Introduction
The Lockheed C-130 Hercules is a versatile, high wing, turbo-prop military and civilian transport plane used by well over 60 countries. It was designed for tactical in-theater airlift and modifiable for various roles including Troop and equipment transport and Para drop, search and rescue, aero medical evacuation, command and control, electronic warfare, arctic ice re-supply, maritime patrol, aerial spray missions, aerial fuel tanker, fire-fighting, disaster relief, combat and weather reconnaissance, and aerial gunship, among others. It is capable of functioning in and out of dirt strips. Equipped with four engines and originally designed in 1951, the first production model was the C-130A. In 1954 the first prototype flight took place followed in 1955 by the first production flight.

Over the years many models have been produced including the C-130A, C-130B, C-130E, C-130H, C-130H2, C-130H3, C-130J, L-100, L-100-20, L-100-30, and C-130H-30. The C-130H, first delivered in 1964, was equipped with a number of improvements over previous models including updated T56-A-T5 turboprops, a sturdier outer wing, and revamped avionics. On side-facing seats, it can carry 92 combat troops or 64 fully equipped paratroopers and can haul 45,000 pounds of cargo. For casualty evacuations, it can airlift 74 litter patients with two medical attendants. Personnel, equipment and supplies can be delivered by conventional landing or by alternative methods of aerial delivery. The specified maximum gross weight in peacetime is 155,000 pounds, although up to 175,000 pounds is allowable in wartime. Normal landing weight is 130,000 pounds. The operating weight is reportedly 80,000 pounds. The C-130H-30 is the stretched version, 15 feet longer.

During the Lockheed scandal of the mid-1970s, millions of dollars in kickbacks and political contributions were made to politicians and military officials in many countries – including Nigeria - by Lockheed, the American aircraft manufacturer, in return for buying their planes. One of the more sensational cases involved Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, who had to resign when the scandal broke. The planes involved were both military and civilian. In Nigeria’s case, it was the C-130 Hercules, also known as “Charlie 130” or “Herc”. Six (6) C-130Hs were delivered between 1975 and 1976 (NAF 910, NAF 911, NAF 912, NAF 913, NAF 914 and NAF 915 ) followed just under ten years later by three C-130H-30s in 1985. These were NAF 916, NAF 917 and NAF 918.

Saturday, September 26, 1992

Much of the morning of Saturday, September 26, 1992, was dominated by activities related to environmental sanitation. Later that afternoon in Lagos, Nigeria, the annual Nigerian Army Squash tournament took place at the Ikeja Military Cantonment. As was to become the annual pattern, Major Ademolekun won the championship. Practically all the significant military commanders in the Lagos area, including the Commander of the Lagos Garrison and the Air Force Base Commander were at the tournament. After it was completed, players, officials and guests retired to the Officer’s Mess for the award of prizes and merriment, oblivious that a national tragedy was unfolding a few miles away.

Shortly before 1730 hrs a Nigerian Air Force Military Transport Plane, a Lockheed C-130H-LM HERCULES (L-82), production number 4624, registration number NAF 911, piloted by Wing Commanders J.P. Alabesunu and A.S. Mamadi finally got the okay from the control tower to take off – en route to Kaduna and Jos in the northern part of the country. From the Kaduna airport its unique passengers planned to make their way by road back to the Command and Staff College in Jaji. Consisting predominantly of middle ranking officers drawn from the 19th, 20th, and 21st regular courses of the Nigerian Defence Academy, accompanied by a few from the 18th course along with some foreign students. They had been in Lagos on a Naval tour as part of the senior division course. The return trip had been postponed twice - once the day before, and the second time earlier that Saturday on account of word that the aircraft piloted by Squadron Leader John Aparenkume - had some engine problems during return flights back from Kaduna, Port-Harcourt and Enugu on unrelated business. After a long wait at the airport, over 150 persons crammed into the plane when the final word came. Most had no seat belts and some items of luggage were not secured. All routine checks completed and formalities observed, the big turboprop plane thundered majestically down the runway and took off into the sunset to rendezvous with fate.

As it took off, problems immediately became apparent. According to a witness - a former Nigerian Airways engineer who may have overheard radio transmissions - one engine failed, prompting the pilot to turn around heading back to the airport. Conceivably, he would have had to attempt to trim the plane for a three engine lift while ascending, and feather the non-functioning engine. Then a second engine failed. With insufficient power and lift to negotiate a safe return to the airport, a decision was made to land the plane in the Ejigbo canal. The pilot reportedly tried to align the plane to the canal, and even deployed water landing gear. At that point the third engine failed. Suddenly and without warning, its nose dipped and it went down, nose first, into the swamp, the fuselage buried in the mud, with the right wing and tail broken up. The time was just after 1735 hrs.

There was no manifest, making estimates of precisely how many were onboard difficult. It was said that 168 students had been in Lagos. However, faced with delays or prompted by other instincts, a few had made alternative arrangements. Some reports claim there were 163 on board. Others have said there were actually 174 passengers on the ill fated flight, including some unidentified civilians, personnel of the Nigerian Air Force Military School, Jos and other military personnel who hitched a ride. However, what is certain is that there were no survivors. During recovery operations, the gruesome body count was even said to have included random body parts. The following individuals were later officially confirmed to have died in the crash:

LIST A: ARMY:-Lt Colonels:1. S.A. Onipede N/2888
2. A.J. Ibiyeye N/33300, 3. J.A. Agber N/2712
4. B.A. Ibanga N/3315, 5. J.O. Okafor N/2803
6. G.O. Ikoli N/5402 7. S.K. Aladesuyi N/3259

LIST B: ARMY:- Majors 1. C.D. Nwambuowo N/5587
2. E. Ezenwa N/3039 3. M.H. Leramoh N/2889
4. S.O. Yawus N/5956 5. S.S. Agada N/5975
6. E.O.A. Okoro N/5861 7. O.O. Mba N/5945
8. E.J. Onwe N/3196 9. S. Bature N/6085
10. T. Zubair N/5465 11. F.U. Bassey N/6018
12. O.G. Akise N/3207 13. J. Shija N/3217
14. A.B.Famowei N/5936 15. A.A. Itodo N/6043
16. J.O. Okobo N/6047 17. K.A. Ogwu N/6055

18. M.S.Dambata N/6063 19. P.S. Stephen N/3389
20. S.O. Amaga N/6095 21. C.U.M. La'ah N/6092
22. I.A. Abolade N/6102 23. W. Adaa N/6112
24. E.A. Ushibe N/6207 25. J. Ugo N/3356
26. S. Abubakar N/3459 27. G. Josiah N/4362
28. Y. Aliyu N/3471 29. G. Ismaila N/3474
30. M.I. Ukeh N/3191 31. S.A. Jibunoh N/6173
32. I.U. Odache N/3482 33. I.E. Mauzu N/6181
34. P.O. Bamidele N/6185 35. I.D. Nock N/6187
36. D.S. Oyelola N/6186 37. L. Nyanayo N/6192
38. N. Obie N/6195 39. R.N. Nwankwo N/6197
40. C.T. Akpe N/6208 41. R. Okeowo N/6291
42. R.A. Olufe N/6292 43. E. Egoro N/3423
44. A.G. Jegede N/3443 45. A.H. Dombe N/3477
46. P. Yaro N/3488 47. A.Y. Abbas N/4221
48. CO.Egharevba N/4222 49. F. Ogbebor N/5460
50. B.A. Anebi N/5461 51. G.O. Oyefi N/5467
52. I.K. Nwuke N/5470 53. V.S. Kure N/5483
54. J.A. Tokula N/5484 55. T. Abina N/5486
56. B. Kadiri N/5489 57. C. Mungu N/5502
58. A.N. Ebiringa N/5506 59. O.A. Ogunaike N/6032
60. B.B. Sadiq N/4028 61. S.O Gbenro N/4646
62. T.I. Adahada N/4747 63. C.E. Ogben N/5102
64. O. Babalola N/5115 65. E.W. Ekanem N/5474
66. C.T. Arowololu N/3216 67. M.S.Ogbeha
68. I.J.Raiya 69. D.O.Okoroji
70. M.A.Agoyi 71. V.U.Mukoro
72. A.E.Mshelia 73. J.A.Audu
74. S.A.Oisamoye 75. A. Bala
76. M.A.D.Badamasi 77. E. Ukagha
78. K.E.Osula 79. N.A.Kajero
80. B. Daranijo 81. M.O.Ajibola
82. U.A.M.Balami 83. S. Omakwu
84. A.O.Obiora 85. A.A.Kawonta
86. C. Otti 87. O.O.Olusanya
88. O.J.Mbaka 89. P. Iyayi
90. T.O.Ogunjobi 91. G.N.Nze
92. H. Onwuegbunam 93. M.A. Pindar
95. O. Adebayo 96. B.O. Potsha

LIST C: ARMY:- SGT
1. M. Bahagoo

LIST D: ARMY:- CIVILIAN STAFF
1. O.B. Oshodi - MOD
2. M.A. Abu (Mrs) - MOD
3. A. Okpe - Reporter.

LIST E: AIR FORCE
1. Wg.Cdr. J.P. Alabesunu 2. Wg. Cdr. A.S. Mamadi
3. Sgn. Ldr. J.A. Adeiza 4. Flt. Lt. S.O. Adamu
5. WO. M.J. Wakala 6. P.S. Tarfa Saidu
7. WO. M.J. Datong 8. Sgt. A. Soyemi
9. Sgn.Ldr.O.O.Effiong 10. ,, John Husainu Tela
11. ,, K. Odubanjo 12. ,, F.O. Akede
13. ,, Habu Saidu 14. A. Duson
15. T.A. Clement 16. R.O. Yusuf
17. S.O. Oyerinde 18. N.O. Alege
19. M.T. Njidda 20. J.K. Osho
21. E.O. Ikwue 22. M.M. Gumel
23. A.A. Ndule 24. E.J. Ekpong
25. A.O. Atteh 26.Jaja(VideoCameraman)
LIST F: NAVY
1. Lt. Cdr. E. Obelen 2. ,, K.A. Fauka Bello
3. ,, S.O. Odusola 4. ,, O. Shiejir
5. ,, E.J. Gabriel 6. ,, A.O. Ojekunle
7. ,, K.O. Igwara 8. ,, A.O.G. Aboruwa
9. ,, S. Lasisi 10. A.A. Amaino
11. E.N. Okafor 12. T. Awoniyi
13. P. Asoro 14. P.N. Amangbo
15. O.O. Onabolu 16. J.O. Omokhuale
17. C.O. Ochigbono
--------------------------
TOTAL: 146
--------------------------
Note:: 5 additional Ghanaians, 1 Tanzanian, 1 Zimbabwean, and 1 Ugandan military officers were involved.

RESCUE AND RECOVERY FOR NAF 911

No organized rescue effort was arranged within a time frame that would have meant anything to the victims of the crash. However, it is clear that the control tower knew something had gone wrong and notified the Airport Commandant. Contradictory reports describe either a small Air Force fixed wing aircraft or Bristow helicopter being dispatched to the canal area to pin down the location of the aircraft. One account says the location could not be confirmed while another says it was confirmed. A small group of civilians and Air Force personnel apparently made their way several hours later to a point close to the scene but had to abandon their efforts because “it was too dark” and “the swamp was too deep”. It would be better they thought, to try again in the morning! Meanwhile, officers in key command positions wined and dined at the Officers Mess at Ikeja Cantonment commemorating the end of the Squash Tournament. It would be several hours before they knew something was amiss.

At about 8 pm, Lt. Colonel Kayode Are, one of the Directing Staff at the Command and Staff College in Jaji, placed a long distance call to his course mate in Lagos, Lt. Colonel Owoye Azazi, CO of the Intelligence Group at the Lagos Garrison to get information about the crash. Azazi had not heard anything. He then contacted some colleagues to find out if there was truth to rumors that a plane had gone down. None of these officers knew what was going on. Azazi, therefore, placed a call to Captain Al Mustapha, Chief Security Officer to Lt. General Sani Abacha, who was at that time Chief of Defence Staff. It was Mustapha that confirmed that a plane carrying students from the CSC at Jaji had indeed crashed “somewhere behind Festac”. However, no orders were forthcoming from Abacha on whether or how to respond and it was not even clear whether the C-in-C, General I Babangida was aware or if aware, had ordered anything done to respond.

Back in 1992 when I first investigated this story through some Air Force contacts, I was informed that Azazi initially assumed a “massive rescue operation” must be going on although it is not clear who he might have thought would be carrying it out. So he got dressed anyway and drove to the area around the Festac Village to see for himself. By now it was around 11 pm and pitch dark. There was no sign of activity. When he returned home, at about midnight, his Garrison Commander, Major Gen. Adisa had called, having just heard of it himself. Thus, he returned the call. Adisa ordered that they both take off the next morning by 5.30 am – 12 hours after the crash - to resume the search. It was around midnight that the first stirrings of a coordinated mid-level tri-service response were noticeable.

Therefore, early on Sunday morning, General Adisa, Commodore Akhigbe, Lt. Col Azazi and Captain Deinde Joseph set off for the Air Force base. There they were told that the plane crashed a few minutes after take off. They were also briefed that a fixed wing aircraft had taken off shortly before dark on reconnaissance, but could barely locate the site of the crash.

The group left the Air Force Base at Ikeja and headed first for Festac Village, but eventually found their way to the section of the Ejigbo canal closer to the Cantonment. As previously noted, some local inhabitants and air force personnel had already crossed the canal through the swamp to the crash site much earlier. The environment was difficult and investigators had to wade in it with muddy water up to their navels. From the appearance of things it seemed evident that the only hope for survival would have required immediate response. Unless rescue got there within the first hour with appropriate equipment, it didn’t seem likely that anyone had a chance. With the plane overloaded and only few using seat belts, most were crushed against one other, luggage and all sorts of metal objects. Some likely died from crush injuries, some certainly drowned, and others certainly suffocated, trapped inside the depressurized, airless Hull. There were reports of scribbled notes by some of the survivors, indicating that they survived the initial impact. As the day progressed, some area boys arrived and tried to ransack and steal items from the dead. They were driven off.

On Sunday, the first day of recovery, access into body of the aircraft was very difficult. There were initial suggestions to use a chain saw but this was deferred out of fear of fire outbreak because of the proximity to aviation fuel. Gaining access was, therefore, fairly slow and crude, inch by inch. The first corpse out was of a civilian, whose body was herniating almost outside the main frame of the aircraft. For many more hours a lot of effort was made before recovery workers got into the mass of bodies, most of which were pushed towards the front of the aircraft deep inside water. That day only 27 bodies were recovered. They were pulled out, loaded into canoes two at a time, brought to the edge of the swamp, carried to the canal edge, ferried across in boats again and then carried to the vehicle park before being taken to the mortuary.

The horrendous experience of that first day provoked some feverish contacts in the Army hierarchy. On Monday, the Head of the Lagos Garrison Intelligence group reportedly spoke with the US Defence Attaché about the possibility of sending Chinook Helicopters to help. However, the rather curious response of the Nigerian Army High Command – as communicated by the Military Assistant to Lt. General Salihu Ibrahim, then Chief of Army Staff, was that for reasons of national pride a request for foreign help was not appropriate. In fact the Army HQ had to be talked out of immediately assembling another course for the Staff College. The details of how “national pride” became a reason to delay recovery of our fallen heroes at that stage are best explained by those involved – and those they were reporting to at higher levels i.e. Generals Abacha and Babangida.

Abacha is now dead and cannot defend himself but his relationship with Babangida when Abacha was the CDS was, to say the least, complex. There are accounts that money for defence needs was never guaranteed to arrive at operational levels when released by government through normal channels. I even read a newspaper story that Babangida at one point actually passed money directly to agitated unit commanders and peace-keeping troops instead of passing it through the Ministry of Defence. According to this report, the common joke amongst lower level officers back then, when talking about defence appropriations, was "Sani ya chi”. If true, then it might explain why a US government grant for the refurbishment of C-130s released in early 1992 may not have made it to the aircraft. All of this, in any case, was occurring in the setting of the deliberate deconstruction of the Air Force following the alleged involvement of some Air Force officers in the so-called Vatsa conspiracy of 1985.

Let’s go back to our story. A retired Air Force officer told this writer a few years ago that Brigadier General Akilu was also contacted about the need for foreign military heavy lift Chinook Helicopters. I have not spoken to Akilu to confirm, but this source says he graciously gave the go ahead for the Recovery Team to contact the CIA Station Chief as a backchannel. Along with General Adisa and Col. Azazi, the group allegedly took a ride in the CIA man’s boat from Victoria Island to Ejigbo. Further contacts obviously took place at a higher level but nothing eventually came of this initiative.

In one of his columns, a respected journalist, Remi Oyeyemi wrote that: “it is on record that less than an hour of the crash, the British government offered to rescue the victims and the offer was turned down by IBB. It is also on record that the U.S. government informed the IBB administration that they had a ship on the high seas very close to Nigeria that could be on the scene within few hours of the crash to help in the rescue effort. It was turned down by IBB.” [ http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/oyeyemi/070802.html ]

I have no independent verification at this time that this specific communication occurred; neither do I have any that it did not. The truth will certainly come out when British and American diplomatic archives of that era are eventually declassified and/or when General Babangida publishes his memoirs. What seems clear from publicly available information though is that at the time such contacts were being made the issue was not rescue (i.e. saving lives that are in imminent danger of being lost). It was recovery (i.e. retrieving corpses and damaged equipment) – although the countries involved in these alleged conversations with the government certainly had the capacity for emergency night-time rescue of at least a few of the victims at the back of the plane if invited early enough. It is also evident that for misguided reasons the Army High Command was not eager for foreign military assistance. In fact it comes across like the story of the disabled man whose child fell into an old well inside his compound but was too proud to ask his neighbor for a long stick that might save the child, so he pretended all was well; but then turned around later to invite his neighbours for the funeral. The truth is that if national pride was really an issue, we would have been building our own planes, maintaining them regularly, following technical guidelines in using them, and we would certainly have had the capability to respond quicker and more effectively to such a disaster. In battlefield conditions it would have required a theater nuclear weapon to kill that many Majors and Lt. Cols. in one go.

In addition to superstitious fear of the dark, and absence of night-time riverain operational training and equipment, the other factor was that in the security environment of 1992, Commanders were very unwilling to give orders to move soldiers for any but the most routine reasons, for fear of being accused of planning a coup. Why else – aside from a Squash championship, the absence of an early warning system and pre-designated first responder - would a military plane crash into a known canal within a few miles of Ikeja Cantonment, Ojo Cantonment, the Naval Barracks at Ojo and Apapa and the Ikeja Air Force Base and yet be marooned for so long? One is at a loss for words.

Even now, Nigeria is not better prepared for such problems anyway. After the Ikeja Cantonment Disaster in January 2002, we invited British and American ordnance experts to help in dealing with unstable munitions. At least we did not invoke imaginary national pride this time. But for how long are we going to be unable to deal with such issues ourselves? Was Hendrik Verwoerd right when, in an address to the South African Senate in 1954, he said: "When I have control over Native education I will reform it so that the Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them ... People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives ... What is the use of teaching the Bantu mathematics when he cannot use it in practice?".......

“it is on record that less than an hour of the crash, the British government offered to rescue the victims and the offer was turned down by IBB.

It is also on record that the U.S. govt informed the IBB administration that they had a ship on the high seas very close to Nigeria that could be on the scene within few hours of the crash to help in the rescue effort. It was turned down by IBB. .....It is also evident that for misguided reasons the Army High Command was not eager for foreign military assistance......"

slimfit1:
Almost all are from the southern part of the country

Gondonu:
This crash was just one too many plagued with a lots of controversies and suspicion.

leofab:
Political mysticism