas were so insignificant during the war? Little or no mentions about them .

This is because, at the start of the war, it was mainly between the northern troops and the Easterners.

Igbos weren't fighting yorubas and hausas weren't fighting yorubas.

Babysheart:
OP, please what book did this come from?

I'd like to know too. It is talking from both sides of the conflict. I've never read an account doing that around the same timeline.

From the comments here I noticed that most (if not all) here don't know a thing about the Biafran/Nigerian Civil War. No wonder why they support One Nigeria and insult Ojukwu and Ndigbo.
With this I'll say that Ojukwu was a lion. The real Odogwu. And the Biafran soldiers were something else. They gave the whole of West Africa (Ghana, Chad, Niger), Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Israel), Europeans (Britain, Russia) and USA a run for their money.
I don't think the Europeans would have believed that a black nation will stand their combined forces for three good solid years and record many victories on them in battle front.
Ife dịka Ojukwu akọkwana anyị.

Very few Nigerians youths know how the Nigerian civil war came about. Most of them just think that Ojukwu just got up one morning and declared war against Nigeria, which is far from the truth

Biafra - Nigeria war!!!

NOT

Nigeria civil war.
It was NEVER a civil war!

It was a war between two countries; one, The beutifull Biafran! The land of the goalgetters.., a very authentic African state full of very industrious beings who showcased their proud African heritage with an unrivaled display of gallantry in the battle field armed with stunning homemade scientific discoveries.... The other a colonial wreck aptly termed nigeria. An eternal embarrassment to black Africa! A nasty disjointed retinue of inebriated cultures slavishly taking their orders from neo-colonial pulpits like wild Vandals in their quest to steal oil wells. The war ended with Nigeria becoming the biggest monument of shame for the black man! Eeeeewwww...

mightyhazel:
I noticed in almost all the civil war narratives by biafrans...the enemy was almost always referred to as northerners or hausafulanis.. does it mean the yorubas were so insignificant during the war? Little or no mentions about them .

Now, I understand how, when and why Hausa/fulanis consider other Nigerians as conquered people. They actually saw Igbos as the only threat to them in exerting their dominance over Nigeria and once Biafra was defeated, they immediately assumed that they've conquered the rest of the country and that feeling has remained till this day.

I must also admit that the Biafrans fought a battle they were destined to lose, considering the limitless odds stacked against them. Even thousands of Chadians and Nigeriens were transported into Nigeria and they joined the Nigerian army to fight against the Biafrans. Add that the humongous stockpile of ammunition that kept arriving Nigeria in plane and shiploads. It's even amazing how the Biafrans were able to resist for 3 years in the face of all these challenges.

In essence, the Biafrans fought against not just Nigeria, but a coalition of forces that included Britain, Russia, Chad, Niger, Egypt, and Cameroun, countries that were all actively involved and coupled with a blockade against Biafra.

Nigeria vs Biafra war is unarguably one of the most one-sided war that was ever fought.

Haywhysat:


This is because, at the start of the war, it was mainly between the northern troops and the Easterners.

Igbos weren't fighting yorubas and hausas weren't fighting yorubas.

No wonder JAMB seemed humanly impossible. At the start of the war, it was Nigeria and Biafra (Defunct eastern region). The war started on July 6, 1967, Lagos garrison organization made of mainly Yoruba had already arrived in Midwestern region where it commence recruiting of Ijo, Itsekiri and Urhobo peeps. The Adekunle and Lagos garrison used Midwestern region as a springboard to launch attack on eastern region on July 12, 1967. By the August 4, 1967 the military governors of western and Midwestern regions have publicly declared their support and allegiance to Nigeria and Gowon.

NigerDeltaIgbos:


Now, I understand how, when and why Hausa/fulanis consider other Nigerians as conquered people. They actually saw Igbos as the only threat to them in exerting their dominance over Nigeria and once Biafra was defeated, they immediately assumed that they've conquered the rest of the country and that feeling has remained till this day.

I must also admit that the Biafrans fought a battle they were destined to lose, considering the limitless odds stacked against them. Even thousands of Chadians and Nigeriens were transported into Nigeria and they joined the Nigerian army to fight against the Biafrans. Add that the humongous stockpile of ammunition that kept arriving Nigeria in plane and shiploads. It's even amazing how the Biafrans were able to resist for 3 years in the face of all these challenges.

In essence, the Biafrans fought against not just Nigeria, but a coalition of forces that included Britain, Russia, Chad, Niger, Egypt, and Cameroun, countries that were all actively involved and coupled with a blockade against Biafra.

Nigeria vs Biafra war is unarguably one of the most one-sided war that was ever fought.

Wish we had the Russians by our side. All they wanted when Mbanefo visited them before the war was for Ojukwu to nationalise the oil companies. Ojukwu refused. Enahoro met them and promised to do so and they ordered their fleet in Egypt to join up with Gowon. Today the indimis have the oil wells.. If only we had the Russians by our side, just the Russians! The geo-political realities arising from that collabo would have been immensely helpful not just to the Biafrans but to Africa in general afterwards...

NigerDeltaIgbos:


Now, I understand how, when and why Hausa/fulanis consider other Nigerians as conquered people. They actually saw Igbos as the only threat to them in exerting their dominance over Nigeria and once Biafra was defeated, they immediately assumed that they've conquered the rest of the country and that feeling has remained till this day.

I must also admit that the Biafrans fought a battle they were destined to lose, considering the limitless odds stacked against them. Even thousands of Chadians and Nigeriens were transported into Nigeria and they joined the Nigerian army to fight against the Biafrans. Add that the humongous stockpile of ammunition that kept arriving Nigeria in plane and shiploads. It's even amazing how the Biafrans were able to resist for 3 years in the face of all these challenges.

In essence, the Biafrans fought against not just Nigeria, but a coalition of forces that included Britain, Russia, Chad, Niger, Egypt, and Cameroun, countries that were all actively involved and coupled with a blockade against Biafra.

Nigeria vs Biafra war is unarguably one of the most one-sided war that was ever fought.

very plausible submission here...


A good pointer that left to federal side and biafra that war wouldnt have lasted 2months..in favor of biafra is the results of the early battles before ussr,the whole western europe,niger,chad,mali,ghana ,cameroun,egypt etc joined the foray... Some northern officers and men were itching to blaze into biafra and ravage it,but reality soon hit them within 72hours of actual battle,before several frenzied missions abroad to source for shiploads of arms and foreign mercenaries and tacticians

Ok

Rugaria:


Wish we had the Russians by our side. All they wanted when Mbanefo visited them before the war was for Ojukwu to nationalise the oil companies. Ojukwu refused. Enahoro met them and promised to do so and they ordered their fleet in Egypt to join up with Gowon. Today the indimis have the oil wells.. If only we had the Russians by our side, just the Russians! The geo-political realities arising from that collabo would have been immensely helpful not just to the Biafrans but to Africa in general afterwards...

honesty and gentlemanliness on the biafran side proved quite costly