So how did he get relieved of that job?
It is in the book. Adekunle was tired. In the military, there’s what is called Post-Trauma Stress Syndrome and it is in the book. Adekunle would be talking to you about something and would drift into another matter. That was a sign that this man was tired. Adekunle would be discussing tactics and strategies with you and suddenly, he would be asking you where the next party would hold, how many drinks would be needed and how many people we would need to dance. These were the signs. We were warning him that he was tired. We warned him against the plan to go to the Ibo area and attack Owerri, Aba and Umuahia. We could capture Uli- Ihiala, which was Biafra’s centre of gravity. A centre of gravity is a place that when I hold it like your balls, you would surrender to me. That’s why you see boxers continue to punch your head so that your knees would buckle. The Adekunle that I knew, that I worked with, didn’t do anything wrong except that he was tired. And it got to a stage where he was losing ground and we were silly. I was just 27 years old and would always go against him. He then ordered that Akinrinade and myself be ambushed. The story is in the book. The mother of the man he sent to ambush us had just visited and I took this woman in my jeep with escorts to Port Harcourt, where his son was. As we were going, shots were fired at us. We thought the woman was sleeping, but she had fainted. But I took her to the child, who was the military police commander. The next day, the man escorted his mother back. My mother was there, too. The two women became friends and I presented her with a bottle of whisky. She then went with my mother. Then this same man from Benue, who’s dead now, was ordered to ambush me. Adekunle sent for Akinrinade and I to report at Port Harcourt at 7am. That meant I had to leave Uyo by midnight. I left at midnight to pick Akinriande at Asa and had to drive without headlights for fear of being found out by enemies on the way. We left Asa at 4:15am and drove to Port Harcourt without headlights. We had to get a password across the line to get through. For example if you say Jack, I should say Johnson; if I fail to say that, they would open fire. When we got to Port Harcourt, we knocked, but he was not home. He was in the office. Adekunle never slept at night. He would be drawing maps. So we went to his office and met him with a Lagos musician, Roy Chicago. As soon as we entered, Roy Chicago said: ‘Oruko yin lafin jeun l’eko, ema jaa (We take pride in your names in Lagos, so please don’t quarrel). We didn’t know what he was talking about. So Adekunle asked us how we got there and we reminded him he told us to come at 7am. He gathered himself together and said he would talk to us separately. Akinrinade was asked to stay outside. He was outside when the dispatch rider that was sent to Uyo to deliver a note that we should not drive through Asa on our way back arrived. The man had the note since he did not meet me there. He met Akinrinade standing there. So he gave the note to Akinrinade, who read it and immediately barged in, shouting: ‘Let’s get out of here; they wanted to kill us!’ I read through the note and looked at Adekunle. I would have just shot him dead right there. I asked him what we did to deserve being ambushed. We took the note to Gowon and others and we explained to them what had happened. Finally, they realised that many of the officers, including Adekunle, were tired and decided to change them. But to change them, the senior officers that were left were Hausa and Gowon was worried that the first and second divisions were already headed by Hausa officers and there was no Yoruba officer to lead the third division. We had Olutoye, we had Shotomi, we had Oluleye, but it was Akinrinade that suggested Obasanjo to General Yakubu Gowon. I didn’t know the man before then. Akinrinade was the first person to take me to his house in Ibadan. Gowon was not sure that Obasanjo would want the job of replacing Adekunle because he was an engineer. We told him Obasanjo did not need to be convinced because the post he was holding in Ibadan as the garrison commander was an infantry job. Gowon said we should contact him. When we met Obasanjo, we told him our mission and gave him a comprehensive briefing on the situation at the war front. We went with maps and explained to him the defects of Adekunle’s plan to attack the Igbo heartland. We also told him about Operations Pincer 1, 2 and 3 and explained that if Pincer 2 was adopted, the war would end in 30 days. We spoke for three hours without food or drink. Obasanjo simply listened. And when he spoke, he said he was an engineer and he was not going to the war front. He also said we wanted to have him killed by nominating him for a spot at the war front. I was enraged and gave him a dressing down. I reminded him of his conduct when the Biafrans entered the Midwest and we asked the army to immediately blow up the Ore Bridge to delay the Biafran advance to Lagos. Obasanjo’s engineering corps did not know what to do. It was one Mr. Akinde of the Public Works Department at Ibadan, assisted by men of the Ministry of Works, who blew up the bridge. I was so incensed that I continued pouring venom on him. The suggestion that the bridge be blown up came from the wife of Governor Adeyinka Adebayo, whose husband was in Iseyin because of the Agbekoya riots. The Agbekoya had moved into Ibadan and were close to the Governor’s Lodge in Agodi and had freed inmates at Agodi Prisons. Mrs. Adebayo said: ‘Eyin ni Army Commander, eranyan lo’be (You are the army commander, please send someone there!).’ This fact is contained in General Adebayo’s biography. But Obasanjo wrote in My Command that he was the one that ordered the bridge blown up. Akinrinande made Obasanjo the Commander of the 3rd Marine Commando, where he came and caused problems because he was clueless.When Obasanjo took over, we briefed him in a comprehensive way. However, I didn’t know that he held a grudge against me over our encounter in Ibadan where he accused Akinrinade and I of wanting to get him to the war front so he could be killed. Obasanjo’s first battle experience was a disaster.

Where is OBJ?
OBJ come and answer your name ooo.
I don't believe this!

The motive of y our post is clear BUT have you heard of PTSD?

[size=18pt]Army standardizes PTSD diagnosis, treatment[/size]

WASHINGTON - The Army, along with the other military services and the Department of Veterans Affairs, is standardizing the diagnosis and treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, known as PTSD.

“No matter where Soldiers are getting care or seeking help for PTSD or any other medical issue, we want to ensure we are doing it the same way,” said Lt. Col. Christopher Warner, the Army Surgeon General’s psychiatric consultant and deputy commander, Clinical Services, Bassett Army Community Hospital, Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

Warner said standardization increases a Soldier’s level of trust and fairness in the system.

The Army medical community is now being trained on guidelines spelled out in Army Medical Command Policy Memo 12-035 (April 10, 2012), Policy Guidance on the Assessment and Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Warner said.

The memo emphasizes the urgency of the issue.

“The majority of service members with PTSD do not seek treatment, and many who do seek treatment drop out before they can benefit,” the memo reads. “There are many reasons for this, including stigma, other barriers to care, and negative perceptions of mental health care. Lack of trust in military behavioral health professionals has been identified as one important predictor of service members not utilizing services. Therefore, it is critical that Army behavioral health professionals do everything they can to advocate for and provide care in a patient-centered manner that reassures patients that they will not be judged and that their primary concerns will be addressed.”

PTSD is a widespread problem. It occurs in 3 to 6 percent of service members with no deployment experience and in 5 to 25 percent of service members who have been deployed to combat zones. Combat frequency and intensity are the strongest predictor of the condition, according to the policy memo.

An example of standardization is using the “patient-centered care” approach.

“Patient-centered care within a culture of trust requires that care providers focus on patients’ primary concerns, and these diagnoses, when inappropriately used, can damage therapeutic rapport and interfere with successful care,” the memo reads.

In the past, some medical commands have supplemented this approach with forensic psychiatry, which, according to Warner, incorporates the medical practice of psychiatry with the legal field to conduct administrative reviews for medical boards.

Warner said the approach is similar to the workman’s compensation model that, while not utilized inappropriately, did not provide a standardized process across the Army.

“That model is no longer in use in the Army,” Warner said.

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown, I Corps commander, speaking at an Aug. 2 press conference at Madigan Army Medical Center, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., agreed that the patient-centered care approach and standardization is best.

“Our No. 1 concern is taking care of Soldiers and their Families,” he said. “Cost doesn’t play a part in military medicine. We want them to have world-class medical care. For that reason, we are going to stop using the forensic psychiatry system with the disability evaluation system here at Madigan.”

Brown explained that forensic psychiatry adds “an extra layer of supervision really not needed for PTSD medical board examinations.” He said that while forensic psychiatry is a good tool to use in specific situations, the Army needs a more consistent and equitable method of fairness in PTSD diagnosis.

The forensic psychiatry model has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on malingering. The policy memo clarifies the reason for discontinuing that model.

“Although there has been debate on the role of symptom exaggeration or malingering for secondary gain in DoD and VA PTSD Disability Evaluation System processes, there is considerable evidence that this is rare, and unlikely to be a major factor in the vast majority of disability determinations,” the memo reads.

Other aspects of standardization for PTSD care are being addressed. For example, some medications used in the past were found to not be the best choices for PTSD, Warner said.

Another example he cited is standardization of new treatment methods based on research, not only from military medicine, but from first responders – firemen, police officers and paramedics – who routinely handle traumatic situations.

A cutting-edge development within the Army for the prevention of PTSD that the committee is looking at, for example, would be Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, which increases a Soldier’s resiliency, he said.

Standardization is not limited to Army Medical Command Policy Memo 12-035. The Army, VA and other services are standardizing the administration of treatment, using the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, or IDES.

Warner said the IDES, in conjunction with the Army Physical Evaluation Board, determines whether or not a service member should stay in service or transition to the VA system as a medical retiree. If the latter, the service member is guided through the process of transitioning from Army to VA care, while he or she is still on active duty, to ensure no loss of coverage or break in treatment, he explained.

The Army’s success at standardization and innovation are a source of pride within the medical community.

“Combat has been our greatest catalyst to medical innovation,” said Maj. Gen. Richard Thomas, commander, Western Regional Medical Command. The general also spoke at the press conference.

Thomas said that the best minds are working to improve diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. He said that besides the VA and other services, the Army is working with universities across the country and even the National Football League to improve the quality of PTSD care.

He added that the Army has developed a collaborative relationship across the medical spectrum in its effort to find the best treatment possible. For example, he said, “surgeons are seeing patients, alongside psychologists, and even practitioners trained in yoga, massage and acupuncture.”

Treating PTSD is a challenge, Thomas said, because it is not as obvious as treating something like a bullet wound. He explained that diagnosis is further complicated because Soldiers often have more than one injury – for instance, PTSD combined with traumatic brain injury.

Additionally, Soldiers often have delayed reactions to traumatic events that may take years to manifest, he said.

One problem still facing the Army is the stigma associated with mental disorders.

“It is critical as leaders to get rid of the stigma involved,” Thomas said. “There is still a stigma in society and in the Army, but I’ve seen an improvement over the years. We want Soldiers to reach out and seek help from the Army or even outside the base if they so desire.”

Thomas said that today, the Army is seeing more Soldiers come forward for treatment, but the gains are still not enough.

“We need everyone’s help in educating Soldiers,” Thomas said. “It’s not a normal thing asking Soldiers to seek help. We need to get across that it’s normal.”

http://www.forthoodsentinel.com/story.php?id=9675