Procedural Posture

Petitioner company sought a writ of mandate to require respondent trial court, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), to vacate its order that denied petitioner's motion to compel an attorney to produce notes of a telephone conversation he had with one of petitioner's officers during a contract negotiation.

Overview

Petitioner company was engaged in the conversion of rental property into condominiums, and approached tenants with an offer to sell them their unit for 10 per cent below the publicly offered price. Brown Act . One condition to the sale was that the tenants had to agree to occupy the unit as their primary residence. An officer of petitioner telephoned an attorney for the tenants, on business and tax matters, who made representations about the tenants' intentions to reside in the unit. The deal closed, and the tenants thereafter placed the unit on the market. A lawsuit followed, seeking rescission for fraud, and the attorney was deposed. The attorney refused to produce notes he had made of the conversation, citing attorney work product. A motion to compel was denied. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate to require the production of the notes pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1088. The work-product rule applied to documents related to legal work performed for a client, not to notes memorializing acts performed as a mere agent. No justification existed for protecting the attorney's notes concerning the conversation.

Outcome

The court issued a writ of mandate that required the attorney to produce the notes because he had been working as the agent of his clients in a non-legal capacity when he took the notes and discussed the rental agreement with petitioner company's officer. The work product rule applied to legal work performed for a client.


Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs, who agreed to arbitration by a sitting superior court judge and waived the right to appeal, filed a petition for judgment to confirm the arbitration award made in their favor against defendant, a building contractor, and moved for an order fixing attorney fees. The award was confirmed by a commissioner of the Superior Court of Orange County, California, but the motion for attorney fees was denied. Plaintiffs appealed.

Overview

After the parties submitted briefs on appeal, the appellate court asked for supplemental briefing on jurisdictional defects. It then held that the sitting superior court judge could not conduct a contractual arbitration subject to confirmation under the California Arbitration Act, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1280 et seq. Notwithstanding the parties' characterization of the initial proceeding as a "judicially binding arbitration," the appellate court held that the "arbitration" was nothing more than a bench trial, in which the parties waived a court reporter and the right of appeal. There was no arbitration award for the commissioner to confirm. Although the parties' stipulation empowered the judge to resolve their dispute with finality and without the possibility of appeal, the judge did not enter a judgment. The judge's statement of intended decision was never filed or entered into the court minutes. The judgment and order made by the commissioner were thus void. The appellate court held that, by reason of his all-purpose assignment to conduct the bench trial in totality, the superior court judge should have the last judicial word.

Outcome

The appellate court remanded with directions that the trial court vacate the void judgment of the commissioner and transfer the matter to the sitting superior court judge for further proceedings, including the entry of judgment, and any post-judgment matters concerning costs and attorney fees