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The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 1:56pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
Nigeria became recognized as a
Republic on the 1st of October,
1963, but this did not mark the
beginning of Nigeria’s political
journey as a Republican state. The
first republic in Nigeria started on
the 1st of October, 1960 upon the
attainment of independence and
ended on the 15th of January,
1966 during the first military coup
d’état .
During independence, Nigeria had
all the features of a democratic
state and was seen by other
African countries as a hope for
democracy. Nigeria had a federal
constitution that ensured adequate
autonomy to three (later four)
regions which were: Northern
region, Eastern region and Western
region; the country adopted and
operated a parliamentary
democracy that emphasized
majority rule; the constitution
included an elaborate bill of rights;
and, unlike other African states
that adopted one-party systems
immediately after independence,
Nigeria had a functional, albeit
regionally based, multiparty
system.
However, the democratic qualities
that Nigeria possessed at that time
didn’t guarantee the survival of
the republic because of certain
structural weaknesses and political
crises. People ask questions like:
what are the factors that led to the
collapse of the first republic in
Nigeria? Why did Nigeria’s first
republic fail? What led to the fall
of Nigeria’s first republic? Etc. In
this article, answers to these
questions will be provided.
Table of Contents
1. Structural Weaknesses that
led to the collapse of the
first republic in Nigeria
1. 1. Ethnically based
Federal Regions,
with uneven size and
power
2. 2. Ethno-Regional
Political Parties
1. The three
dominant
parties
3. 3. The political
alignment which
formed after the
1959 election
4. 4. The fear of ethnic
domination
2. Now to the five crises which
gradually eroded the
foundations of Nigeria’s
First Republic, leading to its
fall/collapse.
1. 1. The disintegration
of the AG, 1962-63
2. 2. Census Crisis,
1962-64
3. 3. The General
Strike, June 1-13,
1964
4. 4. The General
Election, December
1964
5. 5. The Western
Regional Election,
October 1965
1. References:
Structural Weaknesses that led to
the collapse of the first republic in
Nigeria
1. Ethnically based Federal
Regions, with uneven size and
power
The first structural weakness which
set the First Republic in Nigeria for
political crisis was its ethnically-
based federal regions and the
asymmetry in size and power
between them. Upon independence,
Nigeria was composed of three
federating regions: Northern,
Eastern and Western regions.
(Later in 1963 a new region, the
Mid-West, was carved out of the
West following a crisis in that
region). Each of the regions was
dominated by one of the country’s
three largest ethnic groups:
Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba
in the West and Igbo in the East.
This arrangement presided over by
the dominant ethnic groups placed
minorities at a considerable
disadvantage in the competition
for jobs and resources at the
regional level. It also allowed the
elites of the three largest ethnic
groups to monopolize access to
federal patronage, which they
leveraged for political support.
These three regions were largely
autonomous from the federal and
were constitutionally powerful as
well, a historian of Nigeria’s
political parties during this period
puts it:
In their respective regions,
the leaders of these
dominant nationality groups
controlled the means of
access to wealth and power…
They tended to equate their
private interests with the
objective interests of their
nationality groups;
conversely, they exploited the
sentiments of their groups to
promote their private
interests.
Of the three regions, the North was
much larger demographically and
geographically (See Fig. 1 & Chart
1). Consequently, it was allocated
more than half the seats in the
federal parliament (See Chart 2).
This meant that a party could
potentially govern the country by
winning votes from the North
alone. This had the double effect of
reinforcing the regional outlook of
the Hausa-Fulani elites and
heightening the fear of northern
hegemony amongst Yoruba and
Igbo elites. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 1:57pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
The country’s federal regions
broadly coincided with – and
reinforced – the nation’s ethnic
cleavages, the exclusion of
minorities from each region’s
political and economic structures,
and the structural tensions which
resulted from the Northern region
being large enough to dominate its
two southern counterparts in
parliament, set the scene for the
political conflicts which consumed
the First Republic. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 1:58pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
2. Ethno-Regional Political Parties
The second structural weakness
which afflicted the First Republic
was the emotive association
between political party and ethno-
regional identity. This meant
politics largely “revolved around
ethnic-based regional…parties”.
Reflecting the tripodal ethnic
balance, three parties bestrode the
political scene like titans and thus
shaped the destiny of the First
Republic: Northern People’s
Congress (NPC), the Action Group
(AG), and the National Council of
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC).
All three parties originally emerged
out of ethno-cultural associations:
NPC from Jam’iyar Mutanen
Arewa (Association of Peoples
of the North)
AG from Egbe omo Oduduwa
(Society for the Descendants of
Oduduwa. In Yoruba folklore
Oduduwa is described as the
ancestral progenitor of the
Yoruba people)
NCNC from the Igbo State
Union
As a result, these three parties and
their leaders reflected, shaped, and
intensified the nation’s ethno-
regional cleavages.
The three dominant parties
The Northern People’s Congress
(NPC) was a “Hausa-Fulani
dominated party” which held sway
in the North. Of the three parties, it
was the most entrenched in its
regional identity. Nothing
illustrates this more than its name,
and the fact that in the 1959 eve
of independence general election it
did not field a single candidate in
the other regions.
The NPC’s foundational aim was
to protect the conservative social
hierarchy of the North from the
“winds of radical change sweeping
up from the south”. The party
chairman, who was also the
Regional Premier (Premiers were
the political leaders of the
Regions, analogous to Governors
today), was Ahmadu Bello, a titled
prince from the region’s
aristocracy. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 1:59pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
Having won the largest number of
seats in the 1959 elections, the
party gained the privilege of
forming Nigeria’s first post-
independence government.
However, as it fell just short of
winning the majority needed to
govern alone (i.e. 157 seats), it
had to form a coalition with one of
the two main southern parties.
Illustrative of the constitutional
power of the Regions, Ahmadu
Bello, who should have been Prime
Minister, being NPC’s party leader,
instead chose to remain as
Regional Premier, instead
preferring to send his deputy,
Tafawa Balewa, to Lagos to lead
the federal government. This would
be analogous to a politician today
passing up the opportunity to
become President, choosing
instead to remain a state
Governor.
The National Council of Nigerian
Citizens (NCNC) was the southern
party which entered into a
coalition with the NPC as a junior
partner in government. It was a
decision for which it was richly
rewarded. “Party stalwarts got
plum ministerial and
ambassadorial posts”. The
Presidency (then a largely
ceremonial role) for example,
which went to Nnamdi Azikiwe, one
of the party’s founders, and the
Finance ministry went to Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the party’s national
treasurer. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 2:00pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
The NCNC, as its name indicates,
originally hoped to project a
nationalist, pan-Nigerian image,
but the ethnic regionalism which
the country’s federal structure
encouraged gradually shrivelled
the party’s political horizons and
it increasingly became the “voice
of Igbo nationalism”. Like the
NPC, the party’s chairman,
Michael Okpara, chose to remain
as Regional Premier after the 1959
election rather than take up a seat
in the federal cabinet. But unlike
the NPC, the NCNC campaigned in
the other two regions during the
election; it won seats in the West
and – in alliance with the Aminu
Kano-led Northern Elements
Progressive Union – won seats in
the North as well.
The Action Group (AG) is the last
party which completes our
tripartite list. The AG, like its
southern counterpart, the NCNC,
initially aspired to be more than a
regional party. It’s advertised
political ideology was “democratic
socialism” which it hoped would
gain it cross-regional support.
However, trapped by the nature of
the political terrain, party elites
soon concluded that “the only
certain avenue to power was a
regional political party”.
Consequently, the AG similarly
shrank into its ethnic enclave and
never managed to shake off its
image as a platform “to safeguard
Yoruba interests”. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 2:01pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
Like the NCNC in 1959, it also
campaigned outside its region and
won seats through alliances with
ethnic minority parties: United
Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC) in
the North and Dynamic party in the
East.
Having won the smallest share of
seats among the three major
parties, and having similarly
performed the poorest in its region
(it only won 53% of the seats in
the Western Region. NPC won 77%
of Northern seats and NCNC won
79% of Eastern seats), the AG thus
went into opposition upon
independence. Awolowo, the party
chairman, became the official
leader of the opposition in the
federal parliament. He was the
only party chairman who “opted to
go to the [federal] centre” and
leave his deputy, Ladoke Akintola,
to become Regional Premier. This
decision, however, was to cost
Awolowo as it left him
“particularly vulnerable” to a
leadership challenge from his
deputy.
The decision of both southern
parties to step out of their ethnic
enclaves to field candidates across
the federation in 1959 reflected
their aspirations that the nation
would be an open constituency for
all parties to compete in. It was
however also a reflection of
political reality. Because of the
sharp disparity in parliamentary
seat allocation, “only the NPC
could dominate the federation from
its regional base alone”. An
advantage neither of the other two
parties enjoyed. Consequently,
even as the nature of the First
Republic’s political culture
strongly anchored the AG and the
NCNC to their ethnic base, the
asymmetry of parliamentary power
in the republic necessarily forced
them to reach out to minorities
beyond their regions.
3. The political alignment which
formed after the 1959 election
It can be argued that the political
constellation which emerged after
the 1959 election was the most
potent of the young republic’s
structural weaknesses. It had huge
impacts on the stability of the
soon to be an independent nation.
The North-South governing
coalition between the NPC and the
NCNC, variously described as
“unnatural”, a coalition of “strange
bedfellows”, only accentuated the
republic’s structural imbalances.
On immediate observations, it was
certainly a partnership of unequal
– with the NPC being by far the
more powerful of the two
governing parties. This meant the
NCNC was always acutely sensitive
to the tenuousness of its share of
power. Further aggravating the
latent tension between the
governing duo was the fact that
politicians from either party viewed
members from the other side with
suspicion, condescension, and
even hostility. This was a
microcosm of the North-South
cleavage within wider the Nigerian
society just after independence
whereby Yorubas and Igbos
“sincerely saw the North as feudal
and backward, a brake upon
nationalist progress”, and the
Hausa-Fulanis “sincerely perceived
the prospect of Southern
domination as a threat to [their] …
cultural values”. The deep cultural
gulf between the two parties,
therefore, led to a governing
coalition that was wracked by
“tension and mistrust”, such that
when multiple crises came the
governing alliance repeatedly broke
down under the strains.
Thus, another facet of the
structural tension caused by the
post-1959 political alignment is
the misfortune which befell the AG
in opposition.
Defeat in the election left the AG
“stranded in opposition…without a
firm base of power resources”; by
extension, it also meant that
Yoruba elites lost their bargaining
power over the distribution of
federal patronage to their region.
To illustrate this point: Apparently,
part of the “bargain” which the
NCNC secured upon joining
government was “enhanced entry
and promotion for Easterners in
the public service and [the] armed
forces”. ‘Relegation’ to the status
of opposition and loss of access to
patronage would eventually split
the AG into two camps. The
disintegration of the AG into
factions was the first crisis which
shook the republic early in its life
– accentuating all its structural
tensions, as we will see in the
second section.
4. The fear of ethnic domination
The last and deepest of the
structural weaknesses was the fear
of ethnic domination which
pervaded the politics of the First
Republic. The Yorubas and Igbos
in the two southern regions feared
that the Hausa-Fulanis would use
the North’s demographic
preponderance to perpetuate
northern hegemony and
monopolise federal resources for
their region; Hausa-Fulanis, in
turn, feared that in an open
contest, the Yorubas and Igbos,
being the more educated, would
dominate the political and
economic structures of the
federation.
Similarly, within the south, the
powerful undercurrent of tribalism
placed the Yoruba and Igbo elites
at loggerheads. And within the
three regions, minority ethnic
groups lived under the suffocating
embrace of the three dominant
groups.
Thus, upon independence in 1960,
Nigeria had a tense, fractured and
conflictual socio-political
landscape which resembled what
Crawford Young has characterized
as a “three-player ethnic game”.
This ethnically charged political
competition hindered national
unity and progress.
Now to the five crises which
gradually eroded the foundations
of Nigeria’s First Republic, leading
to its fall/collapse.
1. The disintegration of the AG,
1962-63
The collapse of the AG’s political
power between 1962 and 1963
produced far-reaching effects. The
crisis that engulfed the party
stemmed from its “staggering
defeat” in 1959. It had been
‘relegated’ to the opposition. The
NCNC had made impressive
inroads into its regional heartland,
securing for itself 21 seats in the
AG’s political turf by exploiting
minority discontent within the
Western Region[41]. Most
damagingly for Awolowo’s
leadership of the party, leading
Yoruba personalities interpreted
the AG’s opposition role as a
defeat for the entire ethnic group.
Under the crushing weight of
disappointment, it didn’t take long
for the party to fracture.
Throughout 1960 and 1961, a
simmering tension developed
between Awolowo and his deputy,
Akintola, who was also the Premier
of the Western Region. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by keentola(m): 2:05pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
The first source of tension was
over the ideological orientation of
the party. Defeat in the election
had led Awolowo to conclude that
the AG could revive its fortunes
and broaden its support base by
sharpening its socialist rhetoric,
radicalising its message and
stepping up attacks on social
inequalities. Awolowo reasoned
that such an ideologically radical
posture would enable the party to
break out of its regional box and
draw cross-ethnic support from
workers and the underprivileged
across the country. This placed
him at odds with Akintola and
many of the party elites who were
regionalist in outlook and status-
quo oriented. It also placed him at
odds with the “Yoruba
businessmen and merchants at the
party’s financial core” who worried
that Awolowo wanted to take the
AG down the route to communism.
Disputes over party strategy further
placed Awolowo and Akintola at
loggerheads. Awolowo and his
faction argued that only a twin
strategy of confronting the NPC in
parliament, and of luring the NCNC
into a “progressive coalition”,
could act as a brake on Northern
power and therefore secure for
Yoruba elites a place at the federal
table. Akintola and his faction, on
the other hand, countered that
moderation toward the NPC –
being the dominant party in
government – was the best
strategy for Yorubas to gain
access to the “privileges and
benefits in the federation”.
Aggravating the emerging party
split was the clash over regional
and party control between
Awolowo who kept a firm hand in
the Western Region to keep his
deputy from “wrestling control of
the party”, and Akintola who
wished to strike out on his own
and emerge from under the shadow
of his party boss. Akintola was
said to have bitterly complained
about Awolowo’s “insatiable desire
to run the government of which I
am head from outside”.
In February 1962, the festering
tension finally erupted at the party
congress as Awolowo moved to
reassert his dominance in the AG.
He orchestrated a series of
motions which led to “critical
changes” in the running of the
party. For example, the party
constitution was amended to
weaken the Regional Premier’s
(Akintola) role, and strengthen the
party President’s (Awolowo) role in
the “Federal Executive
Committee” (FEC) – the party’s
key decision-making body. In
addition, Awolowo’s allies “scored
a clean sweep of the elections for
major party offices”.
As Akintola licked his wounds,
having emerged from the party
congress with his pride and power
dented, Awolowo moved in for the
kill. The opportunity seemed ripe
to remove his weakened rival from
office. In May, just three months
after the party congress, he incited
the party into deposing Akintola as
Premier and party deputy.
Unsurprisingly Akintola refused to
go down quietly. He challenged the
constitutionality of his removal in
court, “vowing a fight to the
finish”.
By now the disintegrating AG and
the deepening split in Yoruba elite
cohesion was clearly becoming a
“threat to peace and order in the
West”. Violent riots erupted
throughout the region as the
power struggle between the two
men and their factions spilt out
into the streets. The NPC and
NCNC watched the deepening
fragmentation of their Western
rival with cautious optimism. They
believed that the intra-party
conflict would open up the West,
allowing them to extend their
influence into the region. Ahmadu
Bello, the NPC party chairman and
Premier of the North went as far as
issuing a public statement of
support for the embattled Akintola.
The struggle between the two
factions reached its climax on the
25th of May when the Awolowo
faction attempted to vote in a new
Regional Premier, Alhaji
Adegbenro, in the regional
parliament. The parliamentary
procedure descended into physical
violence. Calculating that in any
vote they would lose as they were
in the minority, parliamentarians
from the Akintola faction,
supported by NCNC members of
the Western regional assembly,
resorted to violent disruption to
block Adegbenro from being sworn
in.
John Mackintosh, a British
political scientist, then lecturing at
the University of Ibadan, described
the scene in parliament:
The House of Assembly met
at 9 a.m. and after prayers,
as Chief Odebiyi rose to
move the first motion, Mr E.
O. Oke, a supporter of Chief
Akintola, jumped on the
table shouting ‘There is fire
on the mountain’. He
proceeded to fling chairs
about the chamber. Mr E.
Ebubedike, also a supporter
of Chief Akintola, seized the
mace, attempted to club the
speaker with it but missed
and broke the mace on the
table. The supporters of
Alhaji Adegbenro sat quiet
as they had been instructed
to do, with the exception of
one member who was hit
with a chair and retaliated.
Mr Akinyemi (NCNC) and
Messrs Adigun and Adeniya
(pro-Akintola) continued to
throw chairs, the opposition
joined in and there was such
disorder that the Nigerian
police released tear gas and
cleared the House.
The Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa
Balewa, gave an even more
graphic account of events:
The whole House was
shattered, every bit of
furniture there was broken …
some persons were stabbed
As the AG reeled from this assault,
the two governing parties stepped-
up the offensive by instituting a
commission of inquiry in June –
“the Coker Commission” – to
investigate allegations of misuse of
public funds in the Western
Region. The Commission found
Awolowo guilty of embezzling
millions in cash and over-draft
from government companies and
parastatals, and of “trying to build
a financial empire through abuse
of his official position”. Such was
the drain on regional funds by
Awolowo and AG party stalwarts
that by 1962 the Western Region
Marketing Board – the wealthiest
of the three regional marketing
boards – “had to borrow to
perform its own routine
operations”. While there was “little surprise or shock among AG supporters” at the extent of the fraud uncovered, and while few doubted Awolowo’s pivotal role in the scandal, many however felt that the findings of the Commission were selective and driven by a political agenda. For a start, its complete exoneration of Akintola from any of the financial misdemeanours struck many as absurd as he was the party deputy and Regional Premier while the region’s funds were being siphoned off to fund party activities. Also, most observers felt that had a similar investigation been done over the finances in the other two regions, the same level of abuse of public funds would have been uncovered. With Coker Commission’s revelations inflicting damaging blows on Awolowo and the AG’s prestige, the Emergency Administrator’s restrictions on AG members were gradually relaxed for Akintola’s supporters and that for Awolowo’s tightened[65]. This allowed Akintola to regroup his supporters; setting the stage for his eventual return as Premier. Under the unrelenting pressure, many Awolowo supporters defected to Akintola’s side in a bid to save their political careers. As indications multiplied that Akintola, backed by federal might, would be reinstalled as Regional Premier without a re-election after the Emergency period expired, some Awolowo supporters began secretly plotting the government’s overthrow. The plot, however, was uncovered by a police informant. In September 1962, the Prime Minister “revealed to a stunned nation” the uncovered plot. In November, Awolowo and the decimated leadership of the AG, now languishing in prison, were charged with “treasonable felony” and “conspiracy to stage a coup d’état”. In December, the NPC- NCNC federal government announced that it would no longer recognise the party as the official opposition. 1963 brought no respite for the rapidly collapsing AG. On the 1st of January, to the surprise of few, Akintola was re-installed as Regional Premier without an election. An election would have revived the flagging fortunes of the AG as Alhaji Adgbenro, the party candidate, would almost certainly have won. Akintola’s return was only made possible by his alliance with one of the governing duo – the NCNC. In return, Akintola rewarded his Eastern ally with a “generous share of power in the West”, resulting in the NCNC scooping up numerous regional ministerial portfolios. More seriously for the Yorubas, particularly in view of the ethno- regional balance-of-power, Akintola was forced, as part of the bargain, to accept the partition of the West. This would eventually lead to the creation in August of a new region – the Mid-West – for the minorities in the West. All the regions had their minority troubles. In the East, for example, the Ibibios, Efiks and Ijaws, to name but a few, all harboured separatist sentiments against their domineering Igbo overlords. And in the North “escalating political repression” twice plunged the region’s Tiv areas into open rebellion, in 1960 and 1964. After the partition, and with its destruction nearing completion, two events finally finished off the AG as a credible force on the national scene. The formal publication of the Coker Commission report in January 1963 gave the NPC-NCNC-led federal government and the Akintola-led Western Regional government the legal cover they needed to confiscate the assets of the AG, and break up its “commercial and financial” networks – steps which did “real damage” to the party. And on September 11, Awolowo and his co-conspirators were finally found guilty of the treasonable felony charge and sentenced to 10 years in prison. This effectively wiped out the top echelons of the AG. The eminent Stanford political scientist, Larry Diamond, in his Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, described the collapse of the AG thus: The breadth and magnitude of the defeat inflicted upon Chief Awolowo and his AG supporters by the NPC and the NCNC was simply staggering. Not only did the Awolowo Action Group lose the power struggle in the West, it was also… destroyed…as an effective opposition force The collapse of the AG immediately led to realignments in the political constellation. With his regional rival in jail and his grip over the West consolidated, Akintola shook off his alliance with the NCNC, dismissed their members from the regional cabinet, formed a new party – the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) – and realigned it with the NPC. This was arguably where he had always wanted to be, as close as possible to federal power. He probably calculated that under the nourishing embrace of the dominant party in government, he could rebuild the shattered position of the West and restore the Yorubas to parity in the ethno- regional balance. More fundamentally, the collapse of one pole (the AG) transformed the contest from a tripolar struggle to a bipolar one. With the disappearance of the AG as a national political force, the two governing parties now faced each other in direct and increasingly acrimonious confrontations. Like the breaking of the ground after an earthquake, deep fissures opened between the NPC and the NCNC. As the dust settled from the crisis, it became manifestly clear that the NPC had reaped the biggest windfall. With a dependent ally in Akintola’s NNDP now in control of the Western Region, the southern dream of an east-west ‘progressive alliance’ against Northern hegemony was shattered. And with 16 independent parliamentarians having earlier in 1961 joined the NPC, their party now had a slim working majority in parliament. These developments meant the NCNC effectively lost its leverage over the federal government, and therefore its “extractive capacity” – denting its power and confidence. The Northern Region now stood poised to bring Nigeria under its sole captaincy. John Stuart Mill, in his 1861 Considerations on Representative Government, set out several conditions for a stable federation, one of which was that “there should not be anyone State [or Region] so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one … it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations”. Eastern Regional Premier, Michael Okpara, belatedly recognizing that the emerging political balance would be unfavourable to the East, tried to “drawback” from the “total extinction” of the AG. Maitama Sule, then an NPC Federal Minister, however, observing the changes taking place, remarked with breath-taking confidence: “In a very short time, the NPC will rule the whole of Nigeria”. It was against this background that the First Republic’s next crisis played out. 1 Like |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by Nobody: 2:49pm On Oct 08, 2019 |
Deep Educative Following Please update this. |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by flyingpig: 9:18pm On Jun 06, 2020 |
Keentola, Can you share with me, link to the comprehensive post? |
Re: The First Republic In Nigeria And Its Collapse (1960-1966) by Nobody: 10:18pm On Jun 06, 2020 |
The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was the southern party which entered into a coalition with the NPC as a junior partner in government. It was a decision for which it was richly rewarded. This means Azikwe of igbo South East became a slave /junior to Ahmadu Bello of North.... The decision was richly rewarded.. Meaning azikwe was compensated with sumtin.. Yes, a figure head n ceremonial powerless president.... Please kindly note that b4 NPc merged with NC NC, the first met with Awolowo AG and offered Awolowo a figurehead powerless president but the great sir Awo rejected such position. Even the great Awo was offered that seat but he rejected.. Awo rejectee was what Azikwe saw heaven.. Till today, Igbos are still slaving for their awusa master... See pic below Twale Great Awo...... 1 Like
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