I repeat: Naai-gerians are a subspecies and South Africans are smarter, faster and generally superior.

It's all here for everyone to see.

Weak Naai-gerian arguments. SMH.

2smooth2shout:

Exactly. you don't like being challenged so you'll like Henry that doesn't have your time. bozo

if you knew Henry's contribution to military blogs, you'll know you are not the type for him to waste his time for.

I'm glad a bloke like him doesn't have time for me, it's loudmouths like you that I have in mind when posting.

zetdee:


I'm glad a bloke like him doesn't have time for me, it's loudmouths like you that I have in mind when posting.

Henry is a Nigerian.

These Naai-gerians should learn from him.

2smooth2shout: There seems to be a mix up about SA military. SADF is totally different from SANDF. The doctrines changed after apartheid regime gave blacks independence. With a lot of the old and ex SADF working as mercineries for private firms worldwide, there are only very few old SADF soldiers that integrated with the new.

So basically, SANDF came to existence in the late 90s. (please dispute my assertion constructively)

Now my question still remains what are the achievements of SANDF?
Read very well before the brainless south africans start to spill senselessness at my question.

The new South Africa also came into existence in the 90s, but it's still better than Nigeria. The SANDF is ranked above Nigeria, all your questions will not change that fact.

Msauza:
Their failure to respond rapidly to Mali crisis is the reason behind the establishment of Rapid Response Force. AU was criticised badly and Zuma could not take it in order to save the face of his former wife NKosazana Zuma.

you really think you know anything about Africas politics. My 19 year old brother is a small boy with limited experience for crying out loud.

Of all the forces that has ever being proposed by anybody in Africa, it is only that which Nigeria (Babangida)proposed that has materialized and is still existing and effective.

We hesitated to go to mali becos we just want to start tieing down our help to some benefits + majority of Nigerians are not in support of yet another foreign intervention.

Our foreign policy has moved from activism and being father christmas on the African continent (it has always being that way from independence to Yar' Adua's administrtion) to economic and diplomatic reciprocacy under GEJ.

You guys were the 1st to get stung by our diplomatic reciprocacy policy when you made that yellow fever blunder.

souldust: you really think you know anything about Africas politics. My 19 year old brother is a small boy with limited experience for crying out loud.

Of all the forces that has ever being proposed by anybody in Africa, it is only that which Nigeria (Babangida)proposed that has materialized and is still existing and effective.

We hesitated to go to mali becos we just want to start tieing down our help to some benefits + majority of Nigerians are not in support of yet another foreign intervention.

Our foreign policy has moved from activism and being father christmas on the African continent (it has always being that way from independence to Yar' Adua's administrtion) to economic and diplomatic reciprocacy under GEJ.

You guys were the 1st to get stung by our diplomatic reciprocacy policy when you made that yellow fever blunder.

You're going off on a tangent.

Msauza's argument is clear and straightforward:

The response brigade was proposed by South Africa because of the failure to respond quickly enough to the Mali situation.

Don't give us stories about why the hesitation, about your foreign policy, Babangoodeeda and what-not.

Too much maningi story.

Read what Msauza is saying.

Deny or admit and be happy.

CraigB: I repeat: Naai-gerians are a subspecies and South Africans are smarter, faster and generally superior.

It's all here for everyone to see.

Weak Naai-gerian arguments. SMH.

Any neutral person going through the facts presented in this thread, from the time Thiza graced the thread with his fabulous posts until this page will come to that conclusion.

zetdee:

Any neutral person going through the facts presented in this thread, from the time Thiza graced the thread with his fabulous posts until this page will come to that conclusion.

Yup.

The smallness of the Naai-gerian mind.

They somehow believe that after all the talking, we will wake up tomorrow and the rankings will suddenly have changed.

andrewza:

1 battlion and since you pulled out it is more than you have. We all so operate in red zones and have a history of makeing them green zones. That is done by winning hearts and minds. You know not commiting war crimes.

Like in your DRC stealing and molesting from ...

Mike..ZA:
South Africa intervened when UNITA,was threatened by the Angolan advance south. Remember Nigeria has never fought any war alone,you guys always share ground with other forces.

95% of ECOMOG army was nigerian, 100% of ECOMOG air force was nigerian, 100% of ECOMOG navy was nigerian. 99% of ECOMOG battlefield and HQ command and control was nigerian. 1,000 nigerian soldiers dies in ECOMOG as 90% of all total casualties.

who was fighting then ? Togo republic ?

no nation fights war alone most of the time. check war history.

world war II germany/italy/austria/japan joined their military together. america/britain/russia/canada/australia joined their military together.

Arab war Egypt/Algeria/Iran/Jordan/Kuwait/Arab league joined their military together against Israel/plus USA/European covert support.

Falklands war Argentina/USSR covert support vs Britain/USA/NATO covert support

Gulf war Iran/American support vs Iraq/Russian support

Gulf war america/NATO/rest of the world joined their military against iraq/mujahedeen

Afghanistan war america/NATO joined their military together against Taliban/Osama Bin Laden/mujahedeen

Bush war Angola/Cuba/USSR cover support vs South Africa/Israeli, French, American, British and NATO cover support

Badme war Ethiopia/Russian support vs Eritrea/Ukranian support

who fight war alone ? a foolish nation that has zero diplomatic connections and international recognition.

you drank your beer directly from brewery factory production tank today

show us any war south africa fought and won clearly in victory

http://beegeagle./2013/01/23/the-real-impact-of-nigerian-ecomog-soldiers-what-you-do-not-get-told/
.

zetdee: How can a devided country like Nigeria ever fight a war with another country, we know a war would give igbos an opportunity to declare biafra.

the current chief of army staff of nigeria is an igbo man, why is he commanding nigerian army against b.oko h.aram ? he should have declared Biafra as a separate nation.

your dreams never come to pass because you dream after bottles of scotch whisky plus dry gin

Mike..ZA:
The late Lt Gen Deon Ferreira (a colonel at the
time and SADF force commander in South East
Angola) was quoted in the Paratus (SADF
publication) of March 1989 after the Lomba Battle
as follows:
"If defeat for South Africa meant the loss of 31
men, three tanks, five armoured vehicles and
three aircraft, then we'd lost. If victory for Fapla
and the Cubans meant the loss of 4,600 men, 94
tanks, 100 armoured vehicles, 9 aircraft and
other Soviet equiptment valued at more than a
billion Rands, then they'd won."

i have posted on this bush war so many times, and i wont repeat it again.

south african military losses in angolan bush war were very small because they did not launch any major offensive to defeat cuba, they only defended a 'frontline' and prevented cuba from entering south africa. the south african frontline vanguard has about 3,000 soldiers, but south african defense line rearguard had about 18,000 soldiers.

most of the fighting was done between cuba/angola/UNITA .

south africa was just playing the defensive role of Taribo West/Joseph Yobo

.

Mike..ZA:
The only war Nigeria has ever fought alone was against Boko Haram,which they're begging for ceasefire now.

does your father have a second wife that is 'doing' you voodoo remote control ?

andrewza:

There were problems, this took place during bad times for the SANDF yet even so the coup was stoped, lestho is stabel and it economy recoverd.

south africans always have an excuse for their military failures. is it a curse ?

Msauza:

Nigeria has zero combat history with other nations.

ask Chad and Cameroon

.

LT SHANGY: please, my fellow NIGERIANS, You don't have to blame the south africans for their mistakes and erred comments. They (south africans) have failed to realise the huge gap between the apartheid SADF and post-apartheid SANDF. The SADF was a hugely strong military, well equipped and well funded. This present SANDF is nothing to write home about, budget constrains has forced them to ground their grippens and rooivaks. They re not well funded and equipped. This is my ranking

1) EGYPT
2) ALGERIA
3) NIGERIA
4) SOUTH AFRICA
5) ETHIOPIA
6) ZIMBWABWE
7) MORROCCO
8] SUDAN
9) KENYA
10) CHAD

i agree with some but not all.

may i humbly give my reasons in summary ? though i will find time this month to explain my own rankings in detail.

your rankings sir ;

1) EGYPT.....undisputed champion, too many weapons. only defeated by mighty israel and no one else can beat egypt except a world class power. egypt is in the world's top 15 military powers. best war experience in africa. defeated libya.

2) ALGERIA.....very low combat experience, no war records of large scale combat like Biafra war/ECOMOG. soldiers very strong physically, equal in stamina to nigeria and ethiopia. nigeria only has a slight edge over algeria in military capacity....nigeria has far better war experience, recce/spying, air defense, weapons industry.

3) NIGERIA....best military combat training/doctrine, best war history in africa. best strategic and tactical recce/spy technical capability in africa (satellites and spy balloons), great ability to watch the enemy from long ranges without being noticed. largest and most modern brown water navy in the whole world, one of the world's most active armies on different terrain. best anti-aircraft defense in africa and still improving it with help from india now. building 70% the first stealth guided missile warship in africa with china's help. rapidly growing defence industry.

4) SOUTH AFRICA......poor military intelligence, poor military strategy, poor quality of soldiers many unprofessional guerrilla freedom fighters holding officer ranks, poor health of soldiers due to HIV, poor combat experience, no single record of war victory, too much dependence on equipment with long range avoiding contact with the enemy to gain battle confidence. too many expensive european equipment hard to maintain and not in service. best defence industry in africa. one of the best 5 air forces in africa. one of the best 5 navies in africa. army is very unreliable. army size is too small to defend land size. shortage of manpower in all armed forces. shortage of jet pilots. insufficient artillery howitzers. soldiers afraid to die.

5) ETHIOPIA....no water, landlocked, cannot be attacked sea, every powerful navy in africa is rendered useless against them. second best military record of war victories after nigeria. the best air force pilots in africa.

6) ZIMBWABWE.....poor economy, too few modern equipment. however, a well trained army, one of africa's best. low combat experience.

7) MORROCCO........more powerful than south africa now. 52 units latest year 2013 version of F-16 jets, best navy warship in africa (2013 FREMM FRIGATE), about 330,000 soldiers regular/reserve, about 15 years war experience against polisario forces of western sahara. also fought brief war with spain recently year 2002, moroccan military was defeated by spain.

8] SUDAN.....many years of war experience, good air force, usually underestimated, but had a good airforce many years ago even before nigeria started.

9) KENYA....bold and confident army, not cowardly like south africa. good battlefield tactics. good army equipments, poor air force equipments. did well against somalia's alshabaab i.slamic m.ilitants

10) CHAD.....same as kenya above. bold courageous army. defeated libya. lost brief border war with nigeria.

Eritrea and Angola are superior to Sudan, Kenya, Chad in terms of weaponry and war experience of about 20 years against south africa, also against UNITA.


PHOTO : SOLDIERS IN THE ARMY OF KENYA

CraigB:

We've heard this song a million times. It's become tired and tiring.

The bombs and bullets will continue to ring out all the way into infinity. You've killed a Boko leader before. It stopped nothing. As it is, you're giving us your wishes.

And don't let me pull out links about GEJ's very recent request for the military to find "new ways" to deal with they issue.

There's no victory. You can't get rid of the disunity problem, even if Shekau were to die. It's deep-rooted.

You are not quite far from the truth, the bullets will keep on flying and hitting targets. But permit me to quickly point out to you that no country is immune to insurgency. then, the capability of a country to contain that insurgency speaks volume of the country's security outfit. Britain, India and Nigeria readily comes to mind. Insurgency is not new to Nigeria, the 1980s maitaisine insurgency led by shehu maikaniki killed thousands of Nigerians before Gen Buhari launched a military offencive against maitasine, forcing them to retreat to the mountains before subdueing them with a hail of airstrikes(this happened while under UN sanctions). Boko haram will be long gone in no distant time. Talking about links, what's keeping you?

Aguagust, i must really confess that you are the most enlightened on military matters in this forum. The missiles being developed at Epe, Lagos are being discovered to be anti-submarines and anti-ship missiles. The Nigerian navy are working round-the-clock to be near-perfectly efficient in naval warfare. Currently acquiring ASW skills in pakistan.

agaugust:

does your father have a second wife that is 'doing' you voodoo remote control ?

You're eating the humble pie. Resorting to insults,to dress your naked stupid.ity.

Mike..ZA:
You're eating the humble pie. Resorting to insults,to dress your naked stupid.ity.

Weakling! You just don't know your left from your right! Fool-at-large!

LT SHANGY: Aguagust, i must really confess that you are the most enlightened on military matters in this forum. The missiles being developed at Epe, Lagos are being discovered to be anti-submarines and anti-ship missiles. The Nigerian navy are working round-the-clock to be near-perfectly efficient in naval warfare. Currently acquiring ASW skills in pakistan.

It just gets better. Soon we'll hear that Nigeria has developed rockets to take Nigerians into space. No wait....a Nigerian official said this will happen in 2015. Why do Nigerians lie to themselves so much?

zetdee:

The new South Africa also came into existence in the 90s, but it's still better than Nigeria. The SANDF is ranked above Nigeria, all your questions will not change that fact.

dude, the old south africa was better than Nigeria. and the new one is just living in past glory. with the way ANC is running the rainbow now, i doubt SA would have had such development under such useless party.

when did you hear old Nigerian soldiers condemning the new intakes' skills and professionalism? for the old SADF to complain about the SANDF comedians, there's something wrong.

SANDF is a joke and south africans have confirmed it themselves.

zetdee:

The new South Africa also came into existence in the 90s, but it's still better than Nigeria. The SANDF is ranked above Nigeria, all your questions will not change that fact.

just mention how. how many missions have they succeeded, what war history or with rebels have do they have with success.

the global firepower ranking is just the same past glory apartheid south africa left for the new

agaugust:

i have posted on this bush war so many times, and i wont repeat it again.

south african military losses in angolan bush war were very small because they did not launch any major offensive to defeat cuba, they only defended a 'frontline' and prevented cuba from entering south africa. the south african frontline vanguard has about 3,000 soldiers, but south african defense line rearguard had about 18,000 soldiers.

most of the fighting was done between cuba/angola/UNITA .

south africa was just playing the defensive role of Taribo West/Joseph Yobo

.

The Offensive Begins
10 September 1987
On 10 September 21 Brigade sent 2 battalions
with 5 T-55 tanks across the river, using a mobile
bridge-layer. South African observers, watching
the crossing, were amazed at the over-confident
behaviour of the enemy, with infantrymen
standing around casually, hands in pockets,
watching the crossing. The South African
reconnaissance force consisted of 4 Ratel-90 anti-
tank armoured cars and 240 infantrymen in 30
Casspir infantry combat vehicles.
The South Africans were ordered to wait and see
what Fapla would do. When an armoured car
began to roll over the bridge, the South Africans
went into action.
An anti-tank missile destroyed the armoured car
and killed the infantrymen around it. A second
missile destroyed the giant Soviet GAZ bridge-
layer. The South Africans then concentrated on
the T-55 tanks which were beginning to move
westwards, and knocked out 3 of them within
minutes. The remaining 2 immediately retreated.
Artillery fire was called in from the South African
G-5 guns situated some distance behind the
South African lines, and by the end of the day 1
Fapla battalion had been completely destroyed,
leaving the remainder of the enemy force to
retreat back across the river in confusion.
13 September 1987
Three days later, on 13 September, Fapla sent 2
battalions of 59 Brigade with T-55 tanks across
the river in a second attempt to establish a
bridgehead. The South Africans and Unita again
attacked immediately, the Ratel-90s firing anti-
personnel shells which cut a swathe of
destruction through the massed enemy infantry.
From the Casspirs infantrymen poured machine-
gun and rifle fire into the exposed enemy. The
Angolans started to retreat, but were exposed on
open ground, with a stretch of marshland
hampering their path back to the river. Within a
short space of time over 200 Fapla soldiers lay
dead.
The SADF/Unita force started mopping up the
last groups of men left when the tanks suddenly
joined in, causing chaos and sending the lightly-
armoured Ratels and Casspirs fleeing in all
directions. Once the South Africans had found
cover in the bush, however, they began to fire
anti-tank (HEAT) shells at the tanks, which were
at a disadvantage with their long gun barrels in
the bush. The Ratels, realising they had the
advantages of speed and manoeuvrability, began
to circle round the tanks, enticing them into
chasing the armoured cars in ever-smaller cricles
until the Ratels were able to come in behind the
tanks and fire. By the end of the engagement 5
tanks had been destroyed and over 250 Fapla
soldiers killed, for the loss of 8 dead and 3
destroyed armoured cars on the SADF side.
The South Africans, after their initial shock at
encountering the tanks, had adapted their tactics
and proved that their armoured cars could cope
with tanks by a combination of fast movement
and accurate shooting, tactics reminiscent of
those used by the Boers against the British over
80 years earlier.
14 to 23 September 1987
After the first series of clashes had taken place
the South Africans were ordered not to cross the
Lomba River, but to establish a line behind it to
block the Angolan advance. The G5 heavy guns
continued to pound the Angolans mercilessly,
while the South African Air Force flew missions
over the enemy to eliminate their anti-aircraft
installations. At the same time Fapla artillery was
bombarding the South African positions with
mortars and heavy artillery.
21 Brigade continued to pile up supplies on their
side of the Lomba, but the South African
bombardments hampered them severely in their
efforts to resume their advance. South African
Recces (Special Forces, the SADF equivalent of
SAS or Green Berets) kept the enemy under
constant observation from hidden vantage points
in the bush, often no more than 50 yards from
the enemy positions. Throughout the campaign
these Recces sat for days and even weeks in their
observation posts, guiding the G5 artillery fire
onto Fapla positions. The enemy knew they were
close by, but were never able to locate them.
47 Brigade had also been slowed down in its
advance by the South African artillery and air
strikes. It was barely moving a kilometre per day,
and the South Africans were slowly drawing it into
a "killing ground" of their choice.
There was a brief interlude in the fighting when
South Africa and Angola finally agreed to
exchange prisoners - a South African Recce,
Captain Wynand du Toit, captured by Fapla in
1985, was exchanged for 170 Fapla soldiers
captured by the SADF and Unita. A couple of
Dutch arms smugglers, captured in South Africa,
were included in the trade. According to Amnesty
International sources, the 170 Faplan soldiers
were taken to the Angolan capital, Luanda, where
they were all executed by the Angolans for having
failed in their duty...
In view of this it was not surprising to the South
African troops to find that many captured Fapla
soldiers expressed an interest in joining Unita, or
asked about the possibility of enlisting in the
SADF!
47 Brigade, by now unable to retreat and
desperate to join up with the other brigades,
made an attempt to link up with 59 Brigade. The
South Africans sent their Ratels in again to attack
the enemy from the West. They had 250 men
available to attack a force of over 1000 men with
heavy weapons. The SAAF dropped fragmentation
bombs on the Fapla positions and then 61 Mech
manoeuvred behind them. The going was rough
in the bush and they ended up on the enemy's
flank instead of directly behind them. After a
sharp engagement in the bush, the Ratels
withdrew again because they simply could not
see the enemy and were drawing a lot of artillery
fire.
59 Brigade began to dig in and received
welcome supplies and reinforcements from 21
Brigade, which had now succeeded in laying a
mobile bridge over the Cunzumbia River. The
SADF, worried now that 47 Brigade would
manage to escape back across the river while 59
Brigade pushed forward against the thin South
African defence line, decided it was time to close
the trap they had been preparing.
3 October 1987 - the Decisive Battle
On 2 October the South African Recces reported
that 47 Brigade had managed to construct a
wooden road across the marshes which were
blocking their retreat to the Lomba River. Trucks,
missile carriers, armoured cars and tanks were
busy assembling at the treeline, preparing to
make an orderly retreat across the road.
The Recces watched from their vantage points in
nearby trees and called in artillery fire on Fapla
while the SADF combat groups worked furiously
to get ready and into position.
The first Fapla vehicles to try to cross were Soviet
Sam-9s. One crossed to safety but the Recces
guided artillery fire onto the second as it tried to
cross, destroying it and effectively blocking the
bridge. The Fapla troops sent a T-55 tank to try
and move it out of the way, but without success.
Every time Fapla tried to make a move the Recces
would call in highly accurate artillery salvoes. For
48 hours without sleep or rest the Recces stood
guard over Fapla's escape route, calling in artillery
fire at the slightest movement, until at last they
heard the distant rumble that announced the
arrival of the armoured cars of 61 Mechanised
Battalion.
The Ratels of 61 Mech had a variety of
armaments, from infantry carriers with 20mm
guns to the tank-busting 90mm gun. Unita
troops had by now positioned themselves to the
south-east of 47 Brigade in case they tried to
break away in that direction.
Fapla artillery began to bombard the
approaching Ratels and Migs flew overhead to
lend support and cover 47 Brigade's escape. The
Ratels went in to attack. Fapla, accustomed to
seeing Unita beat a hasty retreat whenever their
tanks appeared, tried the same tactic and sent
their tanks towards the SADF positions. To their
dismay the South Africans' reaction was the exact
opposite - they attacked. The Ratels raced for the
tanks, surrounding them and dodging back and
forth until they could get behind them and shoot
at the comparatively vulnerable rear ends of the
tanks.
Major Laurence Maree, second-in-command of 61
Mech, later told the British journalist and author,
Fred Bridgland:
"I can't tell you how much courage it takes in a
Ratel driver and gunner when a tank is charging
towards them to summon up the will to stop still
for long enough to stabilise their firing platform
and get their round off. [Unlike a T54/55 tank,
which has built-in stabilisers and can fire on the
move, a Ratel, like other armoured cars, can only
fire from a static position]. Of course, as soon as
they'd fired, off they sprinted like Turbo-charged
hares. One of our guys died that afternoon facing
down a T-55 in his Ratel. A 100mm shell from the
tank skipped up from the sandy ground and went
right through the turret. The Ratel commander,
Lieutenant Hind, was terribly wounded and he
died later. We had two others very seriously
wounded that day, and another three with light
wounds. The medics just pulled the shrapnel out
of those who were slightly hurt, cleaned up the
wounds, and they went straight back into
combat." (1)
The Fapla troops, although outgunning the South
Africans and outnumbering them 4 to 1, began to
lose their nerve and one of the battalions
suddenly made a break towards the river. They
streamed across the open grassland towards the
river in an undisciplined mob and the South
Africans brought down MRL fire and high-
explosive mortar shells on them. A second
battalion also broke and ran for the river, with the
Ratels chasing them. Approximately 100 vehicles
were now jostling to try and reach the bridge by
way of the wooden road. Recces directed artillery
fire from the G-5s onto them, causing havoc. The
area was now a wasteland of shattered trees and
burnt grass from the shells and shrapnel from
both sides.
Migs piloted by Cubans flew some 60 sorties that
day, dropping bombs and trying to strafe the
South African positions, but they were wildly
inaccurate and had little effect.
Fapla tanks made an effort to recover some of
the abandoned vehicles, but were themselves
destroyed by the pinpoint accuracy of the G-5
artillery fire. When the firing finally stopped at the
end of the day over 600 Fapla soldiers lay dead
on that stretch of open ground and 127 Fapla
vehicles stood destroyed or abandoned near the
river.
On the morning of 4 October the South Africans
were able to survey the remnants on the
battlefield. Recovery teams were sent in to
salvage whatever was still usable and the SADF
generals were delighted to hear that their troops
were able to salvage intact one of the Sam-8
missile systems, complete with missiles, radar and
logistics vehicles, the first example of this highly-
effective Soviet weapon ever to be captured by a
western country.
The remnants of 21 and 59 Brigades had joined
forces and were trying to reorganize. A few
firefights broke out as the SADF and Unita troops
moved across the battlefield to salvage
equipment. A few inexperienced Unita soldiers
almost caused havoc as they attempted to drive
off the undamaged tanks.
The South Africans intercepted messages from
Russian commanders ordering the Fapla Migs and
troops to make an all-out effort to destroy the
abandoned equipment, but by then the South
Africans had moved the Sam-8 system back
behind their positions and had it well
camouflaged. Unita later tried to claim the Sam-8
for itself with a view to passing it on to the
Americans, but South Africa, recalling the way
America had abandoned its allies in Angola,
refused and retained the missile system for its
own arms research.
October to December 1987 - The Last Phase
After the battle was over mopping up operations
continued on both sides. South African observers
watched in disgust as Fapla soldiers shot many of
their own wounded where they lay because they
were unable to evacuate them or give them
medical care. At the end of the day the South
African commander, Deon Ferreira, sent a
message to HQ that their mission had been
accomplished and that the Angolan/Cuban
advance on Mavinga had been stopped. His new
orders were to clear all remnants of the enemy
forces from the eastern side of the River Cuito and
establish positions from which they would be able
to prevent any further crossings into Unita
territory. No mention was made of capturing
Cuito Cuanavale itself. The SADF did, however,
want to be in a position from which they could
shell the airfield and neutralise the base as a
starting point for a new offensive. Cuito allowed
the Cuban Migs easy access to Unita territory and
if it was destroyed the Migs would have to move
175 kilometres to the west.
The G5 artillery groups were moved up and
commenced bombarding Cuito. The SAAF sent in
4 Mirages as a decoy and while the Migs were
being rolled out of their reinforced concrete
hangars the G-5s pounded the runway with
shells. Within a short space of time the airfield
was destroyed and the remaining Migs were
forced to move back to Menongue.
Stinger missiles were also used to good effect by
Unita and two Cuban pilots were taken prisoner
after their Mig had been shot down.
The Cuban/Faplan offensive had failed. Later the
Cubans tried to save face and boost their
demoralized troops by claiming loudly that they
had won the "Battle for Cuito Cuanavale", which
they claimed to have successfully defended
against all South African attacks!
Throughout the campaign the South Africans,
mindful of the fact that they were involved in an
undeclared war and without allies in the west,
refrained from making any public statements on
the progress of the war. This gave the Cubans
and Angolans the advantage in the propaganda
war. The SADF could not reveal that it only had a
small combat force of less than 3000 lightly-
armed troops in Angola, as this would have
revealed their weaknesses to the enemy. The
superior training and tactics of the SADF had
convinced the Cubans and Angolans that they
were facing a large, heavily-armed force.
As Chester Crocker later wrote:
"In early October the Soviet-Fapla offensive was
smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga. It
turned into a headlong retreat over the 120 miles
back to the primary launching point at Cuito
Cuanavale. In some of the bloodiest battles of the
entire civil war, a combined force of some 8,000
Unita fighters and 4,000 SADF troops destroyed
one Fapla brigade and mauled several others out
of a total Fapla force of some 18,000 engaged in
the three-pronged offensive. Estimates of Fapla
losses ranged upward of 4,000 killed and
wounded. This offensive had been a Soviet
conception from start to finish. Senior Soviet
officers played a central role in its execution. Over
a thousand Soviet advisers were assigned to
Angola in 1987 to help with Moscow's largest
logistical effort to date in Angola: roughly $1.5
billion in military hardware was delivered that
year. Huge quantities of Soviet equipment were
destroyed or fell into Unita and SADF hands when
Fapla broke into a disorganized retreat... The
1987 military campaign represented a stunning
humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its
strategy. It would take Fapla a year, or maybe
two, to recover and regroup. Moreover the
Angolan military disaster threatened to go from
bad to worse. As of mid-November, the Unita/
SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale
airfield and pinned down thousands of Fapla's
best remaining units clinging onto the town's
defensive perimeters." (2)
The results of the campaign up to April 1988
were 4,785 killed on the Cuban/Faplan side, with
94 tanks and hundreds of combat vehicles
destroyed, against 31 South Africans killed in
action, 3 tanks destroyed (SADF tanks entered
the war after the Lomba River campaign) and 11
SADF armoured cars and troop carriers lost. A
total of 9 Migs were destroyed and only 1 SAAF
Mirage shot down.
After 13 years in Angola the Cubans had still not
achieved their aim of destroying Unita and
marching into Namibia as "liberators". They had
badly underestimated the South Africans and
discovered to their cost that they were facing
highly-trained, battle-hardened troops. If they
had taken the trouble to examine South Africa's
military history, they might perhaps have paused
for thought at the fact that the forefathers of
these troops, the Boers, had held the full might of
the British Empire at bay during the Boer War,
when 450,000 British troops took three years to
subdue a force of little more than 20,000 Boers.

NaijaPikinGidi:

Weakling! You just don't know your left from your right! Fool-at-large!

You're a Nigerian.

Mike..ZA:
You're a Nigerian.

And you're a South African! Dumbest comment yet from another dull head South African!

saengine:

It just gets better. Soon we'll hear that Nigeria has developed rockets to take Nigerians into space. No wait....a Nigerian official said this will happen in 2015. Why do Nigerians lie to themselves so much?

stop weeping about our missile program na. fact is Nigeria is working to perfect it' missile technology and have tested many.
unlike your military that doesn't have secrets, Nigerian military is one of the most secretive in the world. we weren't aware of the APC, Defense boat, etc until they were unveiled. that's how secretive they are so don't expect more info than what you've goten so far about our missile programs.

Mike..ZA:
The Offensive Begins
10 September 1987
On 10 September 21 Brigade sent 2 battalions
with 5 T-55 tanks across the river, using a mobile
bridge-layer. South African observers, watching
the crossing, were amazed at the over-confident
behaviour of the enemy, with infantrymen
standing around casually, hands in pockets,
watching the crossing. The South African
reconnaissance force consisted of 4 Ratel-90 anti-
tank armoured cars and 240 infantrymen in 30
Casspir infantry combat vehicles.
The South Africans were ordered to wait and see
what Fapla would do. When an armoured car
began to roll over the bridge, the South Africans
went into action.
An anti-tank missile destroyed the armoured car
and killed the infantrymen around it. A second
missile destroyed the giant Soviet GAZ bridge-
layer. The South Africans then concentrated on
the T-55 tanks which were beginning to move
westwards, and knocked out 3 of them within
minutes. The remaining 2 immediately retreated.
Artillery fire was called in from the South African
G-5 guns situated some distance behind the
South African lines, and by the end of the day 1
Fapla battalion had been completely destroyed,
leaving the remainder of the enemy force to
retreat back across the river in confusion.
13 September 1987
Three days later, on 13 September, Fapla sent 2
battalions of 59 Brigade with T-55 tanks across
the river in a second attempt to establish a
bridgehead. The South Africans and Unita again
attacked immediately, the Ratel-90s firing anti-
personnel shells which cut a swathe of
destruction through the massed enemy infantry.
From the Casspirs infantrymen poured machine-
gun and rifle fire into the exposed enemy. The
Angolans started to retreat, but were exposed on
open ground, with a stretch of marshland
hampering their path back to the river. Within a
short space of time over 200 Fapla soldiers lay
dead.
The SADF/Unita force started mopping up the
last groups of men left when the tanks suddenly
joined in, causing chaos and sending the lightly-
armoured Ratels and Casspirs fleeing in all
directions. Once the South Africans had found
cover in the bush, however, they began to fire
anti-tank (HEAT) shells at the tanks, which were
at a disadvantage with their long gun barrels in
the bush. The Ratels, realising they had the
advantages of speed and manoeuvrability, began
to circle round the tanks, enticing them into
chasing the armoured cars in ever-smaller cricles
until the Ratels were able to come in behind the
tanks and fire. By the end of the engagement 5
tanks had been destroyed and over 250 Fapla
soldiers killed, for the loss of 8 dead and 3
destroyed armoured cars on the SADF side.
The South Africans, after their initial shock at
encountering the tanks, had adapted their tactics
and proved that their armoured cars could cope
with tanks by a combination of fast movement
and accurate shooting, tactics reminiscent of
those used by the Boers against the British over
80 years earlier.
14 to 23 September 1987
After the first series of clashes had taken place
the South Africans were ordered not to cross the
Lomba River, but to establish a line behind it to
block the Angolan advance. The G5 heavy guns
continued to pound the Angolans mercilessly,
while the South African Air Force flew missions
over the enemy to eliminate their anti-aircraft
installations. At the same time Fapla artillery was
bombarding the South African positions with
mortars and heavy artillery.
21 Brigade continued to pile up supplies on their
side of the Lomba, but the South African
bombardments hampered them severely in their
efforts to resume their advance. South African
Recces (Special Forces, the SADF equivalent of
SAS or Green Berets) kept the enemy under
constant observation from hidden vantage points
in the bush, often no more than 50 yards from
the enemy positions. Throughout the campaign
these Recces sat for days and even weeks in their
observation posts, guiding the G5 artillery fire
onto Fapla positions. The enemy knew they were
close by, but were never able to locate them.
47 Brigade had also been slowed down in its
advance by the South African artillery and air
strikes. It was barely moving a kilometre per day,
and the South Africans were slowly drawing it into
a "killing ground" of their choice.
There was a brief interlude in the fighting when
South Africa and Angola finally agreed to
exchange prisoners - a South African Recce,
Captain Wynand du Toit, captured by Fapla in
1985, was exchanged for 170 Fapla soldiers
captured by the SADF and Unita. A couple of
Dutch arms smugglers, captured in South Africa,
were included in the trade. According to Amnesty
International sources, the 170 Faplan soldiers
were taken to the Angolan capital, Luanda, where
they were all executed by the Angolans for having
failed in their duty...
In view of this it was not surprising to the South
African troops to find that many captured Fapla
soldiers expressed an interest in joining Unita, or
asked about the possibility of enlisting in the
SADF!
47 Brigade, by now unable to retreat and
desperate to join up with the other brigades,
made an attempt to link up with 59 Brigade. The
South Africans sent their Ratels in again to attack
the enemy from the West. They had 250 men
available to attack a force of over 1000 men with
heavy weapons. The SAAF dropped fragmentation
bombs on the Fapla positions and then 61 Mech
manoeuvred behind them. The going was rough
in the bush and they ended up on the enemy's
flank instead of directly behind them. After a
sharp engagement in the bush, the Ratels
withdrew again because they simply could not
see the enemy and were drawing a lot of artillery
fire.
59 Brigade began to dig in and received
welcome supplies and reinforcements from 21
Brigade, which had now succeeded in laying a
mobile bridge over the Cunzumbia River. The
SADF, worried now that 47 Brigade would
manage to escape back across the river while 59
Brigade pushed forward against the thin South
African defence line, decided it was time to close
the trap they had been preparing.
3 October 1987 - the Decisive Battle
On 2 October the South African Recces reported
that 47 Brigade had managed to construct a
wooden road across the marshes which were
blocking their retreat to the Lomba River. Trucks,
missile carriers, armoured cars and tanks were
busy assembling at the treeline, preparing to
make an orderly retreat across the road.
The Recces watched from their vantage points in
nearby trees and called in artillery fire on Fapla
while the SADF combat groups worked furiously
to get ready and into position.
The first Fapla vehicles to try to cross were Soviet
Sam-9s. One crossed to safety but the Recces
guided artillery fire onto the second as it tried to
cross, destroying it and effectively blocking the
bridge. The Fapla troops sent a T-55 tank to try
and move it out of the way, but without success.
Every time Fapla tried to make a move the Recces
would call in highly accurate artillery salvoes. For
48 hours without sleep or rest the Recces stood
guard over Fapla's escape route, calling in artillery
fire at the slightest movement, until at last they
heard the distant rumble that announced the
arrival of the armoured cars of 61 Mechanised
Battalion.
The Ratels of 61 Mech had a variety of
armaments, from infantry carriers with 20mm
guns to the tank-busting 90mm gun. Unita
troops had by now positioned themselves to the
south-east of 47 Brigade in case they tried to
break away in that direction.
Fapla artillery began to bombard the
approaching Ratels and Migs flew overhead to
lend support and cover 47 Brigade's escape. The
Ratels went in to attack. Fapla, accustomed to
seeing Unita beat a hasty retreat whenever their
tanks appeared, tried the same tactic and sent
their tanks towards the SADF positions. To their
dismay the South Africans' reaction was the exact
opposite - they attacked. The Ratels raced for the
tanks, surrounding them and dodging back and
forth until they could get behind them and shoot
at the comparatively vulnerable rear ends of the
tanks.
Major Laurence Maree, second-in-command of 61
Mech, later told the British journalist and author,
Fred Bridgland:
"I can't tell you how much courage it takes in a
Ratel driver and gunner when a tank is charging
towards them to summon up the will to stop still
for long enough to stabilise their firing platform
and get their round off. [Unlike a T54/55 tank,
which has built-in stabilisers and can fire on the
move, a Ratel, like other armoured cars, can only
fire from a static position]. Of course, as soon as
they'd fired, off they sprinted like Turbo-charged
hares. One of our guys died that afternoon facing
down a T-55 in his Ratel. A 100mm shell from the
tank skipped up from the sandy ground and went
right through the turret. The Ratel commander,
Lieutenant Hind, was terribly wounded and he
died later. We had two others very seriously
wounded that day, and another three with light
wounds. The medics just pulled the shrapnel out
of those who were slightly hurt, cleaned up the
wounds, and they went straight back into
combat." (1)
The Fapla troops, although outgunning the South
Africans and outnumbering them 4 to 1, began to
lose their nerve and one of the battalions
suddenly made a break towards the river. They
streamed across the open grassland towards the
river in an undisciplined mob and the South
Africans brought down MRL fire and high-
explosive mortar shells on them. A second
battalion also broke and ran for the river, with the
Ratels chasing them. Approximately 100 vehicles
were now jostling to try and reach the bridge by
way of the wooden road. Recces directed artillery
fire from the G-5s onto them, causing havoc. The
area was now a wasteland of shattered trees and
burnt grass from the shells and shrapnel from
both sides.
Migs piloted by Cubans flew some 60 sorties that
day, dropping bombs and trying to strafe the
South African positions, but they were wildly
inaccurate and had little effect.
Fapla tanks made an effort to recover some of
the abandoned vehicles, but were themselves
destroyed by the pinpoint accuracy of the G-5
artillery fire. When the firing finally stopped at the
end of the day over 600 Fapla soldiers lay dead
on that stretch of open ground and 127 Fapla
vehicles stood destroyed or abandoned near the
river.
On the morning of 4 October the South Africans
were able to survey the remnants on the
battlefield. Recovery teams were sent in to
salvage whatever was still usable and the SADF
generals were delighted to hear that their troops
were able to salvage intact one of the Sam-8
missile systems, complete with missiles, radar and
logistics vehicles, the first example of this highly-
effective Soviet weapon ever to be captured by a
western country.
The remnants of 21 and 59 Brigades had joined
forces and were trying to reorganize. A few
firefights broke out as the SADF and Unita troops
moved across the battlefield to salvage
equipment. A few inexperienced Unita soldiers
almost caused havoc as they attempted to drive
off the undamaged tanks.
The South Africans intercepted messages from
Russian commanders ordering the Fapla Migs and
troops to make an all-out effort to destroy the
abandoned equipment, but by then the South
Africans had moved the Sam-8 system back
behind their positions and had it well
camouflaged. Unita later tried to claim the Sam-8
for itself with a view to passing it on to the
Americans, but South Africa, recalling the way
America had abandoned its allies in Angola,
refused and retained the missile system for its
own arms research.
October to December 1987 - The Last Phase
After the battle was over mopping up operations
continued on both sides. South African observers
watched in disgust as Fapla soldiers shot many of
their own wounded where they lay because they
were unable to evacuate them or give them
medical care. At the end of the day the South
African commander, Deon Ferreira, sent a
message to HQ that their mission had been
accomplished and that the Angolan/Cuban
advance on Mavinga had been stopped. His new
orders were to clear all remnants of the enemy
forces from the eastern side of the River Cuito and
establish positions from which they would be able
to prevent any further crossings into Unita
territory. No mention was made of capturing
Cuito Cuanavale itself. The SADF did, however,
want to be in a position from which they could
shell the airfield and neutralise the base as a
starting point for a new offensive. Cuito allowed
the Cuban Migs easy access to Unita territory and
if it was destroyed the Migs would have to move
175 kilometres to the west.
The G5 artillery groups were moved up and
commenced bombarding Cuito. The SAAF sent in
4 Mirages as a decoy and while the Migs were
being rolled out of their reinforced concrete
hangars the G-5s pounded the runway with
shells. Within a short space of time the airfield
was destroyed and the remaining Migs were
forced to move back to Menongue.
Stinger missiles were also used to good effect by
Unita and two Cuban pilots were taken prisoner
after their Mig had been shot down.
The Cuban/Faplan offensive had failed. Later the
Cubans tried to save face and boost their
demoralized troops by claiming loudly that they
had won the "Battle for Cuito Cuanavale", which
they claimed to have successfully defended
against all South African attacks!
Throughout the campaign the South Africans,
mindful of the fact that they were involved in an
undeclared war and without allies in the west,
refrained from making any public statements on
the progress of the war. This gave the Cubans
and Angolans the advantage in the propaganda
war. The SADF could not reveal that it only had a
small combat force of less than 3000 lightly-
armed troops in Angola, as this would have
revealed their weaknesses to the enemy. The
superior training and tactics of the SADF had
convinced the Cubans and Angolans that they
were facing a large, heavily-armed force.
As Chester Crocker later wrote:
"In early October the Soviet-Fapla offensive was
smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga. It
turned into a headlong retreat over the 120 miles
back to the primary launching point at Cuito
Cuanavale. In some of the bloodiest battles of the
entire civil war, a combined force of some 8,000
Unita fighters and 4,000 SADF troops destroyed
one Fapla brigade and mauled several others out
of a total Fapla force of some 18,000 engaged in
the three-pronged offensive. Estimates of Fapla
losses ranged upward of 4,000 killed and
wounded. This offensive had been a Soviet
conception from start to finish. Senior Soviet
officers played a central role in its execution. Over
a thousand Soviet advisers were assigned to
Angola in 1987 to help with Moscow's largest
logistical effort to date in Angola: roughly $1.5
billion in military hardware was delivered that
year. Huge quantities of Soviet equipment were
destroyed or fell into Unita and SADF hands when
Fapla broke into a disorganized retreat... The
1987 military campaign represented a stunning
humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its
strategy. It would take Fapla a year, or maybe
two, to recover and regroup. Moreover the
Angolan military disaster threatened to go from
bad to worse. As of mid-November, the Unita/
SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale
airfield and pinned down thousands of Fapla's
best remaining units clinging onto the town's
defensive perimeters." (2)
The results of the campaign up to April 1988
were 4,785 killed on the Cuban/Faplan side, with
94 tanks and hundreds of combat vehicles
destroyed, against 31 South Africans killed in
action, 3 tanks destroyed (SADF tanks entered
the war after the Lomba River campaign) and 11
SADF armoured cars and troop carriers lost. A
total of 9 Migs were destroyed and only 1 SAAF
Mirage shot down.
After 13 years in Angola the Cubans had still not
achieved their aim of destroying Unita and
marching into Namibia as "liberators". They had
badly underestimated the South Africans and
discovered to their cost that they were facing
highly-trained, battle-hardened troops. If they
had taken the trouble to examine South Africa's
military history, they might perhaps have paused
for thought at the fact that the forefathers of
these troops, the Boers, had held the full might of
the British Empire at bay during the Boer War,
when 450,000 British troops took three years to
subdue a force of little more than 20,000 Boers.

so your tiny brain couldn't summarize this article. shame

2smooth2shout:

stop weeping about our missile program na. fact is Nigeria is working to perfect it' missile technology and have tested many.
unlike your military that doesn't have secrets, Nigerian military is one of the most secretive in the world. we weren't aware of the APC, Defense boat, etc until they were unveiled. that's how secretive they are so don't expect more info than what you've goten so far about our missile programs.

"missile program"......you mean fireworks.

"pefect it's missile technology".....you mean buy more fireworks.

I'll come back to this forum in 2065 when you've developed the expertise to design and build anti submarine missiles. Keep lying to yourselves. Your Generals make big wonderful statements to impress illiterates, but behind the scenes there's not much going on. Who was the General in the air force who said a Nigerian built UAV was the first for Africa? Probably 99% of Nigerians believed him, now they're on other forums telling the world that Nigeria is the leader in UAV technology on the continent. Keep lying to yourselves.

Mike..ZA:
You're a Nigerian.

did he mention he's a Togolese? you are stup1d

2smooth2shout:

stop weeping about our missile program na. fact is Nigeria is working to perfect it' missile technology and have tested many.
unlike your military that doesn't have secrets, Nigerian military is one of the most secretive in the world. we weren't aware of the APC, Defense boat, etc until they were unveiled. that's how secretive they are so don't expect more info than what you've goten so far about our missile programs.

419 brain is too small to develop missiles. We want a link to convince us.